Concept
No Impeachment Use
Compromise offers and negotiations
No Impeachment Use
Rule 408(a) bars a second use of compromise evidence besides proving the claim: the evidence may not be offered “to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction.”1 The bar runs “on behalf of any party,” so plaintiff and defendant are equally shut out. It reaches both kinds of protected evidence: the furnishing, promising, or offering of valuable consideration to compromise the claim, in clause (a)(1),2 and conduct or statements made during compromise negotiations about the claim, in clause (a)(2).3 Earlier sections treated the first prohibited use, proof of the validity or amount of a disputed claim. This clause closes a different route to the jury, one that begins with a witness on the stand and ends with the same settlement words in front of the factfinder.
Impeachment means attacking a witness's credibility, and the rule names two ways of doing it. A prior inconsistent statement is something the witness said before trial that cannot be squared with the testimony, and the opponent offers the earlier words to show the witness is unreliable. A contradiction is proof of some other fact, such as an offer, a payment, or an act at the bargaining table, that conflicts with what the witness said on the stand. Rule 408 precludes both uses of settlement communications and conduct.4
Impeachment with a negotiation remark succeeds only if the jury treats the remark as the truer account of what happened, and that is the merits inference under another label. The risk is sharper because negotiation statements are unreliable by design. The rule contemplates that parties need to feel free to make assumptions for the purpose of settlement negotiations, and the author assumes those statements to be true only for the purpose of compromise.5 Using inconsistent statements from negotiations for general impeachment of a party's testimony is fraught with danger that the statements will be misused to prove liability, it threatens the frank interchange of information during negotiations, and it generally should not be permitted.6 Consider the negotiator's position: a party who takes the stand almost always says something about the facts that an opponent can set against an earlier remark, so if impeachment were allowed, nearly every sentence at the table would be a potential exhibit.
A South Carolina contract dispute between Fesmire and Digh shows the misuse in a litigated case. The master admitted redacted letters from the settlement negotiations and used them as supposed prior inconsistent statements to impeach Digh's credibility, which in turn bolstered Fesmire's version of the parties' contract.7 The court held that admitting the letters violated South Carolina's Rule 408, because they were offered in compromise negotiations, and it described the master's use as a misuse of allegedly prior inconsistent statements to prove liability under the guise of impeachment.8 A footnote added that the federal rule's prohibition against impeachment through a prior inconsistent statement is explicit.9
The federal rule has not always been explicit. Before the 2006 amendment it did not expressly bar the use, and a majority of decisions permitted compromise evidence to be admitted for impeachment.10 Rule 408(a) was amended effective December 1, 2006 to prohibit the use of conduct or statements made in settlement negotiations when offered “to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction.”11 A decision from before that date that allowed impeachment with a negotiation statement therefore rests on superseded text. It records how courts read a gap that the amendment closed, and it should not be treated as current federal law.
The amendment names two forms of impeachment and leaves the others alone. Rule 408 does not preclude other forms, such as proof of a witness's bias or prejudice, and Rule 408(b) lists bias or prejudice first among the purposes for which the court may admit compromise evidence.12 Bias impeachment asks whether the witness has a reason to favor one side, and a payment from that side supplies the reason whatever the witness said at the table. A defendant who calls a witness hurt in the same collision may therefore be met with proof that the witness was paid or promised money in compromise of the witness's own claim, because that financial tie bears on bias.13 Admitting the payment sets the principle that bias may be shown against the policy of encouraging compromise.14 Because the rule says the court “may” admit the evidence, the call belongs to the judge, and a later section takes up that balancing.
The same witness and the same settlement produce opposite rulings because the jury is asked to draw different inferences. The payment works through the tenant's financial interest, which exists whether or not anything said at the table was true. The remark works only if the jury believes the table version over the testimony, and that is the route the amendment closed. Statements and conduct also remain subject to the exception in clause (a)(2), covered earlier, for criminal cases in which the negotiations related to a claim by a public office exercising regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority.15 On an exam, sort the type of impeachment first. A stem that offers a settlement-talk remark as a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction points to exclusion, a stem that offers a payment to show bias points to the court's discretion, and a stem that relies on a pre-2006 decision relies on text that no longer exists.