Concept
Rule 409 Versus Rule 408
Payment of medical expenses
Rule 409 Versus Rule 408
Two drivers stand beside their wrecked cars, and one says, "We can't agree who's responsible for the accident, but I'll pay your hospital bill and we'll forget the whole thing." That statement is an offer to compromise a disputed claim, which Rule 408 covers, and it is also the humanitarian assistance that Rule 409 covers.1 Offered to prove fault, the offer to pay falls within both exclusions. The overlap is not complete, however, and the questions that test these rules live in the gaps.
Rule 409 bars evidence of furnishing, promising to pay, or offering to pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses resulting from an injury when the evidence is offered to prove liability for the injury.2 Rule 408 bars evidence of furnishing, promising, or offering valuable consideration to compromise a claim, and of conduct or statements made during compromise negotiations about the claim, when the evidence is offered to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim (or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction).3 Each rule is limited to its forbidden purpose, so each leaves the evidence available for something else. Rule 408(b) gives examples: proving a witness's bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.4 Rule 409 lists no permitted uses, but because it excludes the evidence only when offered to prove "liability," the implication is that any other purpose is allowed.5
Three differences separate the rules: whether a dispute is required, whether statements that accompany the payment are protected, and which kinds of payment are covered. The table sets those differences beside the points on which the rules agree.6
| Point of comparison | Rule 408 | Rule 409 |
|---|---|---|
| Dispute required? | Yes, a disputed claim | No |
| Payments covered | Any valuable consideration offered to compromise the claim | Medical, hospital, or similar expenses resulting from an injury |
| Accompanying statements | Conduct and statements made during compromise negotiations are excluded | Statements of fact made with the offer are not excluded |
| Evidence barred when offered to prove | The validity or amount of the disputed claim | Liability for the injury |
| Other purposes | Admissible; Rule 408(b) gives examples | Admissible by implication; no list of examples |
Disputed Claim Requirement
Rule 408 applies only where there is a disputed claim, and its text says so: it protects compromise evidence offered to prove or disprove the validity or amount of "a disputed claim."7 Rule 409 sets no such condition and excludes offers and payments even when nobody has disputed anything.8 The difference follows from what each rule encourages. A compromise presupposes a disagreement to compromise, so the policy of encouraging settlement has nothing to protect until a dispute exists. Humanitarian help is wanted at the moment of injury, before anyone has asserted or contested a claim, and a rule that waited for a dispute would come too late for the conduct it was meant to encourage.9
An insurer illustrates the gap. People involved in an injury-causing incident, and insurers that may ultimately bear financial responsibility, have reasons to pay the victim's medical expenses, and an insurer in particular has an incentive to provide care that decreases the magnitude of the injury.10 If the insurer pays before the claimant disputes anything, Rule 408 cannot apply, because that rule reaches only a disputed claim, but Rule 409 excludes the payment when it is offered to prove liability.11 Once a driver says "we can't agree who's responsible" and then offers the hospital bill, the dispute exists and both rules apply. A tempting error is to reason that a payment made before any claim was asserted cannot be excluded because there was nothing to compromise. That error applies the compromise rule's trigger to the medical-expense rule.
Treatment of Statements
Rule 408 protects more than the payment, because its text also reaches "conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim."12 Rule 409 reaches only the furnishing, promise, or offer to pay, and statements made in connection with such an offer are not excluded.13 The rationale is that communication is essential if compromises are to be effected, so statements need broad protection, while that is not so for payments or offers or promises to pay medical expenses, where factual statements are expected to be incidental.14 Parties can settle a disagreement only by saying what happened and what each would accept, and if each concession could be read to a jury, both sides would retreat into guarded generalities. An offer to pay a hospital bill is complete without any discussion of the accident, so shielding the surrounding facts would add little encouragement while depriving the factfinder of the speaker's own account. For that reason the need for relevant evidence outweighs the value of encouraging humanitarian conduct by excluding statements of fact made in connection with it.15
The court in Fesmire v. Digh explained why the compromise rule shelters statements so broadly. The rule contemplates that parties need to feel free to make certain assumptions for the purpose of settlement negotiations, and those statements are assumed to be true only for the purpose of compromise negotiations.16 The rule codifies the longstanding principle that evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is not admissible.17 No comparable shelter covers a statement made alongside an offer to pay medical bills.
The two scenes contain the same admission, and the only difference is whether a dispute and a compromise effort surround it. The same split decides the familiar problem in which Ralph offers to pay Minnie's medical expenses and says he was texting. The offer is inadmissible to prove negligence, and the texting statement comes in against Ralph, because statements made in connection with an offer to pay medical expenses are not excluded and a party's own statement offered against him is not hearsay.18
Kinds of Payments Covered
Rule 408 covers the furnishing, promising, or offering of "a valuable consideration" in compromising a claim, so whatever the parties trade to settle counts, whether money or the payment of a towing charge.19 Rule 409 is confined to medical, hospital, or similar expenses resulting from an injury.20 The limits reflect different policies. The policy favoring settlement does not depend on what changes hands, since a dispute can be closed with any valuable consideration. The humanitarian policy centers on helping the injured person with the expenses of the injury, so the rule follows those expenses and stops short of other costs of the accident. An offer to compromise by paying the other person's non-medical expense, such as a towing charge, therefore falls outside Rule 409, but Rule 408 excludes it if the underlying claim was disputed.21
Together the two rules leave a gap. Had the drivers in that scene been disputing fault, Rule 408 would have excluded the same offer to cover the tow.22 A student who assumes that every payment-related remark is shielded by one rule or the other will exclude evidence that neither rule covers.
A last check applies under either rule: the evidence is barred only when offered for the forbidden purpose, and it remains available for another purpose, such as a witness's bias under Rule 408(b).23