Concept
Reasons for the Rule
Compromise offers and negotiations
Reasons for the Rule
Rule 408 bars compromise evidence offered to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim, but its text does not say why.1 The reasons matter because they settle the hard cases: whether a remark belongs to the negotiations, whether a dispute exists yet, and when an exception applies.
Two reasons support the rule, and they answer different questions. The first concerns the evidence: an offer to settle says little about who is right, yet a jury may hear it as a confession. The second concerns the legal system: courts cannot try every dispute, and parties will not negotiate openly if their concessions can be used against them once talks fail. Relevance alone does not explain the rule; the main reason is public policy.2
The difference shows up in subdivision (b), which lets the court admit compromise evidence for another purpose, such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice.3 Evidence offered that way does not ask the jury to read an offer as an admission, yet the interest in open negotiation is still at stake, so a judge deciding whether to admit it must weigh that interest.4
Limited Probative Value
An offer to settle proves little about the merits, though it is not irrelevant. The threshold for relevance is very low, and one rational inference from compromise efforts is that the person making them sees weakness in her claim or defense. Those efforts can therefore be read as an implied recognition of a relevant fact.5
The same conduct supports other inferences just as easily. A party may offer to settle to avoid the time and expense of litigation whatever the merits, or to avoid the negative publicity that attends certain claims.6 A juror who hears only that an offer was made cannot tell which motive was at work, yet a trier of fact may jump to the conclusion that the offering party has conceded responsibility.7
The strength of the inference also varies with the numbers. A very small offer to settle a very large claim reads as a desire for peace rather than an admission of weakness, while relevance grows as the offer approaches the amount claimed.8
The second offer shows why relevance cannot carry the rule. If exclusion depended on how little an offer proves, the $48,000 offer would come in. But payment of larger sums does suggest liability, and acceptance of smaller sums does suggest that a claim lacks merit, so relevance alone would not produce a rule that excludes both.9 The rule rests on public policy instead, a ground with the added advantage of avoiding difficult questions of relevancy.10
Advocates sometimes argue that an offer near the full demand proves so much that it should be admitted. The argument misreads the rule. Closeness to the demand does raise the probative force of the offer, but the bar applies at any size, because the policy favoring settlement, and not the weakness of the inference, is what excludes it.
Encouraging Settlement
The stronger reason for the rule is that the civil justice system depends on settlement. If even a quarter of civil actions went to trial, the backlog would be so serious that in some jurisdictions litigants might wait decades for their day in court, which makes settlement a necessity and not merely a convenience.12 The system would grind to a halt if every filed case were tried.13 S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District states the purpose of Rule 408 in these terms: to facilitate the settlement of disputes by encouraging the making of offers to compromise.14
Candor makes settlement work, and fear of later use destroys it. The problem-solving approach to negotiation requires honest disclosure of a good deal of information to the other side, yet lawyers are very reluctant to reveal anything that could come back to haunt them if negotiations fail and litigation continues.15 Litigants would be extremely reluctant to make offers at all if the offers could be used against them at trial.16 Lawyers could not risk negotiating if what they said or did in trying to settle were later provable when the attempt failed.17 Exclusion removes the reason for silence.
Fiberglass Insulators v. Dupuy shows the policy at work. The plaintiffs wanted to prove at trial what attorneys had said while settling earlier, related litigation between the same parties. The court of appeals held that Rule 408, and the public policy of encouraging settlement behind it, required exclusion, and it affirmed the district court’s order.18 Its reasoning started from the rule’s reach: Rule 408 would exclude a completed compromise between a third person and a party, so there is even more reason to exclude settlement negotiations between the same parties to the suit at hand.19
The same policy explains why Rule 408 protects statements and conduct as well as offers. Subdivision (a)(2) bars evidence of conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim.20 The present rule fosters free discussion and eliminates the need to decide whether a statement that was not expressly qualified falls within or without the protected area of compromise. The question is whether the statements or conduct were intended to be part of the negotiations toward compromise.21 A negotiator need not hedge each sentence to keep it protected.
The policy also marks where the rule ends. There is no policy of encouraging compromise of undisputed claims, which should be paid in full, so an offer to pay an admitted claim is not protected. If both validity and amount are undisputed, an offer to pay a lesser sum or to pay in installments is therefore admissible.22
The protected setting looks different. In one reported dispute, a party asked what it would take to “make this go away,” was told to pay back what he took, offered to split $29,000, and heard in reply that the missing funds totaled more than $100,000. The opinion saw no doubt that this was an offer to compromise a disputed claim, and the other side’s trial testimony confirmed that he understood the give and take as a compromise negotiation.23
Timing can also decide whether a dispute exists. In Healy, the sewage authority’s engineer told Healy that its claim for a price adjustment “probably has merit.” The court held Rule 408 inapplicable, because the claim had not yet been rejected and there was not yet a dispute.24 Until someone rejects the claim, there is nothing to compromise.
The policy also governs how judges use the exceptions. Subdivision (b) says the court may admit compromise evidence for another purpose, so the decision belongs to the judge.25 In Sanders v. Madison Square Garden, L.P., the court described the judge’s task: weigh the need for the evidence against the potential for discouraging future settlement negotiations, with broad discretion over whether to admit settlement evidence offered for another purpose.26 A proponent who offers settlement evidence for a genuine other purpose should therefore expect the judge to ask whether the need for it outweighs its chilling effect on future negotiations.