Concept
The Hickman Decision
Work-product protection
The Work-Product Doctrine
The Hickman Decision
A lawyer's file of witness statements and interview memoranda is not open to an opponent on simple demand. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), laid down that rule, and every later rule about work product grows out of its reasoning. The Supreme Court held that a lawyer's written statements and memoranda of witness interviews, prepared in anticipation of litigation, are discoverable only on a substantial showing of necessity or justification, and it reached that result without resting on the attorney-client privilege.1
The case posed a question the Federal Rules had not answered. Discovery is the pretrial process by which each side can compel the other to disclose the facts it holds, and the Court treated mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts as essential to proper litigation. But discovery, like all procedure, has boundaries, and the question was whether those boundaries enclosed a lawyer's private files.2 The Rules were silent about work product when the case was decided; Rule 26(b) was later amended to codify the principles the case declared.3
This unit follows the case from the sinking to the holding, then sets that holding beside the attorney-client privilege, which Hickman put aside. The two doctrines have different triggers and resist an opponent's need to different degrees, and the comparison keeps them apart.
Facts and Holding
The tug John M. Taylor sank while towing a car float, and five members of its crew died.4 Three days later the tug owners and their underwriters hired a law firm, of which Fortenbaugh was a member, to defend them against suits by representatives of the dead crew members and to sue the railroad for damage to the tug.5 Fortenbaugh then privately interviewed the survivors and took statements from them with an eye toward the anticipated litigation. He also interviewed other people who might know something about the accident, and sometimes he wrote memoranda of what they told him.6
Four of the five death claims settled without a lawsuit. The fifth claimant sued under the Jones Act in November 1943, naming the two tug owners, individually and as partners, and the railroad.7 A year later he served 39 interrogatories on the tug owners, which are written questions that must be answered under oath. Number 38 asked whether anyone had taken statements from crew members, and it demanded exact copies of any written statements and, for oral ones, the exact provisions of what was said.8
The tug owners answered everything except No. 38 and the supplemental interrogatories that followed it. They admitted that statements of the survivors had been taken but declined to summarize or set out the contents. They objected that the requests called “for privileged matter obtained in preparation for litigation” and amounted to “an attempt to obtain indirectly counsel's private files,” and they warned that compliance would mean turning over the complete files, the telephone records, and almost the thoughts of counsel.9
The District Court, sitting en banc, found that no recognizable privilege was involved and ordered production.10 When the tug owners and Fortenbaugh refused, they were held in contempt.11 The Third Circuit, also sitting en banc, reversed. It reasoned that the information was part of the “work product of the lawyer” and therefore privileged from discovery under the Federal Rules.12 The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed that the discovery ordered and the contempt conviction were improper, but on an analysis different from that of either lower court.13
Justice Murphy's opinion for the Court first agreed that the attorney-client privilege did not apply. The protective cloak of the privilege does not extend to information a lawyer secures from a witness while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation, and it does not cover the memoranda, briefs, and other writings counsel prepares for his own use or the writings that reflect his mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories.14 That agreement did not decide the case. Neither Rule 26 nor any other discovery rule contemplates production when a party, without any claimed necessity or justification, seeks written statements, private memoranda, and personal recollections prepared by an adverse party's counsel in the course of his legal duties, and that is so even though the subject matter is neither privileged nor irrelevant. Such a demand falls outside the arena of discovery, because not even the most liberal discovery theory can justify unwarranted inquiries into an attorney's files and mental impressions.15
The reasons begin with what a lawyer's preparation consists of and what exposing it would do. That work shows up in interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, and countless other tangible and intangible forms, which the Court aptly though roughly called the “work product of the lawyer.” Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten, an attorney's thoughts would not be his own, and inefficiency, unfairness, and sharp practices would develop in the giving of legal advice and the preparation of cases.16 Commentary adds two points. Routine discovery of this kind would reveal an adversary's legal theories, evaluation of witnesses, and plans for trial and settlement, and lawyers would grow reluctant to keep written records, which hardly improves the quality of representation.17 The collected materials are also the tangible result of the lawyer's efforts, and an opponent should not be permitted to piggyback on them.18
Justice Jackson, concurring, added a reason rooted in accuracy. A lawyer's account of what a witness said would be the lawyer's own language, permeated with his inferences, and when the witness later testified with any variation, opposing counsel could whip out the lawyer's version to impeach the witness.19 The majority drew the professional consequence: using the lawyer's account for impeachment would make the attorney much less an officer of the court and much more an ordinary witness.20
The protection is not absolute. The statements might be admissible, might lead to other facts, or might serve impeachment or corroboration, and production might be justified where witnesses are no longer available or can be reached only with difficulty. But the policy against invading a lawyer's course of preparation is so well recognized that the burden rests on the party who would invade it to establish adequate reasons for production.21 The Hickman plaintiff offered no reason at all, only what the Court called a naked, general demand for the materials as of right.22 The Court thereby took a middle position between the district court, which would have made a lawyer's work product normally discoverable, and the Third Circuit, which by calling the material privileged would have barred all discovery no matter how pressing the need.23
The Court was most protective of the lawyer's own account of what witnesses said. Under ordinary conditions, forcing an attorney to repeat or write out what witnesses told him and to hand the account to his adversary gives rise to grave dangers of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness, and no legitimate purpose is served. It makes the attorney testify to what he remembers or saw fit to write down, and that testimony could not qualify as evidence.24 Only a rare situation could justify production of such accounts, and the plaintiff's case was not of that type.25 The portion of work product that reflects the lawyer's own mental impressions or opinions came out of Hickman almost absolutely immune from discovery, a distinction later sections develop as the two tiers of work product.26
The plaintiff's failure on necessity traces directly to the facts. He had already sent searching interrogatories about everything before, during, and after the sinking, and they were sworn to have been answered to the best of the defendants' information and belief. Full and honest answers would necessarily have included all pertinent information Fortenbaugh gathered from the witnesses, and the plaintiff did not suggest the answers were incomplete or dishonest.27 He could examine the public testimony of the witnesses before the Steamboat Inspectors, and he claimed no hardship; for aught that appeared, the essence of what he sought had already been revealed through the interrogatories or was readily available from the witnesses for the asking.28 His counsel frankly admitted that he wanted the oral statements only to help prepare to examine witnesses and to make sure nothing had been overlooked, which was too little to justify an exception.29 Commentary states the point compactly: on Hickman's facts, where plaintiff's counsel could interview or depose the witnesses herself, discovery of the statements they gave defense counsel would be denied.30
The hypothetical comes out the other way from Hickman because the Court itself named unavailable witnesses as a ground for production,31 and commentary offers the death or disappearance of the person who spoke with the lawyer as an example of strong need.32 The same statement in the same lawyer's file is protected in one lawsuit and discoverable in another, and the variable is the requesting party's showing.
Work Product Versus Privilege
Hickman separates the two doctrines by the order of its own reasoning. The Court sorted the plaintiff's demand through the attorney-client privilege first and found that the privilege did not reach it: the privilege does not extend to information a lawyer secures from a witness in anticipation of litigation or to the lawyer's own writings prepared for use in the case.34 The privilege objection failed, but the demand failed anyway, because an attempt to obtain a lawyer's written statements, private memoranda, and personal recollections without any showing of necessity falls outside discovery even when the material is neither privileged nor irrelevant.35 Work product is the protection that remained once the privilege was set aside, and it stands on different footing.
The label has practical consequences. When a court upholds a claim of privilege for material that is not privileged, an appellate court can correct the error by holding that the claimed privilege was not applicable.36 The Third Circuit had treated the lawyer's work product as privileged from discovery. The Supreme Court held that the attorney-client privilege did not reach the interview materials37 and said the district court should have sustained the refusal to produce on the separate ground that the plaintiff made no showing of need.38
Federal Rule of Evidence 502(g) defines the two protections side by side. The attorney-client privilege is the protection that applicable law gives to confidential attorney-client communications, and work-product protection is the protection that applicable law gives to tangible material, or its intangible equivalent, prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.39 The definitions turn on different variables. The privilege definition asks about a confidential communication between attorney and client and says nothing of litigation. The work-product definition asks when and why material was prepared and says nothing of any client communication. Because the variables are independent, a document can fall in any cell of a two-by-two grid.
| Prepared in anticipation of litigation | No litigation anticipated | |
|---|---|---|
| Confidential communication between client and lawyer | Both: a lawyer's notes of a client's confidential briefing after suit is threatened | Privilege only: a client's confidences to a lawyer drafting a will |
| Not a client-lawyer communication | Work product only: the Hickman witness statements | Neither: a lawyer's notes of a business call with an outsider when no suit is threatened |
The Hickman statements sit in the lower-left cell. A lawyer who interviews a witness and takes a statement or writes a summary creates documents that involve no communication between attorney and client, so the privilege does not cover them, yet the work-product doctrine shields them unless the opponent shows it would be very difficult to get the information any other way.40 The lower-right cell shows the privilege's limits: communications with non-lawyers, and communications made for purposes other than seeking legal advice, do not obtain the privilege.41 The upper-left cell explains why a party resisting discovery often asserts both doctrines at once, since materials may be protected by the work-product doctrine as well as or instead of the privilege.42 The privilege reaches past lawyer and client to their agents, such as investigators, accountants, and physicians, but only when those agents communicate with the lawyer or client to help the lawyer deliver legal services.43 Its limits thus follow who is communicating, with whom, and for what purpose, while the limits of work product follow when and why the material was prepared.
The two doctrines also differ in how much pressure they withstand. Creating a privilege reflects a judgment that protecting the communication matters more than giving litigants access to it, so absent some constitutional issue a claim of privilege usually prevails even when the withheld information is crucial.44 The privilege is not subject to an exception simply because a litigant, agency, or other third party claims an important need to know what the client discussed with the lawyer.45 Work product, by contrast, bends to need. The rule bars access to documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation only absent a showing of substantial need,46 and Rule 26(b)(3) allows discovery on a showing that the requesting party has substantial need of the materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means.47
The difference follows from what each protection guards. A privilege withdraws the communication from litigation. Work product guards the mental processes of the attorney and the tangible result of the lawyer's efforts, on which an opponent should not be permitted to piggyback.48 Those interests give way when the opponent cannot get the substance anywhere else: Hickman itself named unavailable witnesses as a ground for production,49 and commentary points to the death or disappearance of the person who spoke with the lawyer as an example of strong need.50 Even then the strength of protection varies within work product, because the portions reflecting the lawyer's own thinking receive almost total protection, and courts order them produced only on an extremely compelling showing of need.51
Because work product bends to need, calling it a privilege invites a mistake. The rule is a qualified one that does not grant full immunity from discovery, and the loose label should not suggest the absolute protection that confidential attorney-client communications enjoy.52 The Supreme Court itself gave a lawyer's work product only a qualified immunity, a middle position between treating it as freely discoverable and treating it as privileged.53
In one respect work product is the broader doctrine. The privilege covers communications, but work product covers the lawyer's whole preparation: documents that reveal the lawyer's opinions, and also the other materials the lawyer assembles, including factual observations, witness interviews, and inquiries made. Examining them might reveal the lawyer's evaluation of the case and strategy.54 That breadth reaches interviews of witnesses who stand wholly outside the attorney-client relationship, which is why Hickman could be decided under work product after the privilege had failed.
Neither doctrine shields the underlying facts. Hickman made clear that either party may compel the other to disclose whatever facts it has, and the Court observed that full and honest answers to the plaintiff's interrogatories would have included everything pertinent that Fortenbaugh learned from the witnesses.55 The privilege protects a communication and work product protects prepared material, and neither definition reaches the events those communications and materials describe.56 A party asked in an interrogatory what happened may therefore protect the lawyer's memorandum, but it must still state the facts. The memorandum stays protected, and the facts remain available through interrogatories and depositions.