Concept
Other Recognized Privileges
Other privileges
Other Recognized Privileges
A privilege is an exception to the general duty to give whatever testimony one can, and a court recognizes one only when it protects interests important enough to outweigh the need for probative evidence.1 Rule 501 lists none. The common law, as United States courts interpret it in the light of reason and experience, governs a claim of privilege unless the Constitution, a federal statute, or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court provide otherwise, and in a civil case state law governs privilege on any claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.2 Federal courts have used that default to recognize a clergyman-penitent privilege and qualified privileges for trade secrets, secrets of state, and informer's identity. They have not recognized a physician-patient or accountant-client privilege.3
The privileges in this section sort by the interest each one serves. The clergy-penitent privilege protects a counseling relationship: like most privileges, it covers confidential communications in a valued relationship, and it exists to promote full and frank communication there.4 The journalist's privilege protects an institution, because it rests on society's interest in a free and accurate flow of information and not on a bond between two people.5 The other three belong to the government: military and state secrets, deliberative and investigative files, and the identity of informers.
Every privilege carries conditions, and a careful answer checks them. The marital privilege shows the pattern. It does not reach communications relevant to a spouse's crime against the other spouse or the immediate family, and it should be claimed before the witness-spouse is sworn, since a court may find it waived if it is not.6 The government privileges add one more question: how far a litigant's need for the evidence can move the court. Most yield to that need. One largely does not once the government makes a threshold showing. Each subsection below asks what the privilege protects, why the law protects it, and where the protection ends.
Clergy-Penitent Privilege
Rule 501 names no clergy privilege, so a minister who refuses to repeat a conversation must rely on the common-law default described above. Federal courts have recognized a clergyman-penitent privilege there, one of the traditional privileges that stands beside the lawyer-client and spousal privileges.7 A grand jury subpoena gets no exemption. The evidence rules do not apply before a grand jury except those on privileges, and a federal grand jury witness's privileges come from federal law, which outside the Constitution and rare statutes means the common law.8
The privilege protects a confidential communication made in search of spiritual guidance, and priests, rabbis, imams, ministers, and similar religious functionaries all qualify as clergy.9 That definition sets two requirements, and each one limits the privilege. A communication is confidential when the speaker intends it to be and sends it by a means that, so far as the speaker knows, does not disclose it to third persons who are not essential to the relationship.10 A remark made before bystanders was never made in reliance on secrecy, so withholding it protects nothing the privilege exists to protect. The second requirement is purpose: the speaker must be seeking spiritual guidance. The listener's title settles nothing by itself, because without the purpose requirement the privilege would cover every conversation that happened to include a member of the clergy, at a cost to fact-finding with no matching public benefit.
The justification is the one behind the other confidential-communication privileges. Privileges exist to promote full and frank communication in valued relationships.11 People seeking spiritual counsel speak about matters they would never otherwise reveal, and if those confidences could be compelled in court, many would hold them back or avoid the relationship altogether. Other policies are often given for this privilege as well: upholding the integrity of the profession, avoiding futile efforts to coerce testimony against principled resistance, avoiding likely perjury if testimony is coerced, and respecting shared principles of privacy, fairness, and morality.12 The second and third have an obvious mechanism. A member of the clergy who treats a penitent's confidence as a duty of conscience may refuse to answer even under court order, so compulsion produces contempt proceedings in place of testimony, and a witness pressed hard enough may say something untrue.
Federal courts applied the privilege in practice, too. In In re Verplank, a federal district court, quoting Wolfe, quashed a subpoena directing a clergyman to testify before a grand jury on the basis of a common-law clergy-communicant privilege.13
Bar questions often supply a clerical title and hope the student stops analyzing there. The second requirement is where the trap usually sits.
The two scenes share a listener who is clearly clergy, and they differ in what the speaker was after. Confidentiality works the same way: had the parishioner in the first scene brought along a friend who had no part in the counseling, the friend's presence would put the confidentiality requirement in doubt.
Journalist's Privilege
A reporter who refuses to name a confidential source, meaning someone who supplied information on a promise that the name would stay secret, claims a privilege that exists in a qualified and contested form. Rule 501 names none, so the claim reaches a federal court through the common-law default, and in a civil case state law governs privilege on any claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.15 The federal courts are divided on whether the common law establishes a reporter's privilege.16 Many accept that journalists have a qualified privilege to refuse to testify about their news sources or to produce unpublished work product.17 An answer should therefore never present the privilege as a settled federal rule.
The reason for the privilege differs from the reason behind the counseling privileges. The attorney-client, clergy, and psychotherapist privileges protect a confidence between two people. The journalist's privilege rests on society's interest in a free and accurate flow of information, an interest that courts believe the absence of a privilege would subvert through its chilling effect on both journalists and their sources.18 The mechanism runs through the source. A person with newsworthy information, such as an employee who knows of wrongdoing, may speak only if the name stays secret, and a reporter who can be compelled to name that person has no secrecy to promise. If the promise is worthless, the information never reaches the public. The protected interest is therefore institutional, and the reporter is the channel through which a public benefit is delivered.
The cost is the usual cost of a privilege: evidence withheld from the factfinder, and here the evidence may be the only account a litigant can find of how a story came to be told. Courts balance the policies behind the privilege against the rights of the courts, the prosecution, criminal defendants, and private litigants to every person's evidence, and they have weighed three factors.19
The first factor measures the litigant's side of the scale: information central to a claim or defense weighs heavily, while peripheral information rarely justifies damage to the press's sources. The second and third approach the same problem from two angles, since the second asks what the seeker did and the third asks what that effort would find. A party that has not looked elsewhere asks the court to burden the press while less costly routes may remain open, and a party whose search has failed shows that the reporter is the last door. The claim is strongest where the information is peripheral or available from another witness, and weakest where it is central and unavailable anywhere else. The person asserting the privilege must show the facts that give rise to it, because a bare assertion does not suffice, and the court decides whether the privilege exists under Rule 104(a).20
The split among federal courts never enters that scene, because the civil proviso hands the question to state law before federal common law is consulted. The split matters where federal law supplies the rule of decision, such as a federal criminal prosecution, because only there must a federal court decide for itself whether the common law protects the source.
The privilege has one more limit that the three factors do not capture. In Matter of Farber, 394 A.2d 330 (N.J. 1978), the court held a journalist's privilege subject to a criminal defendant's constitutional right of compulsory process to obtain evidence for the defense.21 The reason lies in the source of each right. A journalist's privilege comes from a legislature or from judges applying the common law, the defendant's right comes from the Constitution, and Rule 501 puts the Constitution above the common-law default.22 The stakes differ as well. In a civil case a withheld source makes the result less accurate, but in a criminal case the same source may supply the reasonable doubt that decides a conviction. The defendant must show that the information is needed for the defense, and a defendant who does so can invoke the constitutional right and defeat the privilege.
An answer on a reporter's refusal to name a source should therefore proceed in a fixed order. Ask first which body of law governs under Rule 501, since a civil claim resting on state law may send the question to a shield statute. If federal law governs, say that federal courts are divided on whether the privilege exists and that courts recognizing it weigh materiality, the seeker's efforts to find the information elsewhere, and its availability from other sources. If a criminal defendant is the party seeking the source, add that a showing of need for the defense can override the privilege. An answer that says the Federal Rules of Evidence give reporters a privilege has the source wrong, and an answer that says federal courts uniformly recognize an absolute privilege states a rule they have not adopted.
Military and State Secrets
The government's privilege against disclosing military and diplomatic secrets enters federal court through the same door as every other privilege, because Rule 501 lists none and sends the claim to the common law unless the Constitution, a federal statute, or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court provide otherwise.24 Federal courts recognize a privilege for secrets of state and list it with trade secrets and informer's identity among the qualified privileges.25 The label needs care, because this privilege is qualified in a narrow sense. In the sense that matters to most litigants, it sits at the firm end of the government privileges, which is why it comes before the weighed privileges taken up next.
The narrow sense is a threshold showing. The government must show a reasonable danger that disclosure would reveal a secret relating to national defense or international relations, and a government that cannot make that showing has no privilege to assert. Once the showing is made, the litigant's need for the information drops out of the analysis, so the government prevails however badly the litigant wants the material. The two parts of the rule have separate reasons. The threshold exists because every privilege costs the factfinder evidence, and a label as elastic as secret would swallow the rule if it covered whatever an agency found embarrassing. Tying the claim to national defense or international relations confines it to the interests that justify the cost.
Removing the litigant's need from the weighing rests on what is at stake and on the kind of error each side of a balance could produce. The harm from disclosure cannot be undone once the secret is out. A balancing rule would ask a judge to set the secret against the litigant's need, and every step of that comparison puts the secret at risk, since it must be shown to the court, perhaps described to the parties, and then released if the judge weighs wrongly. An erroneous ruling for the government costs one litigant some evidence in one lawsuit, while an erroneous ruling for the litigant releases something that cannot be recalled. Because the two errors are so unequal, the privilege controls once the government makes its showing, whereas the privileges in the next subsection are weighed against need.
Both documents come from one agency in one lawsuit, and the content of each decides the outcome. A stem that calls a document sensitive or confidential invites the answer that the firm privilege applies, and the correct response asks what the document would reveal. Only a secret relating to national defense or international relations triggers this privilege.
The privilege has a second limit in criminal cases. The government generally cannot both prosecute a defendant and assert a governmental privilege to deprive the defendant of important information, and cloaking potentially defensive information with a state or military secrets privilege may be inconsistent with going forward with the prosecution.26 The reason ties back to Rule 501, which places the Constitution above the common-law default. A privilege the courts developed cannot override a defendant's constitutional rights, so the government must choose between pressing the case and keeping the secret. That choice is the second sense in which the privilege is qualified, and it is why an answer should never describe the privilege as unconditional.
Deliberative and Investigative Files
An agency that refuses to hand over an internal document reaches a federal court through the same common-law default, since Rule 501 lists no governmental privileges.28 Federal courts have used that default to recognize various governmental privileges, among them the two taught here, one for internal policy deliberations and one for law enforcement investigative files.29 These privileges, together with the privilege for presidential communications, are qualified: each yields when the litigant's need for the evidence outweighs the harm that disclosure would cause. That feature separates them from the military and state secrets privilege, which stops asking about need once the government has made its threshold showing. Here the court weighs, case by case.
The deliberative privilege protects the opinions, recommendations, and policy debate that come before an agency decision. The reason is a predictable effect on how officials write. An official who knows that every recommendation, objection, and comparison of options may be read aloud in a courtroom has reason to write only the safe version, to leave the sharpest criticism unsaid, or to move the discussion off the page, and the decision suffers for it. The logic is the instrumental logic of the privileges taught earlier, but the beneficiary differs. A client holds the attorney-client privilege to protect a personal confidence, while the interest here is the quality of public decision making. That benefit is also a prediction, since no one can measure how much more candid officials become, and the harm from disclosing a policy memorandum is some loss of candor and some embarrassment, a real cost that falls short of the irreversible harm from exposing a defense secret. A privilege resting on a modest and uncertain benefit cannot justify withholding evidence a litigant truly needs, which is why it applies only where the damage from disclosure outweighs that need.
The line between opinion and fact marks the edge of the privilege, and the candor rationale explains where it falls. Candor matters when an author is saying what the agency should do. A report that records what happened, such as measurements taken at a scene, a timeline of events, or witness statements, reveals no one's policy judgment, so producing it chills no one's advice and the reason for withholding it is missing.
A stem that calls a document an internal agency report invites the conclusion that the deliberative privilege applies, and that instinct loses points when the document only records facts.
The memorandum and the report could sit in the same file under the same letterhead. What separates them is whether the document speaks to what should be done or to what happened.
The privilege for investigative files rests on a different mechanism. An open investigation depends on secrecy, because its file shows who is under scrutiny, what investigators already know, where they plan to look next, and who has spoken to them. A civil litigant who obtains that file can pass it to the target, and the consequences include flight, destroyed evidence, and witnesses who decline to cooperate the next time. The harm is greatest while the investigation is open and shrinks as it closes, which is why a court weighs the specific damage that disclosure would do against the litigant's need and does not treat every file as sealed.
The setting in which the claim arises changes the weight on the scale. Where a privilege gives only qualified protection, federal courts have held that the grand jury's investigative function outweighs the privilege's protective function.30 The grand jury exists to find out whether a crime has been committed, and it could not do that if every qualified privilege blocked its subpoenas, so the public interest on the need side is at its height. A qualified privilege that might protect an investigative file against a civil litigant can therefore give way when a grand jury seeks the same material.
Confidential presidential communications receive a qualified privilege of their own, and the privilege rests on the separation of powers. A President who must decide matters of great consequence needs candid advice, and the advice dries up if it can be compelled whenever a litigant asks. In United States v. Nixon a prosecutor sought presidential recordings for use in a pending criminal trial, and the Court recognized the privilege but held it qualified, so that a generalized interest in confidentiality could not prevail over a demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a criminal trial. The privilege yields at that point because of the stakes. A criminal trial decides whether a person loses liberty, and its fairness depends on the court having the relevant evidence, while the confidentiality interest was asserted in general terms. A related rule covers governmental privileges in prosecutions: the government generally cannot prosecute a defendant and also assert a governmental privilege to deprive the defendant of important information.31
Step three does the work, and the three privileges differ in what sits on each side of the scale. For deliberative material, the government's side is the candor of future advice. For investigative files it is the success of the investigation, and for presidential communications it is the independence of the executive branch. In each case a specific, demonstrated need for the evidence, strongest in a criminal case, tips the balance.
Informer's Identity
A claim that the government may keep a source's name secret reaches a federal court the way every other governmental privilege does, through the common-law default, because Rule 501 names no informer's privilege.33 Federal courts recognize it and count it among the qualified privileges, alongside those for trade secrets and secrets of state.34 The privilege lets the government refuse to disclose the identity of a person who has furnished information about criminal activity. Because the privilege is qualified, it carries a built-in limit, and that limit is what a bar question will usually test.
The privilege serves two interests that operate on different people. The first is the safety of the informer and the informer's family, since a person who reports a crime may face retaliation from anyone the report implicates, and secrecy about the name is the informer's one safeguard. The second belongs to law enforcement. Investigators depend on citizens who are willing to come forward, a source whose name is revealed is less useful in later cases, and a would-be source who sees what happened to earlier informers learns to stay silent. The government invokes the privilege, and what it protects is the supply of information about crime. That purpose differs from the counseling privileges taught earlier, which protect a confidence between two people.
The privilege is not a flat rule that the government never has to name its sources. In Roviaro v. United States the Supreme Court held that at trial the privilege is limited by "the fundamental requirements of fairness," so that "[w]here the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way." The limit follows from what each side of the scale holds. The government's interest is in keeping future sources willing to speak, while the defendant's interest is in a trial that reaches an accurate result, and in a criminal case the outcome can be the loss of liberty. If the informer could contradict or explain the government's account, a trial held without the name tilts toward error. The same idea appears as a constitutional point: the government generally cannot both prosecute a defendant and assert a governmental privilege to deprive the defendant of important information, and shielding the identity of an important prosecution witness with the informer's privilege may offend the defendant's constitutional rights.35 Rule 501 places the Constitution above the common-law default, which is why a judge-made privilege has to yield at that point.36
A student who answers an informer problem by reciting the privilege and stopping has given only the first half of the rule, and the facts of the problem usually supply the second half.
The two informers differ in what each can add to the trial. The caller in the first scene started an investigation that proved itself through other evidence. The source in the second scene supplied the account the jury will weigh against the defendant's alibi. What the informer can contribute to the determination of the case decides the outcome, which explains why the privilege held in one scene and gave way in the other. This also separates the informer's privilege from the military and state secrets privilege, which ignores the litigant's need once the government makes its threshold showing, while the informer's privilege gives way whenever fairness to the accused requires disclosure.