Concept
The General Bar
Past sexual conduct of a victim
The General Bar
Rule 412(a) opens with a prohibition: the evidence it lists “is not admissible in a civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct.”1 Two categories fall under the ban: evidence that the victim engaged in other sexual behavior, and evidence of the victim’s sexual predisposition.2 As a first approximation, the first category covers past acts and the second covers opinion and reputation testimony.3 The phrase “sexual misconduct” reaches well beyond rape prosecutions, because it includes civil employment discrimination suits that allege sexual harassment.4
Rule 412 works as a gatekeeper. Its limits apply equally to reputation evidence, opinion evidence, and evidence of specific sexual acts, and the exceptions are the ones written into the rule itself.5 Evidence of a victim’s sexual behavior or predisposition therefore reaches the factfinder only by passing through Rule 412, which means it must fall outside the broad ban through an exception the rule supplies.6 A party who has found some other route to relevance has not finished, because the gate comes first.
The rule rests on a judgment about relevance and a concern about harm. A person’s past sexual conduct is rarely relevant to how that person acted on a specific occasion,7 and admitting it would expose the victim to embarrassment and invite stereotypical thinking.8 The rule therefore bars the evidence, whether offered as substantive proof or for impeachment, except in designated circumstances.9
Congress treats the accused differently. In Rules 413 through 415 it overrode Rule 404’s exclusionary principle, so a factfinder may consider a defendant’s prior sexual activity as proof of propensity.10 Rule 413 refers to offenses in chapter 109A of title 18, which include abusive sexual contact under 18 U.S.C. §2244 and sexual abuse of a minor under §2243.11 The two sets of rules rest on premises that may conflict: Rule 412 assumes that past sexual conduct says little about conduct on a specific occasion, while Rules 413 through 415 require admission of a defendant’s past sexual offenses as relevant to that very question.12
The two barred categories divide along a simple line: other sexual behavior concerns what the victim is said to have done, and sexual predisposition concerns what the victim is said to be like.
Other Sexual Behavior
Rule 412(a)(1) bars “evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior.”13 Three words carry the analysis. The phrase offered to prove ties the bar to the inference the proponent wants the factfinder to draw. The word behavior sets how much conduct counts. The word other separates the history the rule shields from the charged event.
Sexual behavior includes every activity that involves actual physical conduct, meaning sexual intercourse or sexual contact.14 The cases extend the term to facts that imply such conduct. The Tenth Circuit held evidence of contraceptive use inadmissible in United States v. Galloway because the use implies sexual activity. The Eighth Circuit excluded evidence of the birth of a child out of wedlock in United States v. One Feather. A Kansas court excluded evidence of venereal disease in State v. Carmichael.15
The extension to implied conduct follows from what the rule is for. A prescription, a pregnancy, or an infection lets a juror reason in one step to sexual activity, and from there to the inferences about consent and credibility that the rule blocks. A narrower definition would let a litigant reach the same inference one medical record at a time. When an exam fact pattern slips in a clinic visit, a pregnancy, or a diagnosis, ask whether the detail implies sexual activity; if it does, treat it as barred sexual-behavior evidence.
Behavior also reaches the mind. The word is construed to include activities of the mind, such as fantasies or dreams,16 and the Advisory Committee Note extends the prohibition to the victim’s sexual fantasies.17 Prior offers to engage in intercourse belong in the same group, because a factfinder could infer from an earlier invitation that the complainant was willing to have sex.18 What links every item is the purpose for which it is offered. An act, a pregnancy, an invitation, and a fantasy are each put forward to show that the complainant is the kind of person who says yes, so the rule treats them alike.
With that definition in place, the bar answers the old argument that a sexually experienced complainant was more likely to have consented or to have lied. On consent, the premise fails because a person’s past sexual conduct is rarely relevant to how that person acted on a specific occasion.19 On credibility, the premise was hypocritical: the cross-examination was not thought to bear on the credibility of women testifying in other kinds of cases, and in rape trials it was allowed even where clinical evidence made any suggestion of consent ridiculous.20 The bar holds whether the evidence is offered as substantive proof or only to impeach, so recasting a question about sexual history as an attack on credibility does not avoid it.21
The word other keeps the bar from consuming the trial. The rule’s gloss defines other sexual behavior as past acts,22 so what the complainant and the accused did during the charged encounter is the subject of the proceeding, not history within the bar. Intercourse with a different man the previous month is a past act, and the bar applies to it in full.
A prior false accusation sits at the edge of the rule. Rule 412 does not bar evidence offered to prove allegedly false prior claims by the victim, but that evidence remains subject to the requirements of Rule 404.23 The defense offers it to show that the complainant lies, not to prove anything about her sexual conduct, so the inference does not run through sexual history.
Sexual Predisposition
Rule 412(a)(2) bars “evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual predisposition.”25 Subdivision (a)(1) reaches what the victim is said to have done; subdivision (a)(2) reaches what the victim is said to be like. Opinion and reputation testimony form its core.26
The Advisory Committee added the clause to exclude evidence that does not directly refer to sexual activities or thoughts but that the proponent believes may have a sexual connotation for the factfinder.27 Mode of dress, speech, and lifestyle are the standard examples when they are used to suggest the victim’s sexual character.28 Admitting such evidence would defeat the rule’s aims of shielding the victim from embarrassment and safeguarding the victim against stereotypical thinking, so it is inadmissible unless an exception applies.29 The bar therefore turns on the inference the proponent wants jurors to draw. If the evidence is offered so that jurors will think of the victim in sexual terms, the clause applies, even though the evidence describes no sexual act.
The reason for a separate clause shows when you imagine the rule without it. A defendant barred from proving sexual acts could still offer stereotypes, such as how the complainant dressed, talked, or lived, and invite the jury to infer that she is the kind of person who says yes. That inference is the stereotypical thinking the rule exists to prevent.
The clause applies in civil cases as well, including a Title VII action in which the plaintiff alleges sexual harassment.30 An employer who offers the plaintiff’s off-hours lifestyle to suggest she welcomed sexual attention aims at the same inference as the rape defendant and meets the same bar.
The clause has a limit, and the limit is sexual connotation. The rule targets evidence the proponent believes may suggest sexual availability to the factfinder, and dress, speech, and lifestyle are covered when they are used to suggest sexual character.31 Evidence that carries no sexual connotation and is offered for another purpose lies outside subdivision (a)(2), and the ordinary relevance and character rules govern it.
Predisposition evidence has no route through the first two criminal-case exceptions. Rule 412(b)(1) lets the court admit three categories of evidence in a criminal case.32 The first covers specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior offered to prove that someone other than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence.33 The second covers specific instances of the victim’s sexual behavior with the person accused, offered by the defendant to prove consent or by the prosecutor.34 Because both are written in terms of specific instances, reputation, opinion, and dress evidence enter through neither. Students often reason that a defendant’s own prior encounter with the complainant opens the door to her general reputation, and it does not. His own consensual encounter the previous summer is a candidate for the second exception; a friend’s testimony that she is known as sexually available is not.
Two routes remain. In a criminal case, the exception for evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights is the only one left,35 and its scope is uncertain.36 Defendants test it case by case, as in Doe v. United States. In a civil case, the court may admit predisposition evidence if its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party, and it may admit reputation evidence only if the victim has placed reputation in controversy.37 Later sections take up each route in detail.