Concept
Medical Privileges Under Rule 501
Physician/psychotherapist-patient
Physician and Psychotherapist Privileges
Medical Privileges Under Rule 501
When a defendant subpoenas a plaintiff's doctor or therapist, a federal court asks two questions in order: which body of law decides whether the conversation is protected, and what that law says. Rule 501 answers the first. Unless the Constitution, an Act of Congress, or a rule the Supreme Court prescribed under statutory authority provides otherwise, privilege "shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience."1 The Rule's second sentence makes one exception. In a civil action or proceeding, on any element of a claim or defense as to which state law supplies the rule of decision, privilege is determined by state law.2
The first sentence makes federal privilege law a body of judge-made rules that can grow. Jaffee v. Redmond reads it that way: Rule 501 "authorizes federal courts to define new privileges by interpreting 'common law principles . . . in the light of reason and experience,'" and on that authority the Court recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege.3
Congress could have written a list of privileges into the Rules and chose not to. The Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence drafted Rules that the Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court approved. Those Rules defined nine specific testimonial privileges, among them a psychotherapist-patient privilege, and made them the exclusive privileges absent a constitutional mandate, an Act of Congress, or a revision of the Rules. Congress rejected that recommendation in favor of Rule 501's general mandate.4
The open-ended Rule lets the law follow changes in practice. The Committee's 1972 draft defined psychotherapists as psychologists and medical doctors who provide mental health services. By the time of Jaffee, all fifty states regulated social workers, where only twelve had in 1972, and social workers supplied a substantially larger share of therapeutic services. The Court concluded that the draft's narrow definition did not counsel against a privilege for social workers practicing psychotherapy.5 Even though the draft never took effect, the Court still drew on the Committee's 1972 recommendation in explaining why therapy depends on confidentiality.6
Every privilege costs the court evidence, and the cost falls on the litigant whose case needs the shielded communication. The Court therefore starts from the maxim that the public has a right to every man's evidence. Everyone has a general duty to give the testimony they can, and any exemption is "distinctly exceptional," a derogation from a positive general rule.7 A proposed privilege must show that it serves interests important enough to outweigh the need for probative evidence.8
Two medical candidates put this approach to work, and they come out differently. The physician-patient privilege is a product of legislatures. New York enacted the first one in 1828, and during the nineteenth century the source of new privileges shifted decisively from the courts to the legislatures.10 Federal courts, looking to the common law, have refused to recognize a physician-patient privilege, along with the accountant-client and parent-child privileges that many states recognize.11 The psychotherapist-patient privilege fared better. Physical ailments can often be treated on the basis of an examination, objective information from the patient, and diagnostic tests. Effective psychotherapy depends on an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient makes a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears.12 Which outcome a litigant gets, though, depends first on which body of privilege law decides the question.
The harder case arises when a plaintiff pleads federal and state claims together and the same evidence bears on both. The two sentences of Rule 501 then point in different directions. Jaffee was a case of that kind. The Court noted the disagreement over the proper rule when both federal and state claims are asserted in federal court and the evidence would be privileged under state law but not federal law, and it expressed no opinion, because the parties did not raise the question and the result did not depend on it.13
The lower courts have supplied a working answer. "The usual solution by the courts" in such cases "has been a preference for federal privilege law when it conflicts with state privilege law."14 The Third Circuit's decision in Pearson v. Miller illustrates that approach. The preference is a practice, not a settled rule. The D.C. Circuit hesitated to decide the question conclusively, and for the first time in its circuit, without briefing, and it did not have to: the federal psychotherapist privilege required withholding some documents as absolutely privileged, and the D.C. statutes appeared at least as protective.15
Step two is where the two medical privileges part ways. In a federal-question case or a criminal prosecution, federal common law offers no general physician-patient privilege but does protect confidential communications with a psychotherapist.18 In a civil case governed only by state claims, a state statute may protect communications with either kind of provider. The same treatment record can therefore be shielded in one federal courtroom and open in another that differs only in the claims pleaded.