Concept
The Basic Exclusion
Remedial measures
Subsequent Remedial Measures
The Basic Exclusion
A plaintiff trips on a loose rug in a building's hallway, and the next day the owner tacks the rug to the floor. At trial the plaintiff wants the jury to hear about the repair, and the owner objects. Federal Rule of Evidence 407 decides the objection. When measures are taken that would have made an earlier injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of those measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product or its design, or a need for a warning or instruction.1 The rule has three working parts: a trigger that describes the measures covered, a prohibition that lists the purposes for which the evidence may not be used, and a closing sentence that leaves other purposes open.
The trigger is a subsequent remedial measure: an action taken after an event that, if taken before the event, would have reduced the likelihood of its occurrence.3 Two features of that definition carry the weight. The first is sequence. The rule excludes evidence only when a harmful event comes first and the measure follows it, so a change made before the plaintiff was hurt does not trigger the rule. The second is purpose. The measure must have been taken to keep the harm from recurring, not for some other reason, such as making the product or property look better.4 What counts as a measure, when it must occur, and who must take it are each developed below.
The prohibition names four purposes. Negligence and culpable conduct serve ordinary fault claims like the rug case. A defect in a product or its design and a need for a warning or instruction serve product claims, and they raise questions of their own, which get a separate section. The closing sentence lets the court admit the evidence for another purpose, such as impeachment or, if disputed, proving ownership, control, or the feasibility of precautionary measures.5 Those purposes make sense only once the reach of the prohibition is mapped, so they come afterward.
The rule matters because the evidence it blocks is tempting. The rug repair suggests that the rug had been loose at the time of the fall and that the owner thought it risky to leave the rug as it was. A hedge-clipper manufacturer that adds a safety feature after learning that someone was hurt by a clipper without it invites the same reading.6 In each case the evidence helps the plaintiff only if the jury treats the measure as the actor's implied recognition of fault. That is why the subsequent remedial measures rule is not a categorical rule of exclusion. It applies only when the evidence is offered to show fault or product defect, and then only when its relevance depends on that inference.7 The reasons behind the rule have their own section, so the focus here stays on how the rule operates.
Because the rule regulates purpose, the way to apply it is to trace the chain of reasoning that makes the evidence useful and see where the chain leads. Take a supermarket. A customer slips on fruit on the sidewalk in front of the store and sues for negligence. Afterward the store begins requiring employees to clean the sidewalk every 15 minutes instead of once an hour, and the plaintiff offers the change to show the old schedule was unreasonably dangerous.8 The evidence is the change in the schedule. The inference is that the store believed its old schedule gave customers too little protection. The conclusion is that the old schedule posed an unreasonable danger. The chain is plausible, since an owner who thinks its procedures inadequate is likely to change them, and the evidence is therefore relevant. But the chain works only if the jury treats the change as the store's implied admission of earlier fault, and that is the inference the rule forbids. The court must exclude the evidence on the store's objection.
Change the defense and the same evidence takes a different route. Suppose the store denies that it was responsible for the sidewalk, and the plaintiff offers the identical change to show that the store had been maintaining that stretch of pavement. The chain now runs from the change to the store's belief that the sidewalk was its job, and from that belief to the fact that it was. Nothing in that chain asks the jury to read the change as a confession that the old schedule was unsafe, so the prohibition has nothing to act on. The rule itself permits evidence of ownership or control when that point is disputed, and the limits on the exceptions are taken up later.
The judge, not the jury, rules on whether evidence of a subsequent remedial measure is admissible, a question Rule 104(a) places exclusively with the court.9 In the rug case, the owner's objection goes to the judge, who applies the rule to the purpose the plaintiff has stated for the evidence.