Concept
Requirements for a Summary
Summaries
Requirements for a Summary
Rule 1006(a) lets a court admit a summary only when the proponent, the party offering the exhibit, can establish certain conditions. The exhibit must be offered to prove the content of voluminous admissible writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court, and it may be offered whether or not those sources have been introduced into evidence.1 Courts read that sentence as a checklist of preconditions,2 and each precondition answers a distinct danger, so none can be dropped.
Volume is what justifies departing from the original-writing requirement of Rule 1002.3 Admissible sources keep the summary from becoming a route for material the rules would exclude if offered directly. Accuracy and neutrality matter because jurors cannot check a chart against thousands of pages, so whatever the chart says tends to become what the records are taken to say. Foundation puts a witness on the stand whom the opponent can cross-examine about how the chart was built, which gives the opponent a person to test instead of an exhibit to accept on faith.4
The Sixth Circuit counted five preconditions and placed proper introduction last.5 This unit takes four ideas in turn: volume, admissible sources, accurate and nonargumentative content, and foundation. Subdivision (b) adds a separate procedural duty that the next section develops. The proponent must make the originals or duplicates available to other parties at a reasonable time and place, and the court may order the proponent to produce them in court.6 Volume comes first because it opens the exception.
Voluminous Writings
Rule 1006(a) reaches only “voluminous” sources “that cannot be conveniently examined in court,” so the proponent must first show that the sources are numerous enough to invoke the exception.7 United States v. Bray put that showing first among the preconditions for a summary chart: the Sixth Circuit required documents sufficiently numerous that the trier of fact would find comprehension difficult and inconvenient.8 The court set the bar at inconvenience, not impossibility, and said the documents need not be so voluminous as to be literally impossible to examine.9 The choice is practical. A jury with unlimited time could read almost any stack of records, so a rule demanding proof of impossibility would almost never apply. What the exception saves is trial hours and the jury's grasp of what the records show.
The rule supplies no number, and courts have declined to supply one. A fixed cutoff of a hundred documents would treat a hundred one-line receipts and a hundred pages of cross-referenced ledger entries as the same problem, although a juror can take in the first set at a glance and will struggle with the second. The First Circuit in United States v. Appolon said that no precise test dictates when source materials are sufficiently indigestible to permit summarization, and that district courts should weigh the volume and complexity of the materials.10 The two factors stand in an inversely proportionate relationship: as either one increases, relatively less is required of the other.11 A very large set of simple records can therefore qualify, and so can a modest set of dense, intricate ones. Relatively less of one factor is still some of it, though, and a single short form is neither numerous nor intricate.
Bray also shows what volume looks like. The scheme there ran two years and the forms were completed daily, so the court estimated more than 500 forms for each of Bray and Owczarzak, plus about 100 for each of two replacement employees.12 That many forms, the court thought, could not conveniently have been examined in court by the jury, but because the defendant did not challenge voluminousness, the court assumed without deciding that the threshold was met.13 The estimate shows volume doing the work, though it was not a holding.
Complexity carries more of the weight in Hermann v. United States. The documents behind the exhibit there included three iterations of a general ledger, a log of wire payments, an IRS Form 886-A, and payroll summaries and e-mails.14 The court concluded that the exhibit rested on sufficiently voluminous and complex data to qualify as a Rule 1006 summary, and it added that the one-page summary might well help the court parse that volume of information in a legally and factually complex trial.15 The inquiry therefore looks to the data the exhibit draws on, not to the length of the exhibit.
Exam stems test this requirement by changing what the chart replaces.
Beneath both factors sits one question: whether summarization will remove a logistical or cognitive barrier to the jury's discharge of its duties.16 Quantity creates a logistical barrier, because there are too many pages to handle in a courtroom. Intricacy creates a cognitive barrier, because records that can be handled cannot be understood without help. A summary that removes neither merely restates the original. Students go wrong in two ways: they search for a document count, which does not exist, or they demand proof that examination was impossible, which the rule does not require. The trial judge sees the exhibits and sets the pace of the trial, so the call is the judge's, and a reviewing court is poorly positioned to second-guess it.17 The last section of this chapter returns to that deference.
Admissible Underlying Materials
Rule 1006(a) reaches only “voluminous admissible writings, recordings, or photographs,” so a summary stands or falls with its sources.19 The Sixth Circuit in Bray made admissibility a precondition: if the underlying documents are hearsay and fit no exception, a chart built on them is inadmissible too, and the same holds for documents inadmissible because they are irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, or unauthenticated.20 Other courts state the principle broadly. Evidence offered under Rule 1006 must be otherwise admissible and stays subject to the usual objections under the rules of evidence and the Constitution, and it “normally is objectionable if the voluminous source material on which it is based is inadmissible.”21
The reason lies in what the exception relaxes. Rule 1006 creates an exception to Rule 1002, which requires originals to prove the content of writings, recordings, and photographs, and it creates no other exception.22 A summary may stand in for the originals, but the hearsay, relevance, authenticity, and unfair-prejudice screens keep applying to what the sources say. A summary can carry only what its sources contain, so it can never be more reliable than they are. If the rule read otherwise, a proponent could give a witness a stack of inadmissible statements, have them compiled into a chart, and put their content before the jury. The opponent, who could have objected to each statement offered alone, would face a single exhibit with the objectionable material blended in. The rule's closing clause asks whether the sources can come in, not whether they have, since a summary is allowed whether or not the sources were introduced.23 The proponent may therefore leave the originals out of evidence, but must be ready to show that they would pass the ordinary screens.
The burden sits with the proponent. In U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Scott the Scotts made no showing that the underlying documents were admissible, and without a proper evidentiary foundation the trial court properly excluded the evidence.24 Hermann shows the opposite posture. The government did not object to the admissibility of the underlying documents, so the court treated the second and third requirements under the rule as not at issue.25 An unchallenged source makes the showing easy, but a proponent who offers nothing loses the exhibit.
One way a proponent clears this requirement is the limited-purpose route, and Appolon shows it. The First Circuit explained that the sale records there were admissible not to prove that the purchase prices reflected the properties' true value, but for the limited purpose of showing that those prices were lower than the prices on the mortgage loan applications, so the records fell outside the hearsay rule.26 A statement offered only to show that it was made raises no question about the truth of what it asserts, so the hearsay rule had nothing to screen. A summary of such records can serve the same limited purpose. Appolon and Scott differ in what the proponent did: in Appolon the proponent could name a purpose for which the sources came in, whereas in Scott the proponent made no showing about the sources at all.
Rule 703 offers a separate path, since the commentary carves out summaries to the extent an expert has reasonably relied on them under that rule.27 That path runs through expert testimony and not through the conditions of Rule 1006(a), and a later section takes it up with opinions and calculations. Two errors recur when students work these problems. The first treats the summary as a fresh exhibit that escapes the hearsay analysis because its preparer can be cross-examined, although cross-examination goes to whether the chart is accurate and cannot make inadmissible sources admissible. The second concludes that sources inadmissible for their truth doom the summary, without asking what purpose they were offered to prove.
Accurate, Nonargumentative Content
The fourth condition asks whether the exhibit reports its sources faithfully and adds nothing of its own. Charts admitted under Rule 1006 are meant to reflect the contents of the documents they summarize and typically substitute in evidence for the voluminous originals, so the First Circuit said in United States v. Milkiewicz that they must fairly represent the underlying documents and be “accurate and nonprejudicial,” quoting Bray.29 Bray divides the standard into two commitments. The first is fidelity: the information on the summary must reflect the underlying documents accurately, correctly, and in a non-misleading manner, so that nothing is lost in the translation. The second applies to a summary admitted in place of the underlying documents: the proponent may not embellish it or annotate it with conclusions or inferences, whether through labels, captions, highlighting techniques, or otherwise.30 A chart that adds up correctly can still fail if its headings argue.
The second commitment follows from what happens after admission. A Rule 1006 summary may go to the jury room like any other exhibit, so one that contains elements of argument functions as a mini-summation by the proponent every time a juror looks at it during deliberations, particularly when the jurors cannot also review the underlying documents.31 The fidelity commitment rests on the same fact from the other direction. Jurors cannot check the chart against thousands of pages, so whatever it reports tends to become what the records are taken to say.
Accuracy is measured against the underlying documents, and the opponent's theory of the case does not set the measure. A summary that names its sources, draws every figure from them or derives it from them, and leaves them open to the opponent answers the usual accuracy attack. In Hermann the exhibit stated that it was based on the general ledger, the wire payments log, the Form 886-A, and the payroll summaries. All its figures came from or were derived from those documents, and the government had access to all of them and could cross-examine the preparer, Mr. Cohen, about them.32 The court also said it would assess the summary together with the underlying documents and the other evidence and testimony at trial to decide the nature of the payment at issue,33 so the summary reports and the factfinder decides.
Where a caption does state an inference, the trial judge has a remedy short of exclusion. In Milkiewicz the district court required the government to modify its summaries to eliminate unnecessary and potentially prejudicial information and labels.34 It had the comparison columns relabeled from “Profit by Margin” and “Profit by Shortage” to “Price Difference” and “Quantity Difference.”35 The two sets of headings differ as arithmetic differs from meaning. A price difference is a subtraction the jury can verify against the records, while a profit is a conclusion about what that subtraction signifies, and that conclusion belongs in the proponent's closing argument. The court ultimately admitted the charts under Rule 611(a), but it demanded neutral headings because it viewed the charts as Rule 1006 summaries, which shows what the neutrality requirement looks like in practice.36 The First Circuit, reviewing deferentially, found that the district court had exercised its discretion with meticulous care.37
Neutral labels are one safeguard. Courts also test a summary against claims that it omits or invents. In United States v. Sawyer the defendant argued that the summary created a false impression about the date the alleged conspiracy began and falsely implied that the expenditures ended after three named representatives left office, and the First Circuit disagreed.38 The court invoked the principle that care must be taken to insure that summaries accurately reflect the contents of the underlying documents and do not function as pedagogical devices that unfairly emphasize part of the proponent's proof or create the impression that disputed facts have been conclusively established or that inferences have been directly proved.39 The objection is a good model for an omission challenge, because it names the specific false impression the gap is said to create. A chart that links items raises a parallel question about support. In United States v. Daniels, some appellants contended that the government's chart associated them with telephone numbers without record support. The court examined the record, found evidence supporting the association of each defendant with each number the chart assigned, and held the contention without merit.40 Every line on such a chart is a claim about the records, and the proponent answers an accuracy objection by pointing to the record support for each line.
Accuracy and neutrality do not end the inquiry. Rule 403 permits exclusion when probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,41 and trial judges weigh a summary's usefulness against its potential for misuse. The Milkiewicz judge did exactly that, considering “the usefulness versus the potential misuse of summaries of this nature” and concluding that jurors needed the charts to sort through “an extraordinarily complex document case.”42 The same concern explains why Rule 1006 may not be employed as a guise for placing an argumentative synopsis of oral testimony or documentary evidence before the jury.43 A judge who finds a summary useful but loaded can trim it, and one who finds it more prejudicial than useful can exclude it.
Foundation and Sponsoring Witness
The text of Rule 1006(a) says what a summary must prove and what it must condense, but it does not say who must introduce the exhibit.45 The cases fill the gap. The Sixth Circuit in Bray listed proper introduction as the fifth and last precondition and said that the proponent should lay the foundation through the testimony of the witness who supervised the summary's preparation.46 A foundation is the preliminary showing that makes an exhibit fit for the factfinder's consideration, and for a summary it has two parts: the proponent must show that the voluminous sources are what the proponent claims them to be, and that the summary accurately summarizes them.47 The first part is ordinary authentication of the sources. The second is a showing about the exhibit itself, and it is the one that ordinarily needs a witness.
A chart cannot vouch for itself. Nothing on its face shows that its figures came from the records the proponent names or that its selection and arithmetic are faithful, and the opponent's only practical way to test those points is to question the person who did the work. Rule 1006 does not by its terms require the preparer to testify, and the court in Hermann said so, adding that “almost always his testimony is indispensable as a practical matter” to authenticate the exhibit.48 The commentary explains why. A sufficient foundation for accuracy is unlikely to be laid any other way, and a summary offered with no one to cross-examine about its preparation should be excluded under Rule 403 if not under the hearsay rule.49 The duty in subdivision (b) to make the originals available completes the arrangement, because it hands the cross-examiner the sources against which to test the witness.50 A student who writes that the rule requires the preparer to testify misstates its text, and one who writes that no sponsoring witness is needed misstates how the foundation gets built.
The sponsor does not have to be the person who entered every figure. Everyone involved in the preparation need not testify, and a sufficient foundation as to accuracy may be laid by someone in a supervisory position.51 In United States v. Fahnbulleh the D.C. Circuit approved introducing a summary through a witness who supervised a team of auditors that reviewed the raw data and prepared the exhibit.52 What matters is that the witness knows how the summary was built well enough to be questioned about it, since the witness exists to give the opponent a person to test.
A witness who sponsors a summary is a summary witness, and the role has limits that follow from its purpose. In Hermann the court allowed Mr. Cohen to testify as a summary witness without being admitted or considered as an expert, but only on authentication matters within his personal knowledge: that he created the summary exhibits, that he relied on the identified documents in doing so, and that the exhibits accurately reflect the contents of those documents. He could not opine on inferences to be drawn from the summaries or present conclusions to the court.53 The exhibits summarized documents available to both parties and contained no expert analysis or opinions, and the government had full means to cross-examine him about their content and preparation.54 A witness who stays inside those three statements adds only the assurance that the exhibit is what it purports to be. One who draws inferences adds opinion, which the rules on lay and expert testimony govern.
The lay-opinion line appears in United States v. Georgiou. An SEC employee gave comparisons of stock quantities and prices drawn from voluminous trading records that he had personally reviewed in the agency's investigation, and the Third Circuit agreed with the district court that this testimony required no scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge and so fell within Rule 701.55 The foundation questions in that case had largely been settled. The defendant did not dispute that the charts and underlying records had been produced, and he had stipulated that they were authentic business records under Rule 803(6). His counsel's live concern was opinion testimony and improper summary of things not admissible in evidence.56 Whether a given summary witness is lay or expert, and how far explanation may go before it becomes opinion, is taken up later in this chapter with opinions and calculations.
A second limit protects the balance of the trial. The First Circuit in Appolon recalled its concern, expressed in United States v. Flores-De-Jesús, that a summary witness can generate imbalances by endorsing the credibility of other witnesses.57 That problem did not arise there. Zappala did not bolster other witnesses' testimony, and he limited himself to introducing and explaining the summary charts he prepared, so permitting him to testify was not an abuse of discretion.58 The sponsor has just walked the jury through an organized body of evidence, so any endorsement of another witness would carry that authority with it while resting on nothing in the records the chart summarizes.