Concept
Elements of Rule 106
Completeness rule
Elements of Rule 106
Rule 106 has two sentences, and each phrase in them does separate work. The first provides that if a party introduces all or part of a statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part, or any other statement, that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time. The second adds that the adverse party may do so over a hearsay objection.1 Four questions follow from those words. What event gives the opponent a right? Which statements does the right reach? When may the opponent demand completion? Can a hearsay objection block it? The sections below take them in that order and leave the fairness standard, which decides what material qualifies, for later.
The text is recent, and older sources describe a different rule. The current version took effect on December 1, 2023.2 Before then the rule governed a “writing or recorded statement” and said nothing about hearsay.3 Opinions and commentary from that period still teach how a fragment misleads, but where they conflict with the current text, the text controls.
Triggering Introduction
The right to completion arises only after a party introduces all or part of a statement, and it belongs to the adverse party.4 The trigger sits at the front of the rule because the rule corrects a distortion, and a distortion cannot exist until some piece of a statement is before the jury. A demand to hear a whole report before anyone has read any of it has nothing to attach to. The right is also one the adverse party “may” exercise: the proponent of a fragment owes no duty to volunteer the rest, and the judge learns that a fragment misleads when the opponent says so.
Introduction covers more than a lawyer offering an exhibit. An examiner who puts part of a statement before the jury has pulled the trigger, and a cross-examiner who quotes excerpts has done exactly that. In Ramirez v. State, the prosecution asked its witness, Officer Owen, nothing about a statement dated August 7, 1985. On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned him skillfully about selected portions of it.5 Left there, the record would have let the defense suggest that the statement conflicted with an earlier one and with the trial testimony, and then argue that the victim’s testimony was fabricated.6 On redirect the State moved to admit the entire transcript under “the doctrine of completeness,” which the court took to be the doctrine embodied in Wyoming’s Rule 106.7 The jury received all fifteen pages, and the defense tactic failed.8 The fragment there arrived on cross-examination, so the trigger is defined by what has been put before the jury and not by the examination under way.
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey supplies the other half of the picture. The defense had already placed material in evidence, and the later question called for Rainey to testify to an out-of-court statement about the accident, made six months after it happened, that would help the jury understand that material more fully.9 The Court said the concerns underlying Rule 106 were relevant but found it unnecessary to decide whether the rule applied, because the general rules of relevancy permitted a ready resolution.10 A later section returns to that decision.
Pulling the trigger gives the adverse party a right and a task. The party invoking the rule must specify the omitted portion that serves as essential, integral context for the part the opponent introduced.11 The burden falls on the party claiming the distortion because the judge cannot guess which of many passages matters, and the rule’s own words supply the test: the omitted material qualifies only if it in fairness ought to be considered at the same time as the part introduced.12 Specification also keeps the rule from becoming a way to answer a fragment with a demand for the whole document.
Two mistakes recur. One treats a bare objection that a document is incomplete as enough to bring in the rest. The other assumes completion must wait until the proponent formally offers an exhibit, when an examiner’s excerpts on cross-examination are already an introduction.
Statements Covered
The current text of Rule 106 uses one word, “statement,” for what the proponent introduces and for what the opponent may require, and the word carries no qualifier. A party who introduces part of a statement exposes itself to completion from the rest of that statement or from any other statement that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.14 The unqualified wording is new. Before the amendment, the rule governed a “writing or recorded statement” and let the opponent require “any other part or any other writing or recorded statement.”15 Spoken statements fell outside it, and the amendment extended the rule to oral statements as well as written or recorded ones.16
The gun example from the commentary shows what that change does. Shown the gun used in a crime, a defendant tells an officer, “Yes, that is my gun. I sold it to Jason last month,” meaning before the crime. At trial the prosecutor could conceivably offer, through the officer, only the first sentence.17 Under the old text, the defendant could not use Rule 106 to force in the second sentence, because the statement was oral, and when he offered the sentence himself, hearsay stood in the way.18 Some judges filled the gap with a completeness principle drawn from inherent authority, citing Rules 611 or 403 together with the call to fairness in Rule 102,19 and trial courts have authority enough under Rules 401 through 403 and 611 to apply the same principle to proof outside the rule.20 That remedy rested on discretion, so the defendant could only ask the judge for a favor while the jury held a picture of a man who had admitted owning the gun.
Under the current text the exchange comes out the other way. The officer’s account of what the defendant said is a statement, the first sentence is a part that the prosecutor introduced, and the second is another part that the defendant may require at that time. Both sentences come in together.21 The reason is plain from the facts: a jury that hears only “Yes, that is my gun” infers ownership when the crime occurred, and the second sentence places the sale before the crime. The same reasoning reaches a murder prosecution in which an officer testifies that the arrested defendant said, “I did it. I shot him,” and the defense wants the words that followed immediately: “It was self-defense. He tried to kill me.”22 The medium of the statement no longer matters. The question is whether the part already heard needs the rest to be understood fairly.
The phrase “any other statement” settles where the completing material may come from, because it permits material from outside the statement the proponent offered.23 Commentary describes how far that can reach: another portion of an e-mail or letter, a follow-up e-mail or letter, a whole chain of messages with replies, and perhaps everything in a file or material from another file.24 In Magellan International Corp. v. Salzgitter Handel, a party built its claim on certain links in a chain of correspondence exchanged within a short period. The court reasoned that the party against whom this incomplete picture was painted could fill in the skeletal outline by adding the missing links.25 The case arose when a party was stating a claim for relief, a setting taken up later in this chapter, but its reasoning carries to trial: a reply or follow-up message is another statement that can complete the first.
The two changes answer different problems. Covering every kind of statement follows from the nature of the harm: a fragment can mislead whether an officer repeats it aloud or a lawyer reads it from a letter, and completion at that time protects the jury’s first impression either way. Covering “any other statement” follows from the nature of context, which often lives in a different document or conversation, so a rule confined to other parts of one statement would let a proponent avoid it by choosing a passage whose qualifier sits in the next message. Fairness still filters the reach, as the e-mail hypothetical shows.
The general rule of optional completeness has always been broader than the old federal text: in many jurisdictions it applies to conversations, to an opponent’s admissions, to confessions, and to all other writings.26 Study materials and opinions written before December 1, 2023 may say that Rule 106 reaches only writings and recorded statements. That was the old federal rule, and applied to a later trial it misdescribes the text.27
Timing: At That Time
Rule 106 packs two timing phrases into its first sentence. The adverse party may require the other material to be introduced “at that time,” and the material must be something that in fairness ought to be considered “at the same time” as the part already introduced.29 Together the phrases give the opponent a right to contemporaneous completion. The opponent need not wait for cross-examination or for its own case, and may make the demand when the fragment is offered.
That right departs from the ordinary order of proof, in which cross-examination is generally restricted to the subjects of direct and redirect to the subjects of cross, although judges have broad discretion to depart from that order.30 The common-law completeness rule worked within that order. The proponent proved whatever part she wished, the opponent could not force her to broaden her questioning, and the opponent could elicit the other relevant parts only after the proponent turned the witness over for questioning.31 Rule 106 goes further by giving the opponent the right to demand that the proponent expand the scope of questioning to avoid a misleading initial impression.32
The reason for the added right is the first impression. The theory is that an introduction misleads without immediate completion, even if the completing material comes in later, on cross-examination or in the other party’s case, because by then it is too late to defuse the misleading impression completely.33 One commentary calls the danger an “ineradicable, false first impression.”34 The two phrases divide the work. “At that time” fixes when the demand is made and answered. “At the same time” ties the demand to fairness, so only material that the jury ought to weigh together with the fragment qualifies, and the proponent’s control over the order of proof is interrupted only for passages that belong with the part already offered.
Courts keep some room in how they deliver completion. A literal application of Wyoming’s Rule 106, the Ramirez court observed, might require the balance of a document to be introduced during cross-examination of the police officer, but that approach could interfere with the orderly presentation of evidence. Courts have therefore found in general that the rule is satisfied when the opposing party may present, on redirect examination, the relevant portions needed to maintain the proper context.35 The facts show how this works. Defense counsel’s questions on cross reached at least nine pages of the fifteen-page statement, so the trial court had ample discretion to find it fair to place the entire statement before the jury and avoid an implication that the victim’s testimony was fabricated. Whether the statement itself was admitted or the officer read it was a matter of discretion under Rule 611(a).36
Redirect is a natural place for completion. The re-examiner often invokes the common-law rule of completeness to prove the remainder of a transaction, conversation, or writing when the adversary has proven a part, if the remainder relates to the same subject matter.37 Redirect follows the cross-examination in which the fragment was used, so the jury hears the missing portion soon afterward. An answer that reads “at that time” as a demand to halt the examination mid-question overstates the rule, and so does an answer that treats every later moment as equally good.
The hypothetical shows why Rule 106 adds to the routes to completion without replacing them. A party that waits keeps the option of bringing out the rest later, but it risks a first impression that has already settled.38 The rule gives the opponent an added right to act at once, and nothing in its text shuts off completion on cross-examination or in the opponent’s own case. A later section takes up those fallback routes.
The Hearsay Override
The last sentence of Rule 106 lets the adverse party require completion over a hearsay objection.40 The sentence is necessary because a right to demand the rest of a statement at that time means little if a hearsay objection can defeat the demand, and the missing portion is very often an out-of-court statement. The gun example shows the problem. A defendant shown the weapon used in a crime said, “Yes, that is my gun. I sold it to Jason last month,” and the prosecutor offered only the first sentence.41 Hearsay is an out-of-court assertion offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and the defendant’s second sentence, offered by him to show the sale, fits that definition. A defendant who offers his own prior statement for its truth offers hearsay.42 If the objection could stand, the choice of fragment would cost the proponent nothing: offer the damaging sentence, then invoke the hearsay rule against the sentence that qualifies it. That is why the override sits in the rule’s text and does not depend on the fairness standard alone.
Before the amendment, the text said nothing about hearsay, and courts reached the problem by different routes. Decisions differ, and distinctions are drawn based on different rules of evidence and different fact situations.43 One route looked to purpose, since the additional material may be offered for context, which may not be a prohibited purpose under the other rule.44 Beech Aircraft reasoned that way. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether Rule 106 applied,45 and it observed that a hearsay objection would not have been availing, because Rainey’s out-of-court statement was offered not for its truth but to show what he had said about the accident six months afterward and to give a fuller understanding of material the defense had already placed in evidence.46
The purpose route has a built-in limit, because a hearsay objection still succeeds when the proponent’s purpose is truth. In one federal prosecution, Coplan and Vaughn sought to admit most of their deposition transcripts. The government argued that Coplan’s real aim was to convince the jury that he was mostly truthful, and Coplan’s own counsel had described the aim as showing “his forthcoming approach to the proceeding.” The court of appeals treated the responses as offered for their truth and found no abuse of discretion in excluding them under the hearsay rule.47
United States v. Hassan shows the same bar in the setting of online postings. Hassan’s follow-up postings, though possibly exculpatory, fit no hearsay exception, and the trial court ruled that they could not be used to establish the truth of any matter asserted, specifically that Hassan did not support terrorists. The court of appeals found no abuse of discretion and added that the jury was unlikely to have been confused or misled by their exclusion.48 A hearsay ruling of that kind would not, standing alone, keep out material that the current rule requires. The question that would remain is fairness, and on that question the court’s remark that the jury was unlikely to be misled would still matter.
The override sentence addresses hearsay and nothing else. Its text names no other objection, and commentary written while the amendment was pending described it as barring a hearsay objection while remaining silent about the rest.49 Other objections, such as a claim of privilege, therefore remain for the judge. The line falls there for a reason. A hearsay objection fits poorly against material offered to supply context, while a privilege protects an interest that has nothing to do with whether a passage completes a fragment.
When another objection bars the completing material, the judge has a further option: if the judge requires the additional material and an evidentiary objection is made to it, the judge may strike or refuse to admit the original out-of-context piece.50 Rule 403 gives the judge a related tool, balancing and excluding the portion offered as misleading, while Rule 106 supplies the alternative of requiring the rest.51
Two opposite errors are common. An answer that requires completing material to satisfy the hearsay rule on its own ignores the final sentence of the current text. An answer that says the override admits completing material over any objection overreads a sentence that names hearsay alone.