Concept
Offers, Payments, and Acceptances
Compromise offers and negotiations
Offers, Payments, and Acceptances
Rule 408(a)(1) reaches the money side of a compromise. It bars proof of “furnishing, promising, or offering—or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept—a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim.”1 The clause names every move in the exchange: the side that hands over value, the side that promises it, the side that offers it, and the opposite side that takes it, promises to take it, or offers to take it. The value is usually money, and the standard name for the opening move is an offer of compromise, an offer by one party to settle a dispute amicably, usually by paying money, to avoid or end a lawsuit or other legal action.2
Clause (a)(1) is narrower than subdivision (a), and the narrowness is deliberate. It covers the exchange of value itself: the offer, the payment, the acceptance. The words and conduct around that exchange, such as what a negotiator says while the figures are traded, fall under clause (a)(2), which protects “conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim” and which the next section takes up.3 The division gives you two questions to put to any negotiation. Was value offered, paid, or accepted in an effort to compromise? Was some other statement or act made during the negotiation? Both clauses share one core prohibition: no party may use the evidence to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim.4 The threshold requirements discussed above, a disputed claim and a genuine compromise effort, apply to each clause.
The clause covers three situations. In the first, one side proposes terms before anything is agreed. In the second, the parties strike a deal, and the question is whether a finished settlement is shielded like an offer that failed. In the third, the compromise was made with someone other than the opponent in the case on trial. The first is the simplest, because protection does not wait on agreement or even on an answer.
Offers and Demands
Clause (a)(1) protects both sides of the bargaining table. A defendant who proposes to pay is offering consideration; a claimant who names the sum that will end the dispute is offering to accept it.5 A settlement demand therefore falls inside the clause as surely as a proposed payment does, and the rule covers the efforts of the party claiming relief and of the party against whom the claim is made.6
Protection does not depend on a reply. The clause covers “offering” and “attempting to compromise,” and an attempt that fails is still an attempt.7 The policy behind the rule points the same way, since admitting such evidence would discourage the compromises that public policy favors.8 Consider the position of whoever speaks first. That speaker reveals a willingness to pay or to accept before learning whether the other side will engage at all. If the proposal were safe only after a counteroffer arrived, no one could count on safety at the moment of speaking, and silence would be the prudent course. A stem that stresses that the offer was ignored, refused, or met with a refusal to talk therefore describes no exception.
United States v. Davis shows what a negotiation looks like in the record. In a conversation with Hammock about funds the fraternity had found missing, Davis asked what it would take to “make this go away.” Hammock answered that Davis should pay back what he took. Davis countered with an offer to split the $29,000 in checks to cash that he thought the fraternity had discovered, and Hammock countered that the missing funds totaled more than $100,000.9 The court had no doubt that Davis offered to compromise a disputed claim, and it noted that Hammock's own trial testimony confirmed that he understood this give and take as a compromise negotiation. It stated the governing rule as one excluding evidence of settlement offers and negotiations when offered to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a claim.10 Davis named a sum, and the other side answered in kind, so the exchange has the shape of bargaining from start to finish.
In Sanders v. Madison Square Garden, L.P. the plaintiff asserted a sexual harassment claim and, separately, a retaliation claim. The defendants wanted the settlement discussions admitted on the retaliation claim, where, they said, the discussions showed that her harassment claim was made in bad faith and was known by her to be invalid when she made it.11 The court called that argument too fine a line. Even limited to the retaliation claim, the evidence was offered for the forbidden purpose of showing that the underlying claim was frivolous.12 It granted the plaintiff's motion to exclude the settlement discussions.13 The claim for which the evidence is offered does not control; the inference the jury must draw does. Sanders also shows the claimant's side of the rule at work, since the evidence at issue came from the plaintiff's own settlement talks.
The bar reaches amount as well as validity, so a bargaining figure cannot be turned into an estimate of what the claim is worth.14
A communication that proposes no trade falls outside clause (a)(1), because the clause asks whether valuable consideration was put forward. In Hanson v. Waller counsel wrote to opposing counsel enclosing photographs of an accident, said the photographs showed that the truck driver could not have seen the deceased if she had been standing directly in front of the truck, and asked opposing counsel to discuss the case.15 The court held that the letter was not evidence of furnishing or accepting valuable consideration in compromising a disputed claim. It was therefore not an offer of compromise, and it was properly admitted as an admission by a party opponent, because Rule 801(d)(2)(C) removes from hearsay a statement made by a person the party authorized to speak on the subject.16 Compare Davis. Davis named a sum to be divided and so put a concession on the table, and a concession is what later use at trial would discourage parties from making. The Hanson letter named nothing to pay or to take, so it exposed no concession for the rule to shield. That does not make every unpriced remark admissible, because clause (a)(2) separately protects statements made during compromise negotiations.17 A stem that describes a letter inviting settlement talks therefore calls for one check: does the letter offer or ask for any consideration?
Completed Compromises
The word “compromising” in the phrase “in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim” reaches a settlement that was actually made. “Attempting to compromise” covers talks that fail; “compromising” covers talks that end in a deal, a finished exchange of value, such as money for a release, that closes the dispute.19 Neither the offer nor the completed compromise itself may be used to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim.20
A finished settlement can look different from a failed offer, since no bargaining remains to protect. The rule still reaches it, and both of the rule's reasons explain why. The first is relevance: a payment may buy peace rather than admit liability, so it says little about whether the claim was good. The second, and the more important, is policy: admitting the evidence would discourage the compromises that public policy favors.21 The policy is easy to see from the payer's side. A payer deciding whether to settle one claim knows that other claimants may exist and may learn of the payment. If the payment could be replayed to them, settling would cost the sum paid and would also hand every later claimant an exhibit, and the payer would do better to refuse the first claim and defend it.
The second customer asks the jury to move from the payment to the validity of a disputed claim, the inference that Rule 408(a) forbids on behalf of any party.22 The payment shows only that the manufacturer chose to end a dispute, and that choice fits a belief that the ladder was sound as well as a belief that it was defective. The signed release changes nothing, because the clause attaches to consideration furnished in compromising the claim, and the $20,000 is exactly that.23
The bar stops where its own terms stop: it applies only when the evidence is offered to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim.24 A settlement agreement is a contract, and when one side sues because the other has not performed, the claim in court is the agreement itself. The plaintiff proves offer and acceptance as the facts the claim rests on, and says nothing about the original dispute, so the forbidden inference is never drawn. Commentary on the rule lists, among the uses it does not bar, showing the terms of a compromise that are part of the current case,25 and subdivision (b) confirms that the court may admit compromise evidence for another purpose.26 A later section returns to enforcement among the permitted purposes.
The boundary also follows from what the rule is for. Rule 408 shields bargaining so that parties will settle, and a settlement is worth having only if it can be enforced. If a party could sign, walk away, and then invoke the rule to keep the agreement out of evidence, a rule meant to encourage settlements would protect those who break them.
The ladder manufacturer's payment and the contractor's agreement are both completed settlements, yet they land on opposite sides of the line. The payment was offered to show what the manufacturer believed about a disputed claim; the agreement is offered to prove its own terms. Students most often go wrong by deciding from the label and treating anything called a settlement as untouchable. Ask instead which inference the proponent needs: a view of the underlying claim's strength, or the existence of the agreement itself.
Settlements With Third Parties
Clause (a)(1) says nothing that confines it to a compromise with the present opponent, and subdivision (a) bars the evidence on behalf of any party.28 The rule therefore reaches past the parties at trial. Evidence that a person previously settled a claim is excluded if offered, in a case involving a different person, to prove liability for that claim, its invalidity, or the proper amount.29
A settlement with someone else can look harmless, since no bargaining in the pending suit is at stake, and tempting, since it seems to carry real inferential force: a defendant who paid another claimant over the same event may seem to doubt its own defense. Federal courts nevertheless hold inadmissible the use of a completed compromise of a claim arising out of the same transaction between a third person and a party to the suit being litigated.30 The reason is the one that supports the rule everywhere: the spectre of a subsequent use to prejudice a separate and discrete claim is a disincentive that Rule 408 seeks to prevent.31 A defendant facing several injured claimants from one accident will settle the first claim only if that settlement will not become an exhibit at the next claimant's trial. Oscar, for instance, would be much less likely to settle with Newell if the payment were admissible against him, and everything would be driven toward trial.32
Rule 408 is not a privilege that protects only the paying party; it blocks any party from using a settlement, even when the person who paid is no longer in the case.33 Students most often go wrong by reading “on behalf of any party” as protecting only the payer, or by assuming that protection lapses when the settling person leaves the case. The question remains what the evidence is offered to prove, so who paid, who remains, and who offers it do not change the answer.34
Exclusion does not leave Oscar without a defense, at least in theory. In most states damages are apportioned, so Oscar may still try to prove through other evidence that Phil is partly responsible for Mason's loss, and that proof should reduce Oscar's liability.35 What Oscar loses is the settlement itself as proof, which is the price of keeping defendants willing to settle.
The reasoning applies with more force when the earlier settlements involved the very parties now in court. In one dispute growing out of the breakup of a business association between Krauss and Dupuy, the trial judge found that the pending claims arose from the same transaction as earlier suits between the same parties. The appellate court reasoned that, since Rule 408 excludes a completed compromise between a third person and a party to the pending suit, there was even more reason to exclude settlements or negotiations between the same parties, and it upheld exclusion of the statements in question.36 It made no difference that the pending case was founded in antitrust and the earlier suits were not, because the claims concerned matters arising from the same litigation and continued the feud between Krauss and Dupuy. The fact that Rule 408 does not in terms bar an item of evidence does not make that evidence otherwise admissible.37
A claimant's settlement with another wrongdoer receives the same protection. The opinion cites a First Circuit decision, McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., that excluded evidence of a settlement the plaintiff had made with a joint tortfeasor.38
Because the rule forbids only inferences about validity or amount, a third party's settlement can still reach the jury for a different reason. Commentary lists establishing bias among the uses the rule does not bar,39 and subdivision (b) names a witness's bias or prejudice among the purposes for which the court may admit compromise evidence.40
The first use is permitted because it goes to credibility, a question on which the strength and value of the underlying claim play no part. Even then, subdivision (b) says the court may admit the evidence, so the judge still weighs the need for it against the risk that jurors will treat the payment as proof of fault.41 That discretion is real. The exception for other purposes must be balanced against the policy of encouraging settlements, and the trial court's judgment will be disturbed only for abuse of discretion; in one case exclusion stood because notice could be proved by means less in conflict with the policy behind Rule 408.42 Courts examine the label closely because ingenious counsel can wear down any exclusionary rule. The general rule of exclusion for subsequent repairs, for instance, has suffered substantial inroads from proposed purposes such as ownership or control of the premises, the feasibility of precautions, and impeachment.43 A third-party settlement question on an exam therefore calls for two checks: what inference the proponent needs, and whether that inference concerns the validity or amount of a claim or something about a witness.