Concept
Exceptions to Exclusion
Plea negotiations
Exceptions to Exclusion
Rule 410(b) opens two exceptions to the exclusion in Rule 410(a) and states both in permissive terms: the court may admit a statement described in Rule 410(a)(3) or (4) when either circumstance is present.1 The first arises when another statement from the same plea or plea discussions has been introduced and fairness calls for considering the statements together. The second arises in a criminal prosecution for perjury or false statement, when the defendant made the statement under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel.2
Three features of the exceptions control most exam answers. They reach only the statements described in Rule 410(a)(3) and (4), meaning statements made at a plea proceeding and statements made in plea discussions with a prosecutor, so a withdrawn guilty plea and a nolo contendere plea stay inadmissible against the defendant even when a Rule 410(b) circumstance is present.3 The word may leaves admission to the trial judge, so neither exception commands it, and exclusion remains the default when neither circumstance exists. Both exceptions also work through the rule's own terms, so the defendant need not agree to anything for either to apply. An agreement to give up the protection is waiver, a separate subject taken up later in this chapter.
The exceptions leave one limit of the exclusion untouched. The federal rule applies no fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, so evidence discovered because of a protected statement is not excluded on that ground alone.4 Rule 410 keeps the statement itself from the factfinder and goes no further.
Fairness and Completeness
Rule 410(b)(1) lets the court admit a protected statement "in any proceeding in which another statement made during the same plea or plea discussions has been introduced, if in fairness the statements ought to be considered together."5 The exception pairs a trigger with a judgment. The trigger is that a statement from the same plea or plea discussions is already in evidence. The judgment belongs to the court: whether fairness calls for the factfinder to hear the two statements together.
The purpose is completeness. A remark can mean one thing standing alone and something quite different beside the statement that qualifies it, so a factfinder who hears only the favorable half may leave with a distorted picture. If the defendant offers one statement made during plea bargaining and the court finds that another statement is necessary to clarify the first, the court will permit the government to introduce the other.6 The 1980 amendment added this provision to the federal rule, so it was not part of the original protection.7
The rule asks only whether another statement "has been introduced" and does not say who must have introduced it. In the ordinary case the defendant is the one who does, because Rule 410(a) bars the prosecutor from offering these statements against him in the first place. In United States v. Mezzanatto, the Court observed that the plea-statement rules bar use only "against" the defendant and so leave open the possibility that he will offer such statements for his own tactical advantage. The Court read the "has been introduced" language of the completeness provision as showing that the rules contemplate exactly that result.8 The defendant therefore decides whether the door opens. He may keep his bargaining statements out entirely, or he may offer a helpful one and accept the risk that the court will let the government bring in the rest.
The words "same plea or plea discussions" narrow the exception. A statement from a separate round of negotiations, over a different charge for example, does not qualify, because the exception does not follow the defendant from one negotiation to the next. One helpful remark from one session therefore opens that session and nothing beyond it. The fairness finding narrows the exception further. A second statement does not come in merely because it hurts the defendant; it comes in because fairness calls for considering it together with the first.
The usual exam error is to reach for this exception when nothing has been introduced.
The exception answers an introduction and cannot supply its own trigger. It also gives the government no route to impeachment. Rule 410(b) does not address impeachment in terms, but the original rule contained a limited exception for "voluntary and reliable statements" offered for impeachment, Congress eliminated that language in 1975, and the Second Circuit and other federal courts have read the change to bar impeachment use of plea-negotiation statements.9 A defendant who tells a different story on the stand has therefore opened nothing by contradiction alone.
Perjury Prosecutions
Rule 410(b)(2) lets the court admit a protected statement "in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement, if the defendant made the statement under oath, on the record, and with counsel present."11 The exception has four parts: one concerns the proceeding in which the statement is offered, and three concern how the defendant made it. The fairness exception answers a one-sided presentation of statements that may be true. This exception answers the opposite problem, a defendant who uses the plea process to say something false.
The standard scenario shows how the pieces fit. After negotiating with the prosecutor, a murder defendant agrees to plead guilty and to provide information about Zed, another participant in the crime, in exchange for leniency. At the hearing to enter his plea, he testifies under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel, minimizing his own role and describing Zed as the major actor. The government later comes to believe that the testimony was false and charges him with perjury. The plea-hearing statements may be used against him in that prosecution.12 Without the exception, those statements would stay protected when the hearing concerned a nolo contendere plea or a guilty plea later withdrawn.
Two points support the result. A defendant who lies at the hearing most likely did not act in good faith to carry out his side of the bargain, and fairness gives little reason to shield him from the consequences.13 The statement is also the crime itself. The prosecutor offers the words as the act of committing perjury, which gives them independent legal significance, so they are not offered for the truth of what they assert and the hearsay rule does not apply. The statement is not evidence of anything; it is the thing at issue.14 A rule that kept it out would leave a perjury prosecution without its central evidence.
Rule 11 supplies the usual setting. Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the defendant "may be placed under oath," and the court must address the defendant personally in open court.15 The word may matters. A plea hearing is not automatically a sworn proceeding, so on an exam the oath is a fact to confirm in the stem and not to assume.
The first step catches the most common slip. A stem that places the defendant before the judge, sworn, recorded, and accompanied by a lawyer invites the conclusion that the statement is admissible, yet those facts satisfy only half of the exception.
The three formalities matter as much as the proceeding does, and each is a fact the government must show about the particular statement. A false account given in an informal meeting with the prosecutor, without an oath or a record, falls outside Rule 410(b)(2) however clearly the government later proves it false. Federal practice follows this text, and state rules often but not always contain a comparable exception, so a question under state law calls for checking the state provision.16