Concept
Applying the Fairness Standard
Completeness rule
Applying the Fairness Standard
Rule 106 lets the adverse party require the introduction of any other part of a statement, or any other statement, that “in fairness ought to be considered at the same time” as the part already introduced.1 Earlier sections covered the trigger, the statements covered, the timing, and the hearsay override. Those parts settle whether a party may demand completion and when. The fairness phrase settles what the demand can reach, and it decides nearly every contested completeness dispute.
The rule lists no qualifying material, so courts apply the phrase one fragment at a time. Three questions organize the work, in the order a judge would ask them. First, does the omitted material explain or correct the fragment the jury has heard? A fragment’s capacity to mislead is the harm the rule exists to cure, and material with no bearing on the fragment goes no further. Second, does the demand stay within what the correction needs? “Any other part” sounds broad, but the fairness clause confines it to passages that answer the distortion. Third, who makes the call, and what else still applies? The trial judge decides, the decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and Rule 403 operates alongside Rule 106.
Context and Explanation
The first question asks how the omitted material connects to what the jury heard. Courts built the answer from the harm the rule prevents. In United States v. Coplan, the Second Circuit, quoting an earlier decision, framed the test by purpose: an omitted portion must be placed in evidence if necessary to explain the admitted portion, to place it in context, to avoid misleading the jury, or to ensure a fair and impartial understanding of it.2 A secondary source asks whether the other material is needed to give a fair picture or to put the matter into proper context.3 Both describe material on the same subject as the fragment that explains, qualifies, denies, or counteracts what the fragment would otherwise suggest.
The test operates at the moment of introduction because of how a misleading fragment works. The original introduction misleads without immediate completion, even if the completing material would surface later, on cross-examination or in the other party’s case.4 Rule 106 therefore gives the opponent a right to demand that the proponent expand the questioning right away, a protection against “an ineradicable, false first impression.”5
Tying the test to meaning separates repair from additional proof. A fragment misleads when what it omits would change what it means. An omitted passage that explains or reverses the fragment cures that problem, because without it the jury cannot fairly understand what it heard. A passage that does neither adds nothing to the jury’s understanding of the fragment. Offering it is an effort to put in more evidence, and the ordinary evidence rules govern that effort.
Beech Aircraft v. Rainey supplies a clear example. The defense used part of a letter by Rainey in a way that could lead the jury to conclude that Rainey did not believe his theory of power failure and had developed it only later, for litigation. Because the trial court sustained an objection by defense counsel, Rainey’s counsel could not counteract that impression by presenting more of the letter on cross-examination.6 The rest of the letter would have changed what the excerpt seemed to mean, and for that reason the Supreme Court called the refusal to admit it a clear abuse of discretion.7
Ramirez v. State shows the same hinge in a criminal case. The defense cross-examined Officer Owen with comments drawn from at least nine pages of the victim’s fifteen-page statement, and the State then offered the whole statement. A concurring opinion would have upheld admitting all of it. The trial court, it reasoned, could find it fair to let the prosecution place the entire statement before the jury to avoid an implication that the victim had fabricated her testimony.8 The opinion added that the rule prevents the use of comments out of context, and that receiving the evidence, even where it duplicates the witness’s trial testimony in many respects, appropriately balances an attempt by the accused to gain an unfair advantage.9 The majority disagreed about the size of the remedy, as the next section explains.
The completing material need not sit in the same document as the fragment. A follow-up e-mail or letter, or a whole chain of correspondence including replies, can supply the context that a single message lacks.10 Magellan International Corp. v. Salzgitter Handel, discussed earlier in the chapter, is an example: the party that relied on selected letters could not keep out other letters that filled in the picture the selected ones left. The same test also marks where completion stops, and the next section takes up that limit.
Run the context inquiry in four moves, because each one depends on the one before it.
The second step carries the practical burden. The party invoking the rule must specify the omitted portion that serves as essential, integral context for the part the other side offered.11 A demand for a named passage can be tested against the fragment; a demand for “the rest” cannot. The judge decides whether the passage supplies fair context, and the next two sections take up how far the judge may trim a qualifying passage and how Rule 403 bears on the call.
Relevance and Scope Limits
“Any other part” sounds like an invitation to demand the whole, and the fairness clause withdraws the invitation.13 Completion repairs distortion, so the distortion the fragment created sets the amount that comes in. Beech Aircraft shows how the two fit together: when one party’s use of part of a document produces misunderstanding or distortion that only another portion can avert, the material needed for completeness is relevant for that reason and is admissible under Rules 401 and 402.14 The converse follows. Material that answers no distortion draws no help from the rule, and Coplan said so directly: the rule does not require the admission of portions of a statement that are neither explanatory of nor relevant to the admitted passages.15
This limit separates two questions that students tend to run together. Whether a passage helps the party offering it concerns the passage’s effect on the case. Completeness concerns the passage’s effect on the fragment already heard. A passage can help the defense considerably and still leave the admitted words meaning what they meant before. In United States v. Bollin, the court of appeals agreed with the district court that the omitted testimony was not necessary to avoid misleading the jury or otherwise to place the admitted testimony in context. The fact that some of that testimony arguably was exculpatory did not, without more, make it admissible under the rule of completeness.16 Bollin applied the pre-amendment text, which covered “a writing or recorded statement.” Its reasoning about explanation and context carries over to the current rule, which reaches any “statement.”17
Ramirez v. State shows the limit applied inside a single statement, and it shows what happens when the response outruns the problem. After the defense cross-examined Officer Owen about parts of the victim’s statement, the trial court admitted all fifteen pages. The Wyoming Supreme Court’s majority held that admitting the whole was error. The document summarized much of the victim’s earlier testimony, most of it had nothing to do with the areas the defense raised on cross-examination, and she had already testified fully about the incident.18 The majority conceded that the trial court arguably could have admitted portions under Rule 106, so the defect lay in the size of the response and not in the idea of completion.19 The error was harmless because the other evidence of guilt was overwhelming.20
The two Ramirez opinions disagreed about how far the defense’s questioning reached. The concurring opinion counted comments from at least nine of the fifteen pages, while the majority saw most of the transcript as irrelevant to the areas the defense addressed.21 Once a court fixes the reach of the fragment’s suggestion, whatever lies beyond that reach falls outside the rule.
Coplan also shows why the 2023 amendment matters here. The defendants offered transcript portions under Rule 106, the district court excluded the deposition responses under the hearsay rule, and the Second Circuit found no abuse of discretion.22 The rule’s final sentence now lets the adverse party proceed over a hearsay objection, so a bare hearsay ground no longer defeats a qualifying request.23 What remains is the scope inquiry: does the passage explain or relate to the admitted one?
The limit applies equally when the omitted material is a separate statement. In State v. Manchester, the State introduced two recordings in their entirety, and a third recording, of a different conversation on a different date, could not be found. The Nebraska court found no abuse of discretion in admitting the first two. The defendant was free to cross-examine on them, both sides had to prove the third conversation through oral testimony, and neither was placed at a greater disadvantage. The admitted tapes were not severed from the third in a way that created the “out-of-context situation” the rule envisions.24 The court applied a Nebraska statute that left completion to the judge’s discretion and gave no automatic right, so the case illustrates the scope reasoning and not the federal text.25 Rule 106 does reach “any other statement,” but the same fairness question governs that reach, and a separate conversation comes in only when its absence would leave the offered statement out of context.26
Students who remember these cases only as exclusion cases make the opposite mistake. None of them lets a judge refuse a passage that corrects the fragment because the document is long or the proponent would rather leave the passage out. The Ramirez majority acknowledged that portions could come in under the rule.27 On a long exhibit, the sound answer sorts the requested passages one at a time. It admits those that change what the fragment means and refuses those that are cumulative, unrelated, or merely helpful.
Discretion and Rule 403
Rule 106 sets a standard and supplies no formula. Whether other material “in fairness ought to be considered at the same time” turns on what exactly was read, what the remainder says, how the examination has gone, and what impression the jury has already formed.29 The trial judge sees all of that in place, so the judge makes the call, and an appellate court reviews it for abuse of discretion.30 The earlier sections supplied the questions the judge asks. This section concerns who answers them, how far the answer is protected on appeal, and what else the judge may weigh.
Several of the decisions below come from state courts. A large majority of states have copied the Federal Rules, with some variation in specific provisions, so those decisions show the reasoning but do not construe the federal text.31
The concurring opinion in Ramirez v. State shows discretion at work. It reasoned that Rule 106, W.R.E., is invoked subject to Rule 403, so some applications of Rule 403 will lead a court not to receive the proffered completing evidence, and that a trial court must have ample discretion to decide which portions of a document are necessary to keep the admitted excerpts in context.32 On that view the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the whole statement. The defense cross-examination had covered comments from at least nine of the fifteen pages, no portion of the statement was inadmissible for any other reason, and the court could find it fair to put the entire statement before the jury to avoid an implication of fabrication.33 That result rested on the breadth of what the defense had used and on the absence of any independent objection. It did not hold that using part of a statement opens all of it. As the last section showed, the Ramirez majority took the opposite view of the same ruling. Deference moves the dispute to whether the call was reasonable on the record, and it does not end the dispute.
Rule 403 stays beside Rule 106 because completing material is still evidence, and supplying context does not exempt it from the costs evidence can carry. Rule 106 asks whether the remainder is needed to correct the impression the excerpt creates. Rule 403 asks whether what the remainder will cost the trial is out of proportion to its value, and in some cases that balancing will lead a court not to receive the proffered evidence.34 A remainder can be needed in part and still arrive bundled with repetitive or inflammatory pages, so the judge may admit the part that does the correcting and keep out the rest. The final sentence of the amended rule lets the adverse party proceed over a hearsay objection and says nothing about Rule 403, so that balancing remains available.35
Malcolm v. Evenflo Co., Inc. shows the two rules combining to defeat a request for completion. The plaintiffs’ expert, D’Aulerio, had collected Evenflo’s own quotations about cracks in a child seat’s shell from federal safety-standard (FMVSS 213) test reports. On cross-examination, Evenflo cited Rule 106 and offered the reports themselves, which showed that many of the seats complied with the standard despite the cracks and fractures.36 The Montana Supreme Court had already held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the compliance evidence more prejudicial than probative and likely to mislead or confuse the jury. It held that the trial court also did not abuse its discretion in denying the attempt to introduce the same evidence under Rule 106, which it called merely a different strategy for introducing the prohibited evidence.37
That last step separates Malcolm from Beech Aircraft. In Beech, the remainder answered a specific inference about the speaker’s own belief, and refusing it left a distorted impression. In Malcolm, the court treated the remainder as proof on a subject it had already excluded under a separate rule, and a completeness label could not carry it back in. The case is the hard one in this group, because the reports bear on the very passages the expert quoted. The court’s answer was that its discretion, exercised once under Rule 403, covered the second request too.
Deference has a floor, and the cases mark both ends. In Beech Aircraft, the refusal to let the plaintiff’s side bring out more of the letter was a clear abuse of discretion, because the excerpt could have led the jury to believe Rainey invented his theory for the lawsuit.38 At the other end, a Nebraska court applying a statute that let the judge require the remainder as fairness requires found no abuse of discretion where the admitted tapes were complete and the missing tape recorded a different conversation, so no out-of-context danger existed.39 Two errors follow from ignoring that range. One treats Rule 106 as automatic, as though any excerpt entitles the opponent to whatever the opponent names. The other treats the trial judge’s call as unreviewable, when Beech shows that refusing to avert a real distortion can be reversible error.