Concept
Statement and Declarant
What is hearsay
Statement and Declarant
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as a statement that the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing and that a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.1 A plainer version of the same test describes a person's words that were meant to describe something that happened, that were spoken before the hearing, and that are repeated in court to prove it happened.2 Either way the test has three working parts: a statement, made outside the current testimony, offered for its truth. The first part comes first because it can end the analysis, and this unit builds it from two defined terms, statement and declarant.
Rule 801(a) defines a statement as a person's oral assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion, and Rule 801(b) defines the declarant as the person who made the statement.3 Two features of that wording carry most of the weight. A person must make the statement, and the person's words or conduct count only if the person meant them as an assertion. To assert, in this field, means only to say that something is so, as when someone says that an event happened or that a condition existed; the word implies no force or confidence.4 A mild remark that the light was red asserts exactly what a shout to the same effect would.
Both features track the testimonial infirmities discussed earlier in the chapter. A person who means to tell someone that something is so can misperceive, forget, choose misleading words, or lie, and the listener cannot test any of it. Lies are more likely when the declarant intends to communicate a fact or idea, so the danger of insincerity shrinks when someone acts without that intent.5 The Advisory Committee meant everything outside the definition to fall outside hearsay: out-of-court conduct is not hearsay if it is not an assertion, and even an assertion is not hearsay unless it is offered to prove the truth of what it asserts.6
Finding a statement and a declarant answers only the first question, because even an undoubted statement escapes the rule when a party offers it for some purpose other than its truth. An officer who explains why he went to a crime scene by saying that he received a radio call to proceed there is not offering the call as proof of anything it asserted, and the testimony is not hearsay.7 A witness's account of a telephone conversation she overheard can likewise show a defendant's knowledge, an element of the offense, without proving the truth of what was said.8 The limit is that an officer who goes on to repeat definite complaints against the accused invites the jury to treat them as proof of the facts asserted, and Rule 403 can then exclude the content absent special circumstances.9 A later unit takes up the purpose question in full; here the task is to identify statements and declarants correctly.
The subsections that follow sort the situations that test the first requirement. Spoken and written words come first, then nonverbal conduct, where the actor's intent to assert draws the line. Conduct never meant as a message, machines and animals that cannot make statements at all, and words that reveal what the speaker never meant to say come after that. The rest of Rule 801(c), that the statement was made outside the current testimony and is offered for its truth, completes the definition in the sections that follow this unit.
Words and Writings
Spoken and written words are the paradigm statements. Rule 801(a) names a person's oral assertion and written assertion first, and Rule 801(b) makes the person who made either one the declarant.10 Words lead the list because a speaker or writer who chooses language to tell someone that something is so puts every testimonial infirmity in play, including a deliberate falsehood. Working a problem therefore takes two steps: find the statement, then find the person who made it.
A written statement reaches the courtroom as a document, with no witness repeating what was said.11 A hospital record showing that morphine was administered is the standard example. Offered to prove that a patient received morphine, the entry is relevant, but it is also a written out-of-court statement conveying that idea, and the purpose of offering it is to establish that the idea is true.12 Digital records follow the same path, because hearsay problems are generally the same for hardcopy and digital records.13 In an age discrimination case, for instance, the plaintiff may offer an email from the company's chief executive to the board announcing, 'We had to fire everyone over forty because they are very expensive and we need to project a younger more vibrant image.' The email is an out-of-court statement whose probative value depends on its truth, so it is hearsay, although it is likely an admission of a party, one of the categories that Rule 801 exempts.14
A book can be a statement just as an email can. Suppose a plaintiff who contends that an ingredient called xanadite is dangerous offers the autobiography of a former employee of the defendant company, in which the author says that it is. The book is an out-of-court statement, and its only relevance is to support the very fact it asserts, so it is hearsay and stays out unless it qualifies as an opposing party's statement. It does not qualify, because the author wrote it after retiring, and the Federal Rules definition requires that the statement be made during the course of the declarant's employment.15
The form of a sentence does not decide whether it asserts anything. Some courts exclude questions and commands from the definition almost categorically because they are not directly assertive, but the more careful opinions find such statements hearsay despite their form when the circumstances or wording show an intent to assert.16 Suppose a bystander at the scene of a collision says, 'What kind of driver just zooms across an intersection, even when the light is red?' If a witness repeats the question to prove that the light was red against Driver when he entered, some courts would call the words not hearsay because a question asserts nothing. The better analysis reads the question as equivalent to the assertion, 'Driver had the light against him when he entered the intersection,' and treats it as hearsay when offered to prove that.17 The bystander chose that sentence to convey a belief about the light, and the jury would be trusting the bystander's eyesight, memory, and honesty without any chance to test them. A question put only to obtain information, with no intent to assert, claims nothing.
Once the statement is identified, the declarant is the particular person who made it. Hearsay vocabulary gives two everyday words narrow meanings. The witness is the person who testifies in court, and the declarant is the person whose out-of-court words the witness repeats. Most hearsay problems contain both: an in-court account by a witness of an earlier statement by a declarant. Suppose a car owner sues a construction company, claiming that something fell from a building under construction and damaged his parked car. He calls a witness to say that a pedestrian who saw the event said later that an object fell from the building onto the car. The witness is a witness not to the accident but to the speaking. The pedestrian, who saw the accident but is not in court, is the declarant, and the testimony is hearsay and would be rejected. Had the pedestrian come to trial, he could have testified about his recollection of the event.18
Being a declarant does not depend on being unsworn or absent. Because 'out-of-court' covers any statement other than one made under oath before the factfinder in the same proceeding, testimony given in an earlier trial is also an out-of-court statement when offered in a later one.19 One person can also fill both roles. Suppose a painter testifies that last spring he told a homeowner, 'This is a Waybright fixture,' and the homeowner offers the testimony to prove who made the fixture. The painter made that remark, so he is its declarant even though he is also the witness. A painter who testifies instead to something he saw while working in the room is telling the jury what he perceived, which differs for hearsay purposes from telling what he once said.20 A later section returns to a witness's own prior statements.
Assertive Nonverbal Conduct
Rule 801(a) makes nonverbal conduct a statement only if the person intended it as an assertion.22 That intent condition sorts conduct, which means anything a person does besides speaking or writing, into two groups. A gesture the actor meant as a message is a statement. An act the actor performed for another reason is not, and the next section takes up that group. This section covers conduct that stands in for words.
The clearest cases are gestures that deliver information in place of speech. An employee directing traffic who waves cars forward on a green light and points them toward the open lane is plainly making assertions, and so is anyone who nods or shakes her head, points a finger at a person to designate or identify him, or uses sign language.23 A staged act can carry the same intent. A defendant who wants to persuade people that her hamburgers are safe prints a poster of herself and her daughter eating one, and in a later food poisoning suit the activity depicted counts as a statement, because it was meant to assert that the meat is safe.24
When conduct substitutes for words, all of the usual hearsay dangers attach.25 A person who nods may have misperceived the event, forgotten part of it, or meant something different from what the witness took the nod to mean, and the witness who describes the nod can be asked only what the witness saw. The intent condition has its own basis: lies are more likely when a declarant intends to communicate a fact or idea.26
The judge decides, under Rule 104(a), whether the actor intended the act as an assertion. The question can be difficult, because it may require deciding the actor's motive and even candor.27 The test is what the actor meant to convey, not what the conduct happens to reveal.
Finding assertive conduct satisfies only the first requirement of the definition. A witness who points at the defendant from the stand makes the gesture while testifying at the current trial, so Rule 801(c)(1) takes it outside the definition even though it is an intended assertion.28
Nonassertive Conduct
Most of what people do carries no message at all, yet what they do often shows what they believe. When a proponent offers such an act, the jury is asked to reason in two steps, from the act to the actor's belief and from the belief to the fact believed. Under the Federal Rules, nonassertive conduct offered for that two-step inference is not hearsay, because Rule 801(a) treats nonverbal conduct as a statement only if the actor intended it as an assertion.30
A ship captain supplies the standard illustration. To prove that a vessel was seaworthy, a party offers a witness who watched an experienced captain examine the ship in the morning and sail on it with his family after lunch.31 The jury is meant to reason that a captain who inspected the ship and then trusted his family to it must have believed it sound, and that a ship an expert believed sound was probably sound. The captain, however, was making a voyage and telling no one anything about the ship. Sailing is conduct meant to accomplish something, not to communicate, so the witness's account is not hearsay. If the witness instead testifies that the captain once said, 'This is a fine ship,' the same belief reaches the jury in words, and those words are hearsay when offered to prove the ship's soundness.32
The drafters weighed the testimonial infirmities differently for words and for conduct. A speaker is always conscious that his words concern their topic, so a person who wanted to mislead about the ship would do it in speech. An actor may not realize that others will read his act as showing what he believes, and it is less clear that anyone would shape an act to create a false impression. Acts also expose the actor to consequences, and a captain who sails an unsound ship stakes his own safety and his family's on the belief the jury is asked to infer.33 Sincerity is the infirmity most affected, and the drafters treated it as the most important. The others are often minimized as well: the captain inspected the ship himself and acted on what he found within hours, so faulty perception and faulty memory are both unlikely.34
The usual error on these facts is to reason that the conduct matters only through the actor's belief and therefore must be hearsay. That chain of inference describes how the evidence works, which is a question of relevance. Rule 801(a) asks a different question, whether the actor meant to assert the belief.
Under the Federal Rules the decisive issue is the driver's intent, not whether his movement supports an inference about what he believed.35 Had he called out that the light was green, his words would be hearsay if offered to prove it. The conduct and the words support the same two-step inference, but only the words are hearsay.36 Change the facts and the answer changes too: a driver who taps his horn and waves an arm toward the crossing to tell a waiting motorist that the light has changed is using conduct as a substitute for words, and a witness's description of that signal is hearsay when offered to prove the light was green.
Sitting in a particular waiting room is conduct of the same kind as the truck's movement. Suppose the question is whether an insured had arthritis, and a witness testifies that she saw the insured sitting in the waiting room of an arthritis clinic. That testimony is not hearsay, even though testimony that the insured once said, 'I have arthritis,' would be. Sitting in the waiting room was not a statement and was not conduct meant to convey information, so it falls outside the hearsay definition.37
The same reasoning reaches reactions. Screams of pain, outbursts of laughter, singing a song, and uttering or writing an expletive are oral or written conduct not intended as an assertion, and such conduct is not hearsay, although any of them can be meant as an assertion in a particular setting.38 In People v. Gwinn, the court treated a victim's screaming and crying on seeing the defendant's likeness as nonassertive conduct, not a statement.39 In Cole, a bank teller who turned pale and shook during a robbery was likewise reacting, and testimony about her condition, offered to prove that the robbers intimidated bank personnel, was not hearsay.40
The Federal Rules reached this position by rejecting an older one. At common law, a statement or conduct was hearsay whenever it was offered to prove the truth of what the speaker or actor implied. In Wright v. Tatham, letters written to a testator implied the writers' belief that he was competent, so they were hearsay.41 That broad definition prevailed for years in England and throughout the United States, until Judson Falknor's argument persuaded the framers of Rule 801 to confine hearsay to conduct the actor intended as an assertion. Most American states follow the same path, though Wright's broad approach survived longer in England.42 The captain's voyage, which was hearsay at common law, is therefore not hearsay under the Federal Rules. Wright itself involved words, not gestures, and the dispute returns when words are offered to prove something the speaker did not assert, which the next section takes up.43
Machines and Animals
Hearsay is a kind of statement, a statement is a person's assertion, and the declarant is the person who made it, so evidence with no human source falls outside the definition before any other element comes into play.45 Radar units, heart monitors, surveillance cameras, and clocks therefore do not make hearsay statements, and neither does a tracking dog that follows an accused's scent from the scene of a crime to his hiding place or a parrot that calls out the accused's name.46
Suppose an officer testifies that a radar unit displayed 40 miles per hour as the defendant's car passed, and the prosecution offers the testimony to prove the car's speed. The display is no one's statement, so the hearsay rule has nothing to exclude. A handler who testifies that a bloodhound tracked the defendant's scent invites the argument that the handler is quoting the dog, and the argument fails for the same reason, since a dog is not a person. A parrot that calls out 'Mistress killed the victim!' makes no statement because it intends to assert nothing, and a clock may tell us the time without stating it.47
The hearsay dangers are human failings. A person can misperceive an event, forget part of it, choose misleading words, or lie, and the oath and cross-examination answer those failings. Machines, parrots, and bloodhounds cannot be cross-examined and cannot take an oath, so the hearsay rule has no tool for testing them.48 Evidence derived from a device or an animal is tested for reliability in another way, by cross-examining the people who know the device's operating principles and particular features or the animal's training and history.49 Judges may sometimes exclude such evidence, but not because of the hearsay rule.50
The analysis changes when a person's assertion passes through a device. A freeway sign that flashes '10 minutes to downtown' makes no statement so long as it operates automatically. If a person at a remote computer types the message for the sign to display, the writing is a statement, because the operator intended to communicate the travel time and the machine intended nothing.51 A recording device works the same way: its output has no declarant, but the person whose words it captures does.
The working question for any machine or animal problem is therefore who made the statement. If no person stands behind the output, the hearsay analysis ends there. If a person spoke, wrote, or typed what the device records or displays, that person is the declarant, and the statement still has to be tested against the other requirements of the definition.
Implied Assertions
Words raise a puzzle that conduct does not, because one sentence can say one thing and reveal another. A caller who places a bet reveals what he believes about the number he dialed, though he says nothing about it. The unstated proposition that a jury is invited to infer is an implied assertion, and Rule 801(a) sorts it by asking whether the speaker intended to communicate it.53 The rule treats oral and written conduct as it treats nonverbal conduct: if the person did not intend an assertion, the conduct is not hearsay.54 Before admitting words on that circumstantial basis, the judge should be satisfied that the declarant did not intend to assert the proposition said to be implied.55
The common-law rule drew the line elsewhere. Under it, a statement or conduct was hearsay whenever it was offered to prove the truth of what the speaker or actor implied, and the letters in Wright show the rule applied to words, since letters to the testator implied the writers' belief in his competence. A federal court would classify the same letters as nonhearsay, because the writers apparently meant to communicate business and social matters and not their belief in his competence. Under the Federal Rules, a statement offered for the truth of what it implies rather than expresses is hearsay only if the declarant intended to communicate the implication.56 Because Wright itself involved words, modern courts still sometimes invoke its broad view when words are offered to prove points the speaker did not directly assert.57
This is the setting of United States v. Zenni, where the government offered calls of this kind to show that the callers believed the premises were used in betting operations.58 The callers were simply placing their bets. The proposition that the house is used for gambling was implied but not intentionally asserted, and implied assertions are not hearsay under Rule 801 unless they are intentional.59 The same reasoning explains why statements giving directions, such as 'slow down' or 'check that person for a gun,' are ordinarily not hearsay.60
The intent test rests on the testimonial infirmities. A speaker who wanted to create a false impression about a subject would naturally speak about that subject, so someone who misstates one thing in order to mislead about another is a remote possibility.61 When the declarant was not focused on the proposition for which the statement is offered, the danger of insincerity shrinks, because intentional assertions are more likely to be lies than unintended implications.62 The other dangers are sometimes minimized as well, but insincerity is the one the intent test reduces most reliably.63
The result reverses when the words answer the very question the proponent wants answered. If an officer interviewing a caller to such a house asks whether it is used for gambling, and the caller answers, 'You know how people like to gamble these days,' the answer is hearsay when offered to prove the house was used for gambling, even though it never names the house or says that gambling occurs there.64 The caller meant to tell the officer that the house was used for gambling, so the proposition is one he intended to assert.
How close the implied proposition sits to the express words is the practical clue to intent. When a declarant calls someone a 'dirty, lying cheat' and the issue is whether she disliked him, you can certainly argue that the remark is equivalent to 'I hate him' and is therefore offered for its truth. Statements clothed in metaphor, irony, or sarcasm work the same way, because the speaker plainly asserts something other than the literal words.65
Intent is measured one proposition at a time. Suppose an inspector said something about a repairman named Maintainer. Offered to prove that the inspector had heard of Maintainer or that Maintainer had worked on the machine, her words are not hearsay, because those ideas are unintended implications of what she said. Offered to prove what she actually asserted about him, the same words would be hearsay. When the words are ambiguous, the court considers how important the statement is and how serious the testimonial infirmities are, and ambiguous words that are the proponent's only proof on a crucial issue tend to be excluded.66
Most courts follow the intent approach of Zenni, while a minority, represented by State v. Dullard, takes a different approach.67 Under the Federal Rules, the declarant's intent controls. The judge decides that intent as a preliminary question under Rule 104(a), and the inquiry can be hard, because it may require deciding the declarant's motive and honesty.68 The judge looks to the wording and the circumstances, including whether the words answer a question about the subject, because more careful opinions find words hearsay despite their form when those show an intent to assert.69
These classification puzzles are less consequential than they look. Deciding whether a borderline statement is hearsay usually has no practical significance, because exceptions to the exclusionary rule often admit the statement anyway, and a statement that is not hearsay needs no exception.70 The number of exemptions and exceptions limits the occasions on which a judge must draw a fine line between hearsay and nonhearsay, and there is no practical reason to draw one if the evidence is admissible either way.71 A victim's statement identifying the driver who struck him, for instance, is hearsay when offered to prove who drove into him, yet the excited utterance exception can admit it because it relates to a startling event or condition.72