Concept
Overcoming the Qualified Protection
Work-product protection
Overcoming the Qualified Protection
Ordinary work product receives only qualified protection, and a requester can overcome it by making two showings under Rule 26(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The requester must show that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare its case and that it cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means.1 Each showing asks a different question. Substantial need asks how much the material matters to the requester’s own case, and undue hardship asks whether the requester could get what the material contains from some other source.
The pairing follows from the reason the protection exists. Hickman placed on the party who would invade a lawyer’s preparation the burden of establishing adequate reasons for production.2 A requester who can reproduce the material through its own effort, by interviewing a witness who remains available, for instance, asks to borrow work it could do itself. A requester who proves both that the material matters and that nothing else can replace it borrows nothing it cannot obtain otherwise. Neither showing carries the motion alone. Important material that is easy to get elsewhere gives a court no reason to open the lawyer’s file, and hard-to-get material that does not bear on the case gives it no reason either.
The gate described here opens ordinary work product, the factual tier. Opinion work product is different. Hickman treated work product that reveals an attorney’s mental impressions, conclusions, evaluations, strategies, and theories as requiring the greatest protection, and it contemplated that a “rare situation,” if any, would justify disclosing it.3 The first showing, substantial need, comes next, and undue hardship follows it.
Substantial Need
Hickman put the burden of justifying production on the party who wants a lawyer’s file. The policy against invading the privacy of an attorney’s preparation is so well recognized, the Court said, that a burden rests on the one who would invade it to establish adequate reasons for production.4 The plaintiff there sought written statements and mental impressions held in defense counsel’s files and mind without any showing of necessity and without any claim that denial would unduly prejudice the preparation of his case or cause him hardship or injustice.5 Rule 26(b)(3)(A)(ii) turns that burden into the first of its two showings, which requires the requester to demonstrate substantial need for the materials to prepare its case.6 Whether the requester could get the same content elsewhere is the separate question of the next subsection.
Relevance cannot carry the showing. A requester reaches the work-product question only for material that is otherwise discoverable, and discoverable material is already relevant. If relevance also established need, every request that cleared the first screen would clear the second, and the protection would protect nothing. The Rule therefore presupposes relevance and asks for more.7
The Hickman plaintiff supplied the standard example of a showing that fails. His counsel admitted that he wanted the oral statements only to help prepare himself to examine witnesses and to make sure that he had overlooked nothing, and the Court held that purpose insufficient to justify an exception to the policy protecting the privacy of counsel’s professional activities.8 Every litigant who asks for an opponent’s file shares that purpose. Honoring it would turn the need requirement into a mere request and leave the protection empty. The rest of the record gave the plaintiff nothing to add. He had already put searching interrogatories to his opponents, the witnesses’ identity was well known, and their availability to him was unimpaired.9 The concurring opinion made the same point more bluntly: the lawyer had the witnesses’ names and gave no reason why he could not interview them himself.10
A successful showing explains what the material will let the requester establish. Hickman itself lists the circumstances in which production might be justified. The statements might be admissible in evidence, might give clues to the existence or location of relevant facts, might be useful for impeachment or corroboration, and might matter because the witnesses are no longer available or can be reached only with difficulty.11 The strongest showing ties the material to an essential element of a claim or defense, and a showing that the materials are needed to establish or defeat such an element should suffice.12 Impeachment falls in the middle of the range. The concurrence noted that a signed statement might help impeach the witness who signed it, if that witness is called and departs from it.13 A requester who ties that use to a particular witness and a particular issue gives the court something to weigh, and one who invokes impeachment in the abstract gives it nothing. A statement taken soon after the event can add weight, because it is probably the most reliable version of what happened.14
Unavailable witnesses matter because they raise the importance of the statement itself. Hickman said production might be justified where witnesses are no longer available or can be reached only with difficulty, and the concurrence added that impossibility or difficulty of access to the witness, or the witness’s refusal to respond to requests for information, could show that the interests of justice require production.15 Suppose a manufacturer that expects suit from a customer hurt by its machine has an investigator prepare a report on the machine’s condition. The machine is later destroyed, the investigator cannot be reached, and the customer, who must prove the machine’s condition, has no other record of it. The customer can compel the report.16
A pedestrian suing a driver stands on the other side of the line. The driver’s lawyer has taken a recorded statement from a passenger who saw the crash, and nothing suggests the passenger is unavailable or unable to recall the event. The pedestrian is unlikely to show the required need, so the statement stays protected. The passenger’s existence must still be disclosed, either in initial disclosures, if the driver will use the passenger, or in response to a proper interrogatory.17 Both scenes turn on whether the facts can still be reached by other means, which is the question the hardship showing answers.
Need and hardship are separate showings, and a requester can fail at either. It is not enough that the party cannot get the information by other means, because the party must also satisfy the court that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare its case.18
Undue Hardship
Rule 26(b)(3)(A)(ii) pairs the need showing with a second one: the requester must also show that it “cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means.”20 This showing asks about substitutes. Could the requester obtain what the withheld material contains from another source, and if so, would using that source impose more than a litigant should have to bear? Hickman applied the same reasoning before the Rule existed, when the Court observed that the essence of what the plaintiff sought had either been revealed to him through the interrogatories or was “readily available to him direct from the witnesses for the asking.”21 The weight of the standard rests on the word undue, because every alternative to a lawyer’s file costs something.
Courts treat the availability of the information from another source as the most important factor. For witness statements, the other means are the direct ones. When the requester can interview the witness or take the witness’s deposition, discovery of the statement is usually denied.22 A requester who can reach the witness is missing no facts, because the witness holds them. What it wants from the file is the opposing lawyer’s finished interview, and its own lawyer can run the same interview and judge which parts matter.
The added expense of the direct route usually does not suffice by itself.23 Discovery always carries routine costs of searching, reviewing, and copying, and courts are unlikely to treat those costs as undue hardship.24 Nearly every substitute for a protected file costs money. If ordinary expense counted, every requester could point to the price of a deposition, and the protection would disappear for anyone willing to say so.
Some burdens do cross the line. A car manufacturer such as Toyota compiled statistical summaries from more than 750,000 dealer repair invoices, and an individual plaintiff such as Peter Painter wants the summaries. The invoices are ordinary business documents and not work product, so Painter could in theory obtain the substantial equivalent by discovering and collating them.25 Reviewing and summarizing that many invoices, however, would be a substantial burden for an individual plaintiff, a cost greater than the routine kind, particularly beside the low cost of obtaining the manufacturer’s own summaries. The comparison echoes the proportionality requirement of Rule 26(b)(1).26 The mechanic’s deposition and Painter’s invoice review both cost money, and the difference lies in the size of the burden relative to the alternative. The deposition delivers the mechanic’s account at ordinary cost, while no comparably cheap route reproduces the summaries.
An equivalent can also be out of reach because the other means do not exist. Where the protected material is a witness statement, courts have often found undue hardship when the witness is dead, beyond the court’s reach, hostile, or unable to remember.27 When the witness is no longer available, the requester cannot obtain the witness’s version of the facts at all, so production of the statement is required.28 A witness’s availability does not end the inquiry, because the real question is whether the requester can obtain the facts without the documents that contain the original statements, and a deposition may fall short of what the earlier statement preserved.29
Hostility shows how a deposition can fail as a substitute. Pam sues Corp. after an accident and seeks a report of a statement that Zed, a Corp. employee, gave soon after it. Corp. answers that Pam can get the same information by deposing Zed. Pam can respond that a deposition is unlikely to be the substantial equivalent, because Zed would probably be a hostile witness, reluctant to say anything that harms his employer, and she will probably prevail.30 The result changes when the witness has no stake in protecting the defendant. A plaintiff who can conduct his own interview of the witness will probably not overcome the qualified immunity.31 What separates the two cases is whether the witness will give the requester a comparable account.
Memory and timing add a further reason a later interview may not be equivalent. A party cannot obtain the substantial equivalent of a prior statement if, by the time it interviews or deposes the witness, the witness’s memory is faulty and the details are gone.32 There is substantial authority, though some cases hold otherwise, that statements taken close to the event are unique because they preserve an immediate impression of the facts, so that the passage of time alone justifies discovery.33 That view sits uneasily with Hickman, where the statements sought were contemporaneous. Yet the survivors there had already testified at a public hearing on March 4, before the lawyer took their statements on March 29, and that testimony was recorded and made available to all interested parties.34
Hickman shows the hardship showing failing on every front. The Court noted that searching interrogatories had been directed to the defendants and that full and honest answers would necessarily have included all pertinent information the lawyer gleaned from the witnesses.35 The witnesses’ identity was well known and their availability unimpaired.36 The Court added that searching interrogatories, production of documents on a proper showing, and direct interviews of the witnesses together revealed the facts in the lawyer’s possession to the fullest possible extent consistent with public policy.37 Every substitute was already in the plaintiff’s hands, so he could claim no hardship in doing without the lawyer’s file.
Because the two showings are independent, a request can fail at either. A motion that proves a statement is critical to an element of the case but overlooks a willing witness at the other end of a telephone line fails on hardship. A motion that proves the witness is dead but cannot tie the statement to any claim or defense fails on need.38