Concept
Common-Law Completeness
Completeness rule
Common-Law Completeness
Rule 106 is the fast route to completeness: when a party introduces part of a statement, the adverse party may require, at that time, any other part or statement that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.1 The older common-law doctrine is the slower route, and it survives beside the rule. The Federal Rules do not expressly codify that facet of completeness, but the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision in Beech Aircraft keeps it available.2
The common-law version leaves the order of proof with the proponent. She may prove whatever part she desires, and the opponent cannot force her to broaden her questioning of the witness. The opponent’s opening comes when she turns the witness over for questioning, and then the opponent may elicit the other parts relevant to the same topic.3 The measure is relevance to the topic. The further showing of a misleading impression belongs to Rule 106, which goes beyond the common-law rule by letting the opponent demand that the proponent expand her questioning to avoid creating one.4
That later turn arrives on cross-examination or redirect, where a traditional rule confines the examiner to the subjects raised in the preceding examination. Trial judges, however, have broad discretion to depart from that rule and from other traditional practices regarding the order of proof.5
Beech Aircraft shows the doctrine at work. The Court called the principle “a reaffirmation of the obvious”: when one party has used a portion of a document so that misunderstanding or distortion can be averted only by presenting another portion, the material required for completeness is ipso facto relevant and therefore admissible under Rules 401 and 402. Refusing to admit the proffered completion evidence was a clear abuse of discretion.6 The stated ground was relevance, so the case is best cited for the proposition that completing material is relevant and admissible. The principle is also not limited to writings or recordings. It could apply to statements that were neither written nor recorded and to other sorts of evidence, and trial courts have authority under Rules 401 through 403 and 611 to apply it to such proof.7
Two worries explain why the routes differ in speed. A fragment can leave a false first impression, and a later, separate reading of the omitted parts may not fully correct it, because the distortion can linger and work its influence at the subconscious level. Against that stands the danger of requiring the whole to be offered, which can waste time and clutter the record with passages that have no bearing on the controversy.8 The common-law version lets the proponent choose and defers the opponent’s answer. The policy argument for Rule 106 is that, to guard against an ineradicable first impression, the adversary needs an additional right to require the proponent to introduce both the part she wants and the other passages that are an essential part of its context.9 The contrast is easy to state. Rule 106 acts at that time but is tied to essential context, and the party invoking it must specify the omitted portion that supposedly supplies that context. The common-law right acts later but needs only relevance to the same topic.10
In practice the line between “at that time” and “later” blurs. A Wyoming court observed that a literal application of its Rule 106 might require the balance of a document to come in during the cross-examination of a police officer. That approach, it said, could interfere with the orderly presentation of evidence, and courts generally find compliance when the opposing party presents the relevant portions on redirect.11 Wyoming authority also marks a limit on breadth. The court held it was error to admit an entire fifteen-page statement that summarized much of the victim’s earlier testimony, because most of it was irrelevant to the areas the defense had addressed on cross-examination and the victim had already testified fully, though the trial court arguably had discretion to admit portions.12 A shared topic opens the door to the relevant parts and not to the whole document.
Relevance to the same topic does not settle every question. The last sentence of Rule 106 lets the adverse party complete over a hearsay objection and mentions no other objection, and the Beech Aircraft ground was relevance under Rules 401 and 402.13 A completing passage that draws an objection of a different kind, such as privilege, therefore leaves the judge a separate ruling to make.
Because the routes differ in speed, in breadth, and in the objections they leave open, a completeness problem yields to four questions asked in order.
The second step does the sorting. A passage that supplies essential context justifies interrupting now, while a passage that only adds to the topic waits for the opponent’s turn. Treating Rule 106 as the only route wrongly concludes that an opponent who stayed seated has lost the chance to complete. Treating the common-law right as a pass for the whole document ignores both the topic limit and any separate objection.