Concept
Waiver of Rule 410
Plea negotiations
Waiver of Rule 410
Rule 410 protects the defendant who made the plea or took part in the plea discussions: the listed statements are inadmissible against that defendant.1 The protection runs one way by design. The Advisory Committee reasoned that limiting exclusion to use against the accused fits the rule's purpose, because use for or against other persons does not impair the freedom of discussion the rule is meant to foster.2 A protection that belongs to the defendant invites a question: may the defendant agree in advance to give it up, so that statements from failed talks can return at trial? In United States v. Mezzanatto, the Supreme Court answered yes. A defendant may waive the exclusion and allow impeachment use of plea-discussion statements, and the agreement is enforceable unless something affirmatively shows that it was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily.3
The answer matters because waiver is where Rule 410 is weakest in practice. Plea-bargaining statements are excluded for reasons much like those behind Rule 408: public policy favors disposing of criminal charges by compromise, and without protection defendants would be less willing to bargain. Using a defendant's words against him would also be unfair, since essentially nothing a prosecutor says in bargaining is ever offered in evidence and the risks run one way.4 A waiver can bring those risks back before the first word is spoken. Many law enforcement officials avoid the rule's effects by refusing to negotiate unless the individual waives his or her rights under it, and the Supreme Court has upheld such waivers despite the arguments that Congress did not intend the rule to be waivable and that waiver may withdraw the rule's protection from most plea negotiations.5
Waiver also differs in kind from the two exceptions in Rule 410(b), covered earlier in this chapter. Each exception depends on a particular event: an introduced statement that in fairness should be considered together with another statement from the same discussions, or a sworn, on-the-record statement challenged in a perjury prosecution. A waiver depends on no event at all. Its reach is whatever the agreement says.
Keep the plea-discussion exclusion apart from its neighbor for plea hearings. Statements made at a nolo contendere plea hearing are shielded from use against the defendant in any later case, whether or not the plea was later withdrawn,6 while statements made in discussions with a prosecutor are protected only if the discussions end without a guilty plea or with a plea that is later withdrawn.7 The waiver cases concern the second category.
A waiver problem asks three questions in sequence: did the defendant agree to give up the protection, is that agreement valid, and does the government's use fall within what was agreed? The subsections follow that order. Mezzanatto comes first, because every later question is measured against what that decision allowed.
The Mezzanatto Holding
In United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995), the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant may waive the protections of Rule 410 and agree that plea-discussion statements can be used to impeach contradictory trial testimony, so long as the waiver is knowing and voluntary. Put precisely, absent some affirmative indication that the agreement was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily, an agreement to waive the exclusionary provisions of the plea-statement Rules is valid and enforceable.8 The case arose under Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6), which are substantively identical.9 The text of the rule excludes a statement made during plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority when the discussions did not result in a guilty plea or resulted in a later-withdrawn one, and it does not mention waiver.10 The facts show the holding at work.
Mezzanatto was arrested after attempting to sell a package of methamphetamine to an undercover police officer. On October 17, 1991, he and his attorney asked to meet with the prosecutor about cooperating. The prosecutor told him that he had no obligation to talk and that cooperation required complete truthfulness. As a condition of proceeding, the prosecutor added, Mezzanatto had to agree that anything he said at the meeting could be used to impeach contradictory testimony at trial if the case went that far. Mezzanatto conferred with his counsel and agreed to proceed on those terms.11 His acceptance had a practical explanation. He had first refused to bargain because he believed his maximum exposure was five years, and he changed his mind when told that ten years was likely. He waived orally, but the gamble did not pay off: the prosecutor withdrew from the discussions on deciding that he could not be trusted.12
At the meeting, Mezzanatto admitted that he knew the package contained methamphetamine but insisted that he had dealt only in “ounce” quantities before his arrest. He first claimed to be merely a broker for Shuster who did not know about Shuster's home methamphetamine laboratory, then conceded that he knew about it, and said that he had not visited Shuster's residence for at least a week before the arrest. The government confronted him with surveillance evidence placing his car on Shuster's property the day before the arrest and ended the meeting because he had not been completely truthful.13 At trial, Mezzanatto testified that he was not involved in methamphetamine trafficking, that he thought Shuster used the laboratory to make plastic explosives for the CIA, and that he did not know the package contained methamphetamine. Over his counsel's objection, the prosecutor cross-examined him about the inconsistent statements from the October 17 meeting, and when he denied making some of them, the prosecutor called an agent who had attended the meeting to recount them. The jury found him guilty, and the court sentenced him to 170 months.14 The use at issue was impeachment by prior inconsistent statement, the same form of credibility attack that Rule 408 forbids for settlement communications.15
The Ninth Circuit had rejected waiver per se, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari because that decision conflicted with the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Dortch.16 The Ninth Circuit's ruling did not rest on any finding that Mezzanatto's own agreement was unknowing or involuntary. It rested on the view that such agreements can never be enforced.17 The Supreme Court began from the opposite presumption.
A criminal defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive many of the most fundamental protections the Constitution affords. A knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to confront one's accusers, and a double jeopardy defense may be waived by pretrial agreement.18 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are treated the same way. Their provisions are presumptively waivable, though an express waiver clause may suggest that Congress meant to occupy the field and preclude waiver in other, unstated circumstances, as in Crosby, where a defendant's failure to appear for part of his trial was not a valid waiver of his right to be present under Rule 43.19
The presumption fits rules of evidence especially well. Parties often agree in writing before trial to the admission of otherwise objectionable evidence, either in exchange for stipulations from opposing counsel or for other strategic purposes, and both the civil and criminal rules appear to contemplate evidentiary agreements at a pretrial conference.20 Because the plea-statement Rules were enacted against a background presumption that legal rights, and evidentiary provisions in particular, are subject to waiver by voluntary agreement, the Court would not read Congress's silence as an implicit rejection of waivability. The burden fell on Mezzanatto to identify some affirmative basis for concluding that the Rules depart from the presumption.21
Two points explain why the Court found no reason to depart from the presumption here. First, the exclusion operates only against the defendant, so the person who may insist on it is the person who agreed to give it up. Second, impeachment use advances the truth-seeking function of trial. Under any view of the evidence, the defendant has made a false statement, either to the prosecutor during the plea discussion or to the jury at trial, and making the jury aware of the inconsistency tends to increase the reliability of the verdict without risking institutional harm to the federal courts.22
Applied to Mezzanatto, the rule was straightforward. He conferred with his lawyer after the prosecutor proposed waiver as a condition of proceeding, and he never complained that he entered the agreement unknowingly or involuntarily. The Ninth Circuit's decision rested on its per se rejection of waiver, so the Supreme Court reversed.23
An exam stem built on these facts tests whether you can locate the source of the result, and it helps to remove the agreement and watch what happens.
The signed term is the only fact separating this defendant from Mezzanatto. With a waiver, the government may confront a testifying defendant with the plea-meeting statements. Without one, the exclusion applies, and the government is left with the two circumstances in which the rules admit such statements, neither of which fits this use.24 The result survives a harsher version of the facts, in which the prosecutor declares the waiver a make-or-break term and refuses to deal unless the defendant accepts it. If the defendant agrees, the term is enforceable, and claims of fraud or coercion go to case-by-case review.25
Mezzanatto also shows why a competently advised defendant signs: most defendants cannot afford to refuse to bargain because too much is at stake.26 A Rule 410(a)(4) analysis is therefore incomplete until the facts have been checked for a stated condition, an oral announcement, or a signed form. The decision itself reached only impeachment. A concurrence for three Justices reserved the case in chief, and Justice Souter dissented. The next subsection takes up those opinions, and a later one takes up how far waivers extend.
Majority and Dissent
Rule 410(a)(4) is silent on waiver,27 so the opinions in Mezzanatto turn on what that silence means. The majority read it as no obstacle. Rules are presumed waivable, so the defendant bore the burden of finding an affirmative reason to think Congress meant otherwise.28 The majority then met four arguments that something overcame the presumption, and the concurrence, the dissent, and later practice all respond to how it did so.
The first argument treated the Rule's stated policy as proof that it cannot be waived. The majority answered that the Advisory Committee's Notes always give some policy justification for an exclusionary provision, but that policy explains only the default rule of exclusion and does not mean the parties can never waive it. The argument proves too much. Hearsay is excluded because it tends to lack trustworthiness, yet even the dissent conceded that the hearsay rules are waivable beyond any question, and the dissent was unwilling to accept the wholesale rejection of party control over evidentiary provisions that its own approach would require.29 The Ninth Circuit's reliance on Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil failed for a related reason. That decision held certain Fair Labor Standards Act entitlements unwaivable because the Act's structure and legislative history showed a specific policy against private contracts on those matters. Mezzanatto identified nothing comparable in the plea-statement Rules, and the majority found that the Rules point the other way.30
The second argument was that waiver would compromise the integrity of the process. The Court accepted that some evidentiary provisions are so fundamental that permitting waiver would discredit the federal judicial process; its example was that a conviction after trial by twelve orangutans would be invalid even if the defendant consented. Rule 410 is not such a provision, because the one institutional interest at stake, the reliability of fact-finding, is served when the jury learns that a testifying defendant said something different to the prosecutor.31
The third argument was that waiver defeats the rule's aim of encouraging plea bargaining. The majority replied that this looks only at the defendant's side. If prosecutors were barred from securing waivers, they might decline to open cooperation discussions at all, and the potential first step toward a plea bargain would never be taken.32 A prosecutor dealing with a would-be cooperator typically wants to know exactly what the defendant believes to be true before deciding whether to call him as a witness in another case,33 and the assurance that statements can impeach contrary testimony may be what makes the conversation worth having. The Court used a market image: a defendant can maximize what he has to sell only if he may offer what the prosecutor most wants to buy. Prosecutors may need help from the small fish to catch the big ones, but that is no reason to preclude waiver, since a prosecutor who decides that crucial information is worth more than the waiver will agree to leave the exclusion intact.34 The Court added that before the Ninth Circuit's decision, when federal prosecutors there used waiver agreements like this one, about 92.2% of convictions in that circuit came from guilty or nolo contendere pleas, against about 88.8% in all federal courts.35
The fourth argument was that waiver invites overreaching because the prosecutor controls the rewards. The Court treated the pressure as an ordinary feature of plea bargaining. The dilemma was indistinguishable from the many hard choices defendants face every day: plea bargaining necessarily presses defendants to plead guilty and abandon fundamental rights, yet the government may encourage a plea by offering substantial benefits in return.36 The mere potential for abuse of bargaining power does not justify foreclosing negotiation, because tradition and experience support the belief that the great majority of prosecutors will be faithful to their duty, and the possibility that some waivers are not informed and voluntary does not justify invalidating all of them. The remedy is case-by-case inquiry into whether a particular agreement was the product of fraud or coercion.37 The next subsection takes up that inquiry.
Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurrence for three Justices whose votes were necessary to the majority.38 She accepted that a waiver allowing the government to impeach with plea-negotiation statements is compatible with Congress's intent to promote plea bargaining. She observed, however, that a waiver reaching use of the statements in the case in chief might more severely undermine a defendant's incentive to negotiate and thereby inhibit plea bargaining, and because the government had not sought such a waiver, she did not explore the question.39 The concurrence reserved the issue and decided nothing about it, so an answer that says it held case-in-chief waivers invalid has misread the opinion. The distinction rests on how each waiver operates. An impeachment waiver does its work only if the defendant later contradicts the statements, while a case-in-chief waiver turns the negotiation itself into proof, whatever the defense does.
Justice Souter dissented. He framed the only question as whether Congress, in adopting Rule 410 and Rule 11(e)(6), intended to create a personal right that its individual beneficiaries may waive, which is a question of congressional intent and not of judicial policy.40 He accepted the general presumption in favor of waiver and said he would have joined the majority if nothing more were available. In his view, though, there was good reason to believe that Congress rejected the general rule of waivability, and once that evidence is squarely faced, a court must respect it.41 His central point was candor. The zone of unrestrained candor shrinks whenever a defendant must stop to consider how much trouble his openness may cause if negotiations fail, so Congress must have understood that recognizing waivers would threaten the judicial system's interest in candid plea discussions.42 Whether the majority was right or wrong on policy was beside the point, he wrote, because the policy it endorsed was not the policy Congress intended.43
The dissent also predicted how waiver would spread. The Rules draw no distinction between impeachment and case-in-chief use, so if the objection can be waived for impeachment it can be waived for affirmative evidence, and if the government can effectively demand waiver in the former instance it will do so in the latter, leaving the Court nothing legitimate to do about it.44 Concluding that the majority's ruling was at odds with Congress's intent and would render the Rules largely dead letters, he dissented.45
Practice has moved partway toward what the dissent feared. Officials can avoid the rule's effects by refusing to negotiate without a waiver,46 and lower courts have generally held that the rationale approving waiver for impeachment applies equally when the prosecution offers the statements in its case in chief. Those who accept the extension reason that enforcing waivers does not frustrate Rule 410's general purpose of encouraging plea negotiations.47 That development does not answer the majority's claim that waiver opens negotiations prosecutors would otherwise decline to begin.
A question that asks whether Rule 410 should tolerate waiver rewards the answer that sets the majority's incentive argument beside the dissent's candor argument, identifies who joined which opinion, and recognizes that only the majority's reasoning is law. The concurrence supplies the reservation that matters for scope, and the dissent explains why a routine waiver demand troubles critics of the decision.
Knowing and Voluntary Waivers
Mezzanatto attached a single condition to its holding. Absent some affirmative indication that the agreement was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily, a waiver of the plea-statement exclusion is valid and enforceable.49 That sentence does two jobs. It makes a waiver presumptively valid, and it puts the burden of overcoming the presumption on the defendant who wants out, who must point to something in the circumstances that signals an agreement that was not knowing or not voluntary. What counts as such a showing is the question here, because every waiver is signed by a defendant who wants a deal and who is dealing with the prosecutor who decides whether to offer one.
Pressure alone does not count. Mezzanatto flagged the dilemma of choosing between waiving and forgoing negotiation, and the Court replied that the dilemma was indistinguishable from the many difficult choices defendants face every day: plea bargaining necessarily presses defendants to plead guilty and give up fundamental rights, yet the government may encourage a plea by offering substantial benefits for it.50 The Court's plea cases show how much pressure the law tolerates. In Brady, the Court held that offering a lower sentence than the defendant would face at trial is not coercive enough to make a plea involuntary, and in Bordenkircher v. Hayes it confirmed that the functional equivalent, threatening higher charges if the defendant refuses to plead, is also permissible.51 Every negotiation carries pressure of this kind, so a rule that voided waivers whenever a defendant felt it would void all of them, which is the per se ban the Court declined to adopt.
What does count is fraud or coercion in the particular case. Tradition and experience support the belief that most prosecutors will be faithful to their duty, and the possibility that some waivers are not informed and voluntary does not justify invalidating all of them, so the appropriate response is case-by-case inquiry.52 That design keeps the many ordinary waivers intact and leaves room to catch the agreement procured by deception or threat. The two words in the test also ask different questions. A knowing waiver is one the defendant understood, and it need not be a formal document: an agreement may be found where the prosecutor orally announced that admissions made in the discussion would be admissible and the defendant, understanding this, took part and made admissions.53 A voluntary waiver is one free of the fraud or coercion at which case-by-case review is aimed.
Mezzanatto's own facts show the test at work. The prosecutor announced the term at the outset, stating that he had no obligation to talk and that anything he said could be used to impeach contradictory trial testimony, and Mezzanatto conferred with his counsel before agreeing.54 The Court enforced the agreement because he conferred with his lawyer after the waiver was proposed and never complained that he entered it unknowingly or involuntarily.55 The pressure on him was real, since he had changed his mind about bargaining on learning that ten years was likely.56 That change of heart gave him a reason to sign. It was not an affirmative indication that the signature was uninformed, because the term was announced openly and a lawyer advised him.
An essay that asks what a defendant in this position must show is asking for the affirmative indication, and the clearest example is a term that was misdescribed to the person who signed it.
The record in that scenario lacks everything that supported enforcement in Mezzanatto. The term was not announced plainly, and no lawyer explained it. A defendant who merely regrets the bargain, or who says that refusing to sign would have ended any chance of leniency, offers nothing of that kind.
United States v. Burch shows the requirement applied after a plea has been entered and withdrawn. Burch had waived his rights as part of a plea agreement, obtained permission to withdraw the plea, and then objected when his plea statements were offered at trial. He argued that the district court's decision to let him withdraw amounted to an implicit finding that the plea and the waiver were involuntary.57 The D.C. Circuit rejected the inference. The district court had called his belated assertion of innocence “implausible” and “hard to accept,” and had allowed a trial primarily because a trial was his “only chance to avoid the draconian sentence adopted by Congress” for his drug offense. It had also warned him that all of his plea statements would be admitted for impeachment, rebuttal, or the case in chief in any future trial, a warning that belies any view that the plea or the waiver was coerced.58 Permission to withdraw can rest on reasons that have nothing to do with coercion, so the grant of the motion was not itself an affirmative indication of involuntariness.
Withdrawal did not disable the waiver, and the rule's history shows why that matters. Courts excluded withdrawn guilty pleas because admitting them would set at naught the allowance of withdrawal and place the accused in a dilemma utterly inconsistent with the decision to award him a trial.59 A waiver is the agreed departure from that protection, so the question is whether the departure was knowing and voluntary, and whether the plea survived is beside the point.
On voluntariness, the court relied on its own earlier decision refusing to call a plea involuntary where the trial judge had conducted a “textbook Rule 11 inquiry, taking pains to insure that the defendant's submissions were knowing and voluntary.” Because the judge's voluntariness determination ultimately rested on a credibility finding, the court would not disturb it absent clear evidence to the contrary.60 The mechanism is easy to trace. A Rule 11 colloquy is a contemporaneous record in which the defendant answers the judge directly, so a later claim of coercion must overcome those answers, and a finding that rests on credibility draws deference on review.
Burch differs from Mezzanatto in where the waiver sat, and that difference changed how the court reviewed the claim. The Burch waiver was one term of the plea agreement itself, and Burch made no attempt to separate it from his broader claim about the whole agreement, so the court could test the waiver only by examining the plea agreement that subsumed it. The Mezzanatto waiver, by contrast, had been negotiated separately, before plea discussions began, which let the Supreme Court focus on its voluntariness alone.61
One further limit has been suggested, though neither Mezzanatto nor Burch adopted it. Some authority proposes that waivers may carry a perhaps-implied requirement of good faith on the prosecution's part, so that a defendant could be relieved of a waiver on proof that the prosecution never intended to reach a plea agreement and took part in the talks only to collect usable admissions.62 The idea follows from the structure of a waiver, which is the price the defendant pays for a chance at a deal. If the prosecutor never meant to deal, the defendant paid the price and received nothing. Because the proposal is unsettled, an exam answer should present it as an available argument and not as an established exception.
Scope of Waivers
Rule 410(a)(4) bars the government from using a statement made in plea discussions with a prosecutor when the discussions end without a guilty plea or with a plea later withdrawn, and a waiver is the defendant's agreement to set that bar aside.65 The earlier subsections showed that such agreements are enforceable when knowing and voluntary. Two further questions remain, and exam problems tend to blur them. For what purposes may the protection be waived: impeachment of the defendant's testimony, rebuttal of the defense case, or proof in the government's case in chief? And what conduct sets off a waiver already given? The first asks how much a defendant may sign away, and the second asks what the particular document says.
Mezzanatto itself reached only impeachment. The three concurring Justices, whose votes were necessary to the majority, worried that admitting plea statements in the case in chief would too severely undermine a defendant's incentive to negotiate, and the Court left that question open.66 Even the impeachment waiver has been applied broadly, since plea statements have been used to impeach a defendant's witnesses where the defendant chose not to testify.67
The D.C. Circuit took up the reserved question in United States v. Burch. Burch's waiver was a term of a plea agreement that resulted from successful negotiations. After he withdrew the plea, the district court admitted his plea statement and his statements at a debriefing session with the DEA as part of the prosecution's case in chief.68 The court of appeals upheld that ruling because it could not discern any acceptable rationale for not extending the majority opinion in Mezzanatto to this case.69
The court drew three principles from Justice Thomas's majority opinion. Voluntary agreements to waive statutory protections, including evidentiary rules, are presumptively enforceable absent an affirmative indication that Congress meant to preclude waiver. The Rules and the Advisory Committee's Notes do not express congressional disfavor toward waivability. And a court weighing whether to override the presumption should assess whatever public policy justifications favor departing from it.70 None of the three depends on whether the statements are used to impeach or to prove guilt. The court then answered the concurrence's worry in two ways. The concern is far less warranted for a waiver executed as a result of plea negotiations than for one required as a condition of beginning them. And allowing the government to bargain for a waiver does not undermine the reliability of fact-finding, the only institutional concern Mezzanatto named as a counterweight to waivability.71 The timing point has a second edge. Because the Burch waiver came out of successful negotiations, the Rules fully protected the defendant while he bargained, so it is difficult to see how the waiver could have reduced the zone of unrestrained candor in the way a waiver secured at the start of bargaining arguably did.72
Lower courts have generally followed that reasoning, holding that the rationale for enforcing an impeachment waiver applies equally when the prosecution offers the otherwise-protected admission in its case in chief to prove guilt.73 Two cautions belong in any answer. Mezzanatto itself did not decide the case-in-chief question, and the objection is strongest where a waiver demanded as the price of talking is used to prove guilt, the combination the concurring Justices feared. Critics also see each extension as a step toward the dead letters the dissent predicted.
The second question, what sets off a waiver already given, usually arises under a proffer agreement, the agreement under which a defendant previews for the government what he would say. Courts have upheld terms that let the prosecution use the proffer as rebuttal evidence if the defendant presents a defense inconsistent with it. Such a term burdens the defendant's choice of defense, but it does not forfeit his constitutional right to present one.74 Because the agreement is what the parties made, its words set the trigger, and a court reads the agreement before it decides anything about the evidence.
United States v. Shannon shows why the wording matters. Shannon argued that he did not “offer any evidence” because he called no witnesses and put on no defense case. The government answered that he waived his proffer agreement's protections when he cross-examined a witness and elicited responses inconsistent with his proffer statements, which it characterized as an “offer of evidence.”75 Whether cross-examination fits the trigger is a question about the agreement's terms and the defense's conduct, and the case teaches that calling no witnesses does not by itself settle it.
The Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Lyle supplies the method. The court asks first whether the defendant offered any evidence or made a factual assertion that would trigger the waiver and, if so, whether the proffer statement fairly rebuts the fact asserted or the evidence offered.76 Lyle's counsel told the jury in opening that Lyle was a mere user of methamphetamine and not a dealer. That was more than a challenge to the sufficiency of the government's proof, and Lyle's proffer statements fairly rebutted it: he had repeatedly distributed small packages of methamphetamine, accompanied another person to obtain and deliver it, and knew where the supplier was. Together those admissions implied participation in a distribution operation, and proper rebuttal is not limited to direct contradiction.77 By contrast, a defense argument that simply challenges the sufficiency of the government's proof on the elements does not trigger a waiver, while a statement of fact in opening, such as one unequivocally naming someone else as the real perpetrator, does.78
The line falls there because of what the waiver is for. A defendant who holds the government to its burden asserts nothing that a proffer could contradict, and the waiver exists to answer assertions. If a bare challenge to the government's proof set it off, every defendant who signed a proffer agreement would surrender the right to put the government to its proof, and the agreement would reach the result of a case-in-chief waiver without saying so.
The agreement's other terms also decide questions the rule leaves open. Drafting matters because the government usually writes the terms. In United States v. Plummer, the government dictated an immunity agreement that referred only to “use immunity,” and the court held the government responsible for failing to distinguish derivative use immunity, reading the agreement as presumptively including it.79 Breach is a further term that can move a statement from protected to usable. Agreements often require the defendant to be completely truthful and bar representations, personal or made “through counsel,” that are materially different from the statements made. Where a plea entered under the agreement is withdrawn, the agreement is probably breached and otherwise-protected admissions may be used.80