Concept
Comparison With Rules 409 and 410
Compromise offers and negotiations
Comparison With Rules 409 and 410
Rule 408(a) excludes two kinds of evidence: furnishing, promising, or offering valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim (or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept it), and conduct or statements made during compromise negotiations about the claim.1 Neither may be offered on behalf of any party to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim, or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction.2 Rule 409 rests on a similar thought: responsible behavior after the fact does not necessarily prove legal fault, and the system should encourage it.3 Rule 410 does for plea bargaining what Rule 408 does for compromise, because it bars the use of bargaining statements to show liability for the charged offense.4 Despite that common ground, the three rules differ on whom the bargain must be struck with, on whether accompanying statements are protected, and on whether the evidence may come in for another purpose.
| Question | Rule 408 | Rule 409 | Rule 410 |
|---|---|---|---|
| With whom must the party facing liability deal? | Anyone who can settle the disputed claim | Anyone who can accept payment | A prosecutor, not the police |
| Are related statements protected? | Yes, statements made during compromise negotiations | No, statements accompanying the payment or offer are admissible | Yes when offered to show liability, with two narrow exceptions |
| May the offer, payment, or plea come in for a purpose other than liability? | Yes | Yes | No |
The table tracks the comparison that the source itself draws among the three rules.5 Rule 409 overlaps most with Rule 408, so it comes first.
Rule 409 and Medical Expenses
Rule 409 excludes proof that a person furnished, offered, or promised to pay another's medical, hospital, or similar expenses when the proof is offered to prove liability.6 The payer may believe he is responsible, or he may be a Good Samaritan who believes himself blameless and wants to help someone in need.7 Either way, U.S. law does not require people to assist others, but it does not wish to discourage such efforts or to punish the Good Samaritan, and Rule 409 follows those principles in a limited way.8 The rule also lets an insurance carrier that anticipates liability and a possible dispute over amount advance the sums needed to compensate the claimant while still maintaining that it is not liable for the full amount claimed.9 Three features set Rule 409 apart from Rule 408.
The first difference is that Rule 409 does not wait for a dispute. Rule 408 protects dealings with someone who can settle a disputed claim, while Rule 409 protects a payment or offer to anyone who can accept it, and the blameless Good Samaritan fits comfortably inside that protection.10 The person paying need not have been involved in the accident or be a party to the suit, and a hospital bill paid weeks after the accident is excluded just as one paid at the scene.11
The second difference is the one students most often miss: Rule 409 shelters the payment or offer but not the talk around it. By its terms the rule excludes only furnishing, offering, or promising to pay expenses, which is narrower than Rule 408, where conduct and statements in compromise negotiations are excluded as well.12 Conversations about why the party paid the medical expenses are therefore admissible, because only the payments are excluded.13 The drafters explain the gap this way: frank factual discussion is essential to negotiating a successful compromise but is not necessary to rendering humanitarian assistance. In the humanitarian setting, the need for relevant evidence to resolve factual disputes outweighs the value of encouraging charity by excluding statements of fact.14
The third difference concerns other purposes. Rule 409 lists no permitted uses, but it states a limiting principle: the evidence is excluded only when offered to prove liability, so any other purpose leaves the rule inapplicable.15 Rule 408(b) instead gives examples, such as proving a witness's bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution, and provides that the court may admit the evidence for them.16 That discretion has limits. The judge must balance the other purpose against the policy of encouraging settlements, and a ruling will be upset only for abuse of discretion; one court of appeals upheld the exclusion of a report offered to prove notice, because notice could be effectively proved by means less in conflict with the policy behind Rule 408.17
Where 408 and 409 Overlap
A driver who says, “We can't agree who's responsible, but I'll pay your hospital bill and we'll forget the whole thing,” has done two things at once. His words are an offer to compromise a disputed claim and also the kind of humanitarian assistance that Rule 409 covers, although the overlap is not complete.19 Because Rule 408 is in play, his statement about responsibility is a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim, and it stays out when offered to prove liability.20 The same pairing explains why statements accompanying an offer to pay medical expenses may escape Rule 409 standing alone and still be excluded when the context suggests the parties were trying to settle the case.21
The overlap is partial in both directions. Rule 409 reaches a payment made when nothing is disputed, which Rule 408 does not. In the other direction, an offer to compromise by paying a non-medical expense, such as a towing charge, falls outside Rule 409 but is excluded by Rule 408 if the underlying claim was disputed.22
Context decides whether talk counts as compromise negotiation. If one party has sued or threatened to sue, later discussions are easy to characterize as compromise negotiations, but if litigation has not been mentioned, conversations are likely to be treated as ordinary business give-and-take outside Rule 408.23 In one exchange, Davis asked what it would take to “make this go away,” Hammock said to pay back what he took, Davis countered with an offer to split $29,000, and Hammock countered that the missing funds totaled more than $100,000. That give and take read as compromise negotiation, and Hammock's trial testimony confirmed that he understood it that way.24 Sokolowski v. Medi Mart, Inc. shows the compromise principle reaching an informal remark: the court said the trial court should have excluded an assistant manager's hearsay statements, which could easily be construed as an offer to settle or compromise.25
Rule 410 and Plea Discussions
Rule 410 excludes withdrawn guilty pleas and nolo contendere pleas, along with statements made during proceedings on them. It also excludes statements made during plea discussions with attorneys for prosecuting authorities that did not result in guilty pleas, or that resulted in guilty pleas later withdrawn.27 The counterparty matters, because the party facing liability must be dealing with a prosecutor, not the police.28 As under Rule 408, statements made in connection with plea bargaining cannot be admitted to show liability for the charged offense.29
Rule 410 leaves far less room for other uses than Rule 408 does. Statements from plea discussions are admissible in only two situations. The first is when other statements from the same discussions have been introduced and fairness requires that the statements be considered together. The second is a criminal prosecution for perjury or false statement, when the defendant made the statements under oath, on the record, and with counsel present.30 The source calls this a much more limited treatment of bargaining statements for purposes other than liability, and its comparison answers no to whether an offered plea can come in for other uses, where Rules 408 and 409 answer yes.31
The counterparty draws the line in those two scenes: a statement to a prosecuting attorney in plea talks is protected, and a statement to an arresting officer is not.32 Whether a defendant may agree in advance to give up this protection is a separate question, one the Supreme Court addressed in United States v. Mezzanatto.