Concept
Physician-Patient Privilege
Physician/psychotherapist-patient
Physician-Patient Privilege
A confidence shared with a physician is privileged only where a legislature has made it so. The common law recognized no such privilege, Congress has never enacted one, and the federal courts have uniformly declined to create one.1 The one medical privilege the Supreme Court has implied under Rule 501 is the psychotherapist-patient privilege of Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996).2
The two privileges differ in source. The psychotherapist privilege is federal common law. The general physician-patient privilege is a creature of state statute: it exists in a given state because that state's legislature enacted it, and a federal court applies it only to claims or defenses based on state law.3 Whether a medical communication is privileged therefore turns on two questions: what kind of provider received it, and which body of law governs the proceeding.
The subsections below trace the privilege to its statutory origin, explain why the federal courts decline to adopt it, and map the scope of a typical state version.
Statutory Origins
The common law knew no privilege for what a patient tells a physician. When a physician asked Lord Mansfield whether he had to disclose professional confidences, the Chief Justice separated honor from law: “If a surgeon was voluntarily to reveal these secrets, to be sure, he would be guilty of a breach of honor and of great indiscretion; but to give that information in a court of justice, which by the law of the land he is bound to do, will never be imputed to him as any indiscretion whatever.”4 Honor may bind a physician outside the courtroom, but inside it the duty to give evidence governs, and only a rule of privilege lifts that duty. Legislatures wrote the rule.
The early statutes took two forms. One provided that a licensed physician or surgeon could not, without the patient's consent, be examined in a civil action about information acquired in attending the patient that was necessary to enable the physician to prescribe or act for the patient. The other forbade any person authorized to practice physic or surgery to disclose information acquired in attending a patient in a professional character and necessary to prescribe or act.5 Both reach only information necessary to treatment, so neither covers everything a patient says in a doctor's presence. The first also makes the patient's consent the key that lifts the bar, which shows whom the statute protects. A physician who declines to answer therefore invokes the patient's protection, and the law lets someone other than the holder assert a privilege as the holder's agent or representative when authorization is express or fairly implied.6
The traditional justification for these statutes is utilitarian: the privilege encourages patients to disclose fully to their physicians.7 Many doubt that it does. The average patient consulting a physician is thinking about the illness or injury and the prospects of a cure, and spares little thought for the remote chance that the condition will someday be disclosed in court.8 Whether a patient seeking treatment would withhold information without a judicial privilege is, accordingly, highly doubtful.9 A privilege that cannot change what patients say cannot produce the candor that is supposed to justify it.
The candor argument is stronger for psychiatry. A psychiatrist's “capacity to help his patients is completely dependent upon their willingness and ability to talk freely,” and “[a] threat to secrecy blocks successful treatment.”10 That difference helps explain why states that reject the general privilege still enact one for psychotherapy, a subject this chapter takes up separately.
A privacy rationale fits the physician-patient privilege better: the intimate nature of communications about one's bodily condition may arguably justify the law's assurance of confidentiality.11 A related humanitarian view treats the privilege as a private enclave that lets the patient make informed, independent choices among medical options.12 Neither theory requires proof that patients speak differently because of the privilege, since each protects the confidence itself. Privacy still has a price. The question is whether the protection is valuable enough to justify both suppressing critical evidence in other cases and administering a highly complex rule, and the answer turns on the public interest, not on the standing of one profession against another.13
Most states now recognize the privilege by statute.14 The states that reject the general rule have not left mental health treatment bare: every one of them has enacted a privilege for psychotherapeutic communications, and most extend it to communications with social workers.15 The Uniform Rules of Evidence likewise keep the psychotherapist privilege and optionally extend it to confidential communications with a physician.16
A stem that describes an embarrassing confidence to a doctor invites the conclusion that it must be privileged. Ask instead whether a statute in the governing jurisdiction creates the privilege. The sensitivity of the information and the physician's ethical duty of silence do not.
No Federal Privilege
Federal courts have uniformly rejected a physician-patient privilege as a matter of federal common law.18 Federal privileges that no statute grants are developed under common law, and Congress has never enacted a physician-patient privilege, which has been a creature of state statute.19 The Federal Rules contain none.20 The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence likewise included a psychotherapist-patient privilege but no general physician-patient privilege.21
Jaffee supplies the reason for treating the two relationships differently. Treatment of physical ailments can often proceed successfully on a physical examination, objective information supplied by the patient, and diagnostic tests. Effective psychotherapy, by contrast, depends on an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient makes a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears.22 The Court found the psychotherapist relationship based solely on confidential communications, so a privilege was necessary, and it compared the physician-patient relationship unfavorably as less dependent on communications.23 A patient with a fractured wrist who holds back an embarrassing detail still presents a wrist that can be examined and x-rayed. A patient in therapy who holds back has withheld the very material the treatment works on.
A court asked to create a new privilege also faces a cost. Privilege claims that would shield information from a grand jury or a criminal trial are not to be expansively construed, because they are in derogation of the search for truth.24 A physician-patient privilege would suppress probative evidence, and its candor rationale is weak, since it is highly doubtful that a patient seeking treatment would withhold information without the assurance of a judicial privilege.25
Federal courts do apply a state's physician-patient privilege to claims or defenses based on state law.26 The kind of claim being tried therefore comes first. In a federal criminal prosecution or a civil case resting on a federal claim, no privilege protects a communication to a physician about physical treatment, however private it was. In a civil case where state law supplies the rule of decision, the state statute may protect it.
Even where a physician-patient privilege exists, it is a narrow shield. State privilege rules generally apply only to testimony, and to the discovery or admissibility of records, in judicial proceedings, so they confer only limited protection of patient confidentiality.27 The closing section of this chapter returns to the difference between a privilege and the broader duty of confidentiality.
The two scenes differ only in the claim being tried, and that difference alone decides whether any privilege exists. A stem that stresses how sensitive the medical information is does not create a privilege in a federal-question case, and the absence of a federal privilege does not make a state statute irrelevant when state law governs the claim.
Scope Under State Statutes
A state's privilege reaches only as far as its statute says, and the statutes vary extensively. Probably a majority follow the pioneer New York and California statutes in protecting “any information acquired in attending the patient,” and courts read that phrase to cover both what the patient says and data acquired by examination and testing.29 A federal court reaches these statutes only when Rule 501 sends it to state law, so the first step in a problem is to identify the governing statute and read its wording.
Things a doctor observes during an examination are protected too. Patients communicate about their symptoms in part by letting a doctor look at and touch them, so courts define communication broadly for this privilege.30 Statutes that seem on their face to protect only the patient's own communications have frequently been construed to be just as broad, although one line of authority holds that facts observable by anyone without professional knowledge or training fall outside the privilege.31
The privilege protects information, not the bare existence of the relationship. That a patient consulted a physician and was treated, along with the number and dates of visits, lies outside it.32 A witness can therefore be asked when and how often a patient came in, even where the physician cannot be asked what was found.
Purpose decides whether an examination is privileged. The privilege applies when the patient is seeking treatment, and it clearly covers communications pertinent to diagnosis and treatment. A consultation to obtain a medical evaluation unrelated to treatment usually falls outside it, as do an examination to secure life insurance, a court-ordered examination, and an examination solely for litigation.33 Both justifications assume a patient who has come for help: the candor rationale seeks full disclosure to the doctor, and the privacy rationale protects bodily confidences shared in that setting. A person examined at an insurer's request, by court order, or for a lawsuit has not come for care, so neither justification reaches the visit.
The setting of a conversation settles little. A consultation with a physician can fall outside the privilege because care was never sought, so the question is always what the communication or examination was for.
The privilege also requires confidentiality: the information must be confidential, or at least intended as such by the patient. Courts accept that nurses and other medical personnel associated with the physician may share the information without destroying its confidential status. Casual sharing with third parties before, during, or after the consultation will probably prevent the privilege from attaching or, if it has attached, result in its waiver.34 A nurse who charts the findings is part of the care, while a patient who retells the conversation to an acquaintance shows she did not need secrecy.
The proceeding can defeat the privilege as well: in most jurisdictions it does not apply in criminal cases.35 The provider matters too. The early statutes name licensed physicians and surgeons and persons authorized to practice physic or surgery, and most states that reject the general privilege extend a psychotherapy privilege to social workers.36
A stem that places a conversation in a doctor's office invites the assumption that everything said there is privileged. The second step is where that assumption most often fails.