Concept
What Qualifies as Work Product
Work-product protection
What Qualifies as Work Product
Hickman v. Taylor shielded a lawyer’s witness statements and interview memoranda from a demand that showed no need for them.1 The lawyer, Fortenbaugh, had interviewed the survivors of a sinking tug “with an eye toward the anticipated litigation,” and he made memoranda of what some other witnesses told him.2 The Court was concerned only with statements obtained by the defendants’ lawyer, so its holding went only that far.3 A litigant who faces a claims adjuster’s report, an engineer’s photographs, or a party’s own notes needs a definition, and Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure supplies one.
Three questions test any item a party wants to withhold. What does the Rule’s text require? Who may prepare protected material? And what forms of material does the protection reach: documents and things, the facts they describe, or both? These questions come first because they decide whether the doctrine applies at all. How strongly an item is protected, and whether the protection was later lost, matter only for items that fit the definition.
Codification in Rule 26(b)(3)
Rule 26(b)(3) took effect in 1970. For more than twenty years the federal courts had applied Hickman case by case; the amendment accepted the qualified immunity Hickman announced, supplied details on which Hickman was silent, and resolved questions on which the lower courts disagreed.4 Other systems draw the lines differently. A state that does not grant witness lists as of right will not make witness statements available as of right.5 Some states that grant the lists as of right still withhold the statements.6
The federal Rule states the protection in three commands that operate in sequence. First, it bars discovery of documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for a party or its representative, and it defines the representatives to include the party’s “attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent.”7 Second, the bar lifts if the material is otherwise discoverable and the requester shows substantial need for it to prepare its case and an inability to obtain its substantial equivalent without undue hardship. Third, even then the court must protect the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, and legal theories of the party’s attorney or other representative.8
Hickman established three basic components of the protection, and Rule 26(b)(3) repeated and added to them.9 Each command has a counterpart in the decision. The Hickman plaintiff made no showing of necessity and claimed no prejudice or hardship from denial, and the essence of what he sought had either been revealed through interrogatories or was readily available from the witnesses “for the asking.”10 The burden therefore falls on the requester. The Rule’s test gives the same answer on Hickman’s facts, because plaintiff’s counsel could interview or depose the witnesses, and the statements stay protected.11 The third command also traces to Hickman, which gave the greatest protection to work product revealing an attorney’s mental impressions, conclusions, evaluations, strategies, and theories and treated its disclosure as a “rare situation,” if one at all.12
Two policies explain why the bar is qualified. Discovery rests on the premise that mutual knowledge of the relevant facts is essential to proper litigation and reduces the risk of surprise.13 Against that stands the danger of “legal parasitism”: one side lessens its own investment by letting its opponent prepare the case and then discovering the result, which undermines the adversary system and inhibits maximum trial preparation.14 The Advisory Committee notes state the principles the Rule ratifies: each side’s informal evaluation of its case should be protected, each side should be encouraged to prepare independently, and one side should not “automatically” have the benefit of the other’s detailed preparatory work.15 The word “automatically” makes a qualified bar possible. A requester who cannot reproduce the material by other means no longer rides on its opponent’s work, and the tests of substantial need and undue hardship ask exactly that.
The shield for mental impressions rests on a separate reason. Routine access to those materials would reveal an adversary’s legal theories, evaluation of witnesses, and plans for trial and settlement, and lawyers would grow reluctant to keep written records.16 Hickman named the categories when it described what lies beyond the attorney-client privilege: memoranda, briefs, and other writings counsel prepared for his own use in prosecuting the case, and writings that reflect an attorney’s mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories.17 Some state rules prohibit disclosure of mental impressions absolutely. The federal rules instead direct the court to guard against disclosure, which keeps the highest protection for the lawyer’s impressions but lets the court order a response when the information is necessary and can be provided without exposing them.18 The directive operates on the passages that reveal the thinking, so a court can order the factual content of a document produced while the evaluative content stays withheld.
In one respect the Rule’s text is narrower than Hickman. It refers only to documents and tangible things,19 while Hickman spoke of mental impressions in “the files and the mind of the attorney.”20 Courts hold that unrecorded work product remains protected under the common-law doctrine Hickman announced.21 In another respect the text is broader, because it reaches material prepared by a party’s investigators, insurers, and other representatives, a point the next subsection develops.
Step three imports the presumptive scope of discovery, information relevant to “any party’s claim or defense,” a scope that is quite broad and does not require admissibility.22 Because step three already requires relevance, relevance cannot also supply the showing step four demands, and a requester who argues only that the item bears on the case has not begun to carry its burden. Steps four and five work independently. A requester who clears step four unlocks the ordinary material, yet that showing does not reach the lawyer’s thinking recorded on the same pages. Later sections take up anticipation of litigation, the two tiers of protection, and the need and hardship showings.
Who May Prepare Protected Material
Rule 26(b)(3) defines protected material by purpose and by preparer, and the preparer category is wide: “documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative (including the other party’s attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent).”24 The lawyer is only one entry on that list. The breadth settled a dispute among the lower courts. Hickman itself involved only statements obtained by the defendants’ lawyer. The Third Circuit, in Alltmont, read the decision’s rationale as applying “to all statements of prospective witnesses which a party has obtained for his trial counsel’s use,” but the lower courts were divided. Rule 26(b)(3) took Alltmont’s side: the immunity, when otherwise applicable, does not turn on whether an attorney obtained the document but extends to material obtained by anyone representing a party, including the party’s insurer.25
United States v. Nobles explains why the Rule casts the net so wide. The Court called the work-product doctrine “an intensely practical one, grounded in the realities of litigation in our adversary system,” and one of those realities is that attorneys often must rely on investigators and other agents to compile materials for trial. The doctrine must therefore protect material prepared by agents as well as material the attorney prepares personally.26 A narrower rule would invite the free ride the doctrine exists to prevent: a lawyer who sent an investigator to interview witnesses would hand the results to the adversary on request.27 The attorney-client privilege likewise reaches investigators, accountants, scientists, and other non-lawyer agents, though only when they communicate in order to assist the lawyer in delivering legal services.28
The party itself can also be the preparer, because the Rule covers material prepared “by or for another party.”29 A plaintiff who writes a chronology of events at his lawyer’s request has prepared protected material although he is not a lawyer. In practice it is often hard to separate material prepared for the party from material prepared for counsel, and the Rule protects both.30
Clearing the preparer requirement does not end the inquiry, because the material must also have been prepared in anticipation of litigation. A substantial line of cases presumes that material was not truly developed for litigation when no attorney’s involvement suggests the “employment of an attorney’s legal expertise.”31 A document written without a lawyer looks like any other business paper, so the party claiming protection must show a litigation purpose. One reported dispute shows the difficulty: the memo’s author drafted it when no lawsuit was pending, no one had threatened suit, and no one had retained counsel to file one.32 The next section takes up what counts as anticipation.
The doctrine is not limited to civil litigation. Nobles observed that the doctrine is most frequently asserted as a bar to discovery in civil cases, but that its role in assuring the proper functioning of the criminal justice system is “even more vital,” because society and the accused both need safeguards that assure thorough preparation and presentation of each side.33 Courts also look to Hickman and Rule 26(b)(3) for the basic features of the protection in other contexts, so the civil definition of who may prepare protected material guides criminal cases too.34 The protection yields when a party puts the material to testimonial use. In Nobles, the Court held that when a party’s investigator testified about his recollection of interviews, the opposing party was entitled to the documents recounting those interviews; the implicit waiver arises where a party seeks affirmative testimonial use of work product, and a later section develops it.35
Documents, Things, and Facts
Two rules describe the form protected material takes. Rule 26(b)(3) protects “documents and tangible things,”37 such as a witness memorandum, a recording, or a photograph. Federal Rule of Evidence 502(g)(2) defines work-product protection, for purposes of Rule 502, as the protection applicable law gives to “tangible material (or its intangible equivalent) prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.”38 The parenthetical shows that the doctrine is not tied to paper. Two questions follow: does unrecorded work product count, and what part of a lawyer’s preparation stays open to the other side?
The Rule’s words leave a gap, because Hickman’s rationale also covers a demand that a lawyer recite unrecorded opinions. Hickman itself spoke of mental impressions in “the files and the mind of the attorney,”39 and courts hold that unrecorded work product stays protected under the common-law doctrine Hickman announced.40 In re Sealed Case, 856 F.2d 268, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1988), applied Hickman to protect against deposition questions that would have required attorneys to testify about their mental impressions of witness interviews.41 The reasons for protecting paper apply equally to memory. Routine access to a lawyer’s evaluations would reveal an adversary’s legal theories, evaluation of witnesses, and plans for trial, and a rule that shielded the memorandum but exposed the lawyer to a deposition question would let the opponent obtain by speech what it could not obtain on paper.42
The doctrine does not protect the underlying facts. It protects documents and tangible things, not what they record,43 and facts learned through trial preparation remain discoverable. Most facts are learned that way.44 A lawyer starts collecting facts as soon as litigation looms, so a rule that shielded facts learned afterward would withdraw most of a case’s basic events from discovery. What the doctrine protects is the lawyer’s own contribution. A memorandum of a witness interview reflects which points the lawyer chose to record and how the lawyer weighed them, and opposing counsel remains free to interview the same witness. Fortenbaugh’s statements in Hickman show the pattern: he interviewed the survivors privately and took their statements,45 while the witnesses themselves were available to the plaintiff.46
The interrogatory carries facts out of a lawyer’s file. The Hickman plaintiff asked, in one interrogatory, whether crew statements had been taken and demanded exact copies of any written ones and, for oral ones, “the exact provisions” of what was said.47 That demand aimed at the lawyer’s own record of the interviews and not at the events. The Court observed that full and honest answers to the plaintiff’s broader interrogatories about the events “would necessarily have included all pertinent information gleaned by Fortenbaugh through his interviews with the witnesses,” so the plaintiff could reach the facts without touching the statements.48 A party must answer from everything available to it, and that includes what its agents, lawyers among them, know. Rule 33(b)(1)(B) requires a party to “furnish such information as is available to the party,” so a corporation cannot avoid an interrogatory because the officer who signs the answers lacks personal knowledge. It must conduct a reasonable inquiry, which may include interviewing employees and reviewing documents.49
Discoverable facts are not unlimited facts. The Hickman Court recognized that discovery has boundaries and that limits arise when an examination is conducted in bad faith or in a manner that annoys, embarrasses, or oppresses the person questioned.50 Courts also curtail discovery to protect the privacy of nonparties: in one wrongful-death case, the court ordered the plaintiff to answer questions about extramarital affairs but not to reveal the names, addresses, and phone numbers of the nonlitigant paramours.51
Students err in both directions. Reasoning that the facts are discoverable and therefore the memorandum must be produced collapses the compilation into the facts; reasoning that the memorandum is protected and therefore the facts may be withheld does the reverse. Rule 26(b)(3)(A) therefore speaks of documents and tangible things: it shields the form in which a lawyer’s selection and weighing is recorded and leaves the information itself open. An overbroad claim of protection can be challenged. Compare privilege, where a disadvantaged party may object when a trial judge erroneously upholds a claim of privilege over evidence that is not privileged, whoever holds the privilege.52 A later section takes up how strongly the evaluative content of a protected document is shielded.