Concept
State Variation and Reform
Marital communications
State Variation and Reform
A marital-communications problem set in state court opens with a different question than the federal elements this chapter has taught. Federal courts apply the privilege as common law, resting on Blau v. United States, which held that confidential communications between husband and wife are privileged against compelled disclosure.1 When the Supreme Court proposed a federal rule on spousal privilege, it recognized no protection for confidential marital communications and limited the privilege to an accused who wants to keep a spouse from testifying against him. Congress deleted that rule, and under Rule 501 the federal courts have continued to recognize the communications privilege as common law.2 Most state courts, in contrast, begin from an enacted statute, and those statutes have a history worth knowing.
The statutes grew out of nineteenth-century reform of the rule that disqualified the spouses of parties from testifying. When England abolished that rule, its Evidence Amendment Act of 1853 added that neither spouse could be compelled to disclose a communication the other made during the marriage. Nearly all American states likewise made spouses competent to testify but disabled them from testifying to communications between them.3 The English Court of Appeal later denied that any common-law privilege for marital communications existed. American courts have said instead, and frequently, that their statutes merely declare the common law, and some have applied the common-law rule with no statute at all, at least until a legislature abrogates it.4 That American view explains the difference in method: a federal court with no statute to consult treats the privilege as common law, while state legislatures remain free to define it in text.
Oregon's evidence code, as State v. Serrano sets it out, shows what a codified version looks like. The code defines “confidential communication” and “marriage,” gives a spouse in any civil or criminal action a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent the other spouse from disclosing, any confidential communication made during the marriage, and lets either spouse claim the privilege.5 Both spouses hold it and may assert it during and after the marriage. Only the spouse called to testify holds the testimonial privilege, and that privilege may be asserted only during the marriage.6 The code then lists its exceptions: criminal actions in which one spouse is charged with bigamy, with an offense against the person or property of the other spouse or of a child of either, or with an offense against a third person committed in the course of an offense against the other spouse; matters occurring before the marriage; and civil actions in which the spouses are adverse parties.7 The list the court quotes has no clause for spouses who jointly commit a crime, the exception federal courts recognize at common law. A student who carries the federal exception into an Oregon problem has imported a rule the quoted text does not contain.
Other states depart from the Oregon pattern in their own ways. Colorado's statute declares a policy of encouraging confidence in certain relationships. It provides that, in civil or criminal proceedings, neither spouse may be examined for or against the other without the other's consent, and it excepts a proceeding involving a crime by one spouse against the other.8 The Iowa Supreme Court, in State v. Anderson, held that a state statute limiting the marital privilege applied only to cases involving mandatory reporting of child abuse, which left the privilege in place for other crimes.9 Even the model rules have shifted on whose privilege it is and in which proceedings it applies. The 1974 revised version limited the privilege to an accused's right to prevent disclosure of confidential communications, and Uniform Rule of Evidence 504 was later amended to add a spouse's privilege to refuse to testify against an accused spouse in a criminal proceeding, alongside a privilege for confidential communications in criminal and civil cases.10 A minority of jurisdictions vests the confidences privilege in the speaker alone, as the section on holders noted. Holder, exceptions, and duration are therefore the three points to check in any state problem.
New Mexico went furthest. In 2019 its Supreme Court ruled that the spousal communication privilege had outlived its useful life and abolished it prospectively, so spouses in that state cannot rely on it going forward.11 Oregon, where either spouse may claim the privilege subject to a statutory list of exceptions, and New Mexico mark the two ends of the range. The same private words can be shielded in one place and freely provable in the other.
Whether the privilege earns its cost is an unsettled argument, and it explains why jurisdictions diverge. The Oregon court put the cost plainly: privileges limit the search for truth, and courts tolerate the loss of relevant evidence to protect relationships judged important, on the theory that open communication within them strengthens the relationship.12 The Advisory Committee that drafted proposed Rule 505 attacked the confidences privilege on that theory's own terms. Its note reasoned that the usual justifications for spousal privileges, preventing marital dissension and sparing a spouse from condemning or being condemned by the other, have no bearing on communications. It added that no one can assume marital conduct will change because of a privilege whose existence the spouses probably do not know.13 The mechanism is simple: a rule that speakers never consider cannot make them more candid, so the evidence it suppresses is lost for nothing.
Defenders such as David Louisell answered by contesting the premises. First, a rule need not be consciously weighed to influence conduct, because a privilege can supply at least a subconscious backdrop to the privacy people expect in intimate relations.14 Second, freedom of communication is part of what marriage is: a marriage without complete privacy of communication would be an imperfect union, and defenders point to the privacy right recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, which barred a state from forbidding married couples to use contraceptives.15 Third, a rule compelling a spouse to reveal what the other confided could force a decent person to choose between lying and going to jail.16 The vigor of that reaction helped defeat all of the proposed privilege rules in Congress, which is why the confidences privilege remains common law under Rule 501.17
Reform proposals aim at different parts of the rule. One would strip protection from confidences once the couple later divorces, which targets the survival rule taught earlier in this chapter.18 Abolition, as in New Mexico, targets the premise that the privilege is worth its cost at all.19 An essay that asks you to evaluate the privilege can draw on both sides of this debate. An essay that asks you to apply it must first identify which jurisdiction's law governs.