Concept
Out-of-Court Statements
What is hearsay
Out-of-Court Statements
Rule 801(c)(1) fixes where a statement must have been made: the declarant must not have made it “while testifying at the current trial or hearing.”1 “Out of court” is only shorthand for that requirement. It covers any statement other than one a witness gives, under oath, on the stand, as testimony in the proceeding where it is offered.2 Testimony in the current proceeding arrives under oath, before the factfinder, and open to cross-examination. A statement made anywhere else arrives without those safeguards. The element therefore asks one question of every statement a party offers: did the declarant make it as a witness in this proceeding?
The question arises only for a statement, which is an utterance intended to communicate something.3 A truck driver who rolls into an intersection probably does not intend to assert that the light has turned green, so his conduct is not a statement, and whether it was made in court never comes up.4
The label “out of court” misleads in one respect, because the courthouse is irrelevant. Technically, a statement made anywhere other than from the stand in the present trial is hearsay when offered for its truth.5 Testimony given in a courtroom at some other trial qualifies, and so, ordinarily, does a statement that a testifying witness made before trial.6
The test looks to the occasion on which the words were spoken, so the declarant’s availability plays no part in it. Availability enters the Rules only through the exceptions, where Rule 803 applies without regard to it and Rule 804 requires that the declarant be unavailable.7 A statement made outside the current testimony is hearsay whether or not the declarant can be found, and even if the declarant later takes the stand.8 The Rules relieve only narrow categories of a testifying witness’s prior statements. Rule 801(d)(1) defines them as not hearsay, a departure from the common law.9 The first subsection below applies the element to the ordinary case, in which someone other than the witness made the statement. The second takes up the witness’s own earlier statement, where students most often assume that live testimony cures the problem.
Absent Declarants
The ordinary out-of-court problem involves a person other than the witness. Someone speaks or writes outside the proceeding, and later a witness on the stand repeats the words, or a party offers the document that holds them. “Absent declarant” means a declarant who is not testifying when the words come in. That person may be across the country, may be dead, or may be sitting in the gallery.
Two statements sit inside every problem of this kind. The first is the witness’s account on the stand, given under oath, before the jury, and open to cross-examination. The second is the earlier statement that the account reports, made at another time and place without those protections.10 Rule 801(c)(1) tests the second. Cross-examination can reach the first: whether the declarant said the words, how the conversation went, whether the witness heard correctly. It cannot reach what lies behind the declarant’s words, because the witness cannot say what the declarant saw, remembered, or meant.
The farmer’s lawyer can press the adjuster on which words the son used, how the conversation began, and whether he sounded sure. The adjuster cannot tell the lawyer whether the son ever looked at the light, how he judged that it had been out for some time, or whether he had a reason to help the trucker. Only the son can answer those questions, and he has not been asked.
The two scenes differ only in the capacity in which the son spoke. In the first, the jury hears his belief through the adjuster, who can vouch only that the words were spoken. In the second, the jury hears it from the person who holds it, with the protections that testimony carries.
A declarant who sits in the courtroom does not escape the label. The farmer’s son could watch the adjuster testify from the back row, and his earlier remark would still be out of court, because the element turns on whether he spoke as a witness, under oath, on the stand, in this proceeding.11 Tying the element to the proceeding and not to the building closes an obvious loophole. If a statement counted as in court because it was made inside the courthouse, a party could have a declarant repeat the words in a hallway or in the gallery, with no oath, no cross-examination, and no observation by the factfinder, and then claim the rule was satisfied.
A written statement works the same way, except that the party usually offers the document itself, so only one layer, the author’s, reaches the jury. The author did not write the words while testifying at the current trial, so the element is met.12 Meeting it proves only half of the definition, because the statement must also be offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.13 A statement can be out of court and still fall outside the rule. An officer who explains that he went to a location because of a radio call is offering the call to explain what he did, not to prove what it said. If he goes further and repeats specific complaints against the accused, the jury is likely to treat the content as true, and Rule 403 may require exclusion.14 A statement that meets both halves of the definition can still come in under an exemption or an exception, and it must also satisfy relevance, authenticity, and, when the contents of a document are to be proved, the Original Writing Rule.15
A criminal case adds a constitutional question that the hearsay definition does not answer, which is whether admitting an absent declarant’s statement violates the Confrontation Clause. That inquiry turns on whether the statement is testimonial. Crawford left open what confrontation test, if any, governs nontestimonial hearsay, but Davis appears to reject any application of the Clause to nontestimonial statements and to treat the testimonial concept as the perimeter of the right, not merely its core.16
A Witness’s Own Prior Statements
A witness who spoke before trial is two things for hearsay purposes: a witness now and a declarant then. Rule 801(c)(1) looks to the occasion on which the words were spoken, so the earlier words do not become testimony because their speaker has since taken the oath.18 A statement a testifying witness made before trial is ordinarily hearsay when it is offered for its truth, and the Federal Rules endorse the common law view that prior statements of a witness offered for their truth are hearsay.19
The roommate said both things, about the same subject, and only the second is hearsay. The occasion alone separates them. Unless the April remark fits an exemption or an exception, the factfinder may not treat it as proof that the rent went unpaid, and that limit holds in bench trials as well as jury trials.20
The remark is not useless to the landlord. A prior inconsistent statement may be introduced to attack the witness’s credibility.21 That use does not depend on the remark being true. It matters only that the roommate has given two accounts that cannot both be right. A party who needs the remark as proof of its contents gets nothing from it, and a prosecution built on a recanting witness shows the cost. Suppose the witness denies the conduct at trial and her earlier unsworn statements to the police are the only evidence of it. The statements may impeach her but cannot prove the conduct, and the judge should grant the defense motion for judgment of acquittal.22 An oath at the earlier proceeding would not change the label either, because sworn testimony at an earlier trial still counts as out of court.23
The same reasoning reaches a witness who quotes himself. A painter who once told a homeowner that a fixture came from a particular manufacturer is the declarant of that remark. If he later testifies, “I told her it was made by that manufacturer,” offered to prove who made it, he is repeating his own out-of-court statement.24 A painter who testifies instead to what he saw while working is telling the jury something he perceived, not something he once said, and no hearsay problem arises.25
Why treat a witness’s own earlier words as hearsay when the speaker stands ready to explain them? Two arguments support the rule. The first concerns cross-examination. At trial a witness may be less willing to change or criticize an account than when it was first given, and a witness who denies making the statement or claims no memory of it forecloses questions about why it was made.26 The second concerns manufactured evidence. If a witness’s earlier statements were generally admissible, well-organized parties would record interviews with prospective witnesses, with no cross-examination at the time, and offer the records at trial.27
The Rules nonetheless make some room. Rule 801(d)(1) treats selected types of witness statements as outside the hearsay definition under particular circumstances, and a later section examines those categories.28 Jurisdictions draw the line in different places. California, for example, also admits prior consistent statements that predate any prior inconsistent statement the opponent introduces, regardless of motive to fabricate, and it does so for both substantive and credibility purposes.29 Outside whatever category applies, the rule stays the same: a witness who is present, sworn, and subject to cross-examination has not thereby avoided a hearsay problem, because the definition asks when the words were spoken.30