Concept
Exceptions to the Privilege
Marital communications
Exceptions to the Privilege
In Blau v. United States the Supreme Court held that confidential communications between husband and wife are privileged against compelled disclosure, and it placed on the government the burden of overcoming the presumption that a spousal communication is confidential.1 Most of this chapter has asked whether the privilege attached to a statement at all. The claimant must show a marriage in existence when the words were spoken, a question of state law on which states differ, as they do over common-law marriage.2 The presumption of confidentiality then does the remaining work, unless the government rebuts it with facts about the setting, such as the speaker’s voluntary disclosure of the communication to a third person.3
An exception asks a different question. It takes a statement that clears every one of those hurdles and withdraws protection anyway, because of what the statement was meant to accomplish or who stands on each side of the case. The distinction matters on an exam. A fact pattern can supply a valid marriage, a spoken message, and a private kitchen, and the answer can still turn on an exception; an answer that stops at “confidential, therefore privileged” is only half finished.
Three exceptions recur. The first removes protection from statements spouses make in committing a crime together. The second removes it when the charged crime was committed against the other spouse or a child of either. The third removes it in litigation between the spouses themselves. Each reflects a judgment that, in that setting, the privilege costs more than it protects. Courts and legislatures word the exceptions differently, so the sections below teach the common core and flag where a state statute, such as Oregon’s, draws its own lines.
Joint Criminal Activity
Spouses who commit a crime together cannot shelter their planning behind the marital communications privilege. In United States v. Picciandra, the court held that communications concerning crimes in which the spouses are jointly participating fall outside the privilege, and it upheld as not clearly erroneous the district court’s finding that Julie Davis was a co-conspirator.4 Her testimony was therefore properly admitted as an exception to the privilege barring confidential marital communications.5 The trial judge decides whether the spouse took part in the crime, and an appellate court disturbs that finding only for clear error.
Two ideas support the exception, and they operate at different points. The first concerns the statement. The confidences privilege protects the intimacy of private marital communications, and courts have concluded that discussions of criminal activity can be excluded from that protection.6 The second concerns the public interest. Most courts recognize the exception because greater public good comes from letting the accused’s spouse testify willingly about their joint criminal activities than from letting the accused erect a roadblock against the search for truth.7
The second idea shows why the exception matters in practice. One federal circuit has held that either spouse may assert the privilege, reasoning that letting the communicating spouse disclose one side of a conversation would eviscerate it.8 A defendant can therefore ordinarily object even when his spouse is eager to talk, and the joint-crime exception is the ground on which her account reaches the jury anyway.
The exception is only one of several independent routes to admission, so an essay should test the other elements before it relies on it. In United States v. Abram, the court recited that the privilege does not apply to conversations between husband and wife about crimes in which they are jointly participating, citing a Fifth Circuit decision.9 Its treatment of the wife’s testimony turned on other points, however. She described what she saw, her husband and Parker counting a large sum of money, and the court found that testimony proper under the testimonial privilege and outside the communications privilege. Her husband’s request that she check for activity at a bank across from her workplace was made in Parker’s presence, so the communications privilege did not bar it either.10
Timing limits the exception. It reaches only statements made after the listening spouse joined the crime, so the privilege still protects a husband’s statements to his wife before she became a participant, though not those he made afterward.11 United States v. Estes shows the line. A husband told his wife about a theft that was already complete. At that moment her only possible role was accessory after the fact, and she could not become even that until she knew the theft had happened. The communication that told her was therefore a necessary precursor to her involvement and could not have been made as part of an ongoing joint criminal activity, so the Second Circuit held that, under the normal rule for confidential marital communications, that part of her testimony should not have been admitted.12 The court declined to follow United States v. Neal, the Tenth Circuit decision on which the government principally relied, to the extent Neal held otherwise.13
United States v. Montgomery protects a letter on the same logic. Mrs. Montgomery wrote her husband, “If you can’t stop [O’Connor] or if we can’t stop her together I am going to write to her or talk to her.”14 She was indicted on the conspiracy count, but she had not become a participant when she made her communications, so no joint criminal activity had been undertaken and the exception did not apply.15 The court added that the majority of circuits agree that communications made before a spouse begins to participate in the criminal activity are privileged, and it set the Tenth Circuit’s Neal decision on the other side.16 It also found no completed crime to which she had served as an accessory after the fact, and the government suggested none, so it did not decide whether the exception would reach such an accessory.17 The case raises a separate confidentiality question as well. Asked at trial whether she meant her husband to keep the information to himself, she answered that she hoped he would pass it on to his sister.18
Estes and Montgomery protect statements for the same reason but arrive from opposite directions. In Estes the crime was finished when the husband spoke, so the wife could join only after the fact. In Montgomery the wife was charged with the conspiracy, but she had not joined it when she wrote. In both cases a later role in the crime could not reach back and turn an earlier statement into one made within a joint enterprise.
Courts hesitate to push the joint-participation idea one step further and use it to compel an unwilling spouse to testify. One federal court refused to do so. It observed that none of the decisions the government cited had used the exception to force an unwilling spouse to testify about confidential communications, and that the two Tenth Circuit decisions among them limited the exception to testimony given with the witness-spouse’s consent.19 The court drew on the Third Circuit’s distinction between the two privileges. The confidences privilege protects the intimacy of private communications, from which discussions of ongoing or future criminal activity can be excluded. The testimonial privilege aims more broadly at marital harmony, which compelling a spouse to testify under a joint-participants exception could damage.20 It added a practical objection: proving the predicate, that the spouse took part in the crime, can require an inquiry that invades the privilege.21 The cases the government relied on had admitted a spouse’s statements through a third-party witness or an intercepted recording, which put a convenient buffer between the spouse and the damaging testimony, and none had required a witness to testify against her spouse.22
Read that decision as a caution about the setting and not as a limit on the exception. It concerns compelling testimony, which engages the testimonial privilege. If a question asks whether a spouse who refuses to testify can be forced on a joint-participation theory, note that some courts decline to go that far.
Crimes Against Family
The privilege gives way when the crime on trial was committed against someone inside the family. It does not apply when one spouse is charged with a crime against the other spouse or against a child of either. In United States v. White, the Ninth Circuit applied that limit to statements about crimes against “a spouse or a spouse’s children,” and a similar exception limits the testimonial privilege.26 A footnote in a Supreme Court opinion on the testimonial privilege traces the same development: the exceptions grew to reach crimes against children of either spouse, and similar exceptions have been found to the confidential marital communications privilege.27
The exception looks to the victim of the charged crime and not to the timing of the statement, and that sets it apart from the joint-crime exception. A husband’s confession of a finished theft to a wife who joined in nothing stays privileged, if the other elements are met. His account to her of an assault on her child falls within the family exception even though the assault is over, because the rule asks who was harmed.
Two reasons support the exception. The first is proof. The injured-spouse exception, which even at common law denied the privilege to an accused spouse in prosecutions for wrongs against the other spouse’s person, rests on the fact that applying the privilege would frustrate enforcement of the criminal statutes, since the victim spouse is typically an important or even essential source of prosecution evidence.28 The second is priority: the public interest in effective enforcement of the criminal law overrides the spouses’ private interest in protecting their relationship.29 Statutes then widen the exception. Most reach any “crime committed by one against the other,” along with crimes against children and against the marital relation itself, such as adultery.30 Some name particular crimes, most often family desertion and pandering, and withdraw the privilege for communications about them explicitly.31
The Tenth Circuit has built a child-abuse rule on the same foundation, and its limits matter. The court has described its earlier decision in United States v. Bahe as recognizing an exception to the confidences privilege for voluntary spousal testimony about child abuse within the household.32 Because either spouse may assert the confidences privilege, that exception takes away a defendant’s power to block a spouse who wants to testify.33 In a later case, United States v. Jarvison, the government asked the court to go further and create an exception to the testimonial privilege in child-abuse cases. The court refused, because doing so would have required an exception, not recognized by any federal court, allowing a court to compel adverse spousal testimony.34 The testimonial privilege belongs to the witness-spouse, who may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying. The word voluntary therefore carries the weight: a willing spouse may describe the confidences, and an unwilling spouse keeps the choice the testimonial privilege gives.
State codes spell the exception out, so read the jurisdiction’s own list. Oregon Evidence Code 505(4)(a) removes the privilege in a criminal action in which one spouse is charged with bigamy, with an offense or attempted offense against the person or property of the other spouse or of a child of either, or with an offense against the person or property of a third person committed in the course of committing or attempting an offense against the other spouse.35 The proposed but rejected federal rule had the same shape for the testimonial privilege, with a parallel clause for a crime against a third person committed in the course of a crime against the other spouse.36
The exceptions usually do not reach abuse of an outsider, someone who is not a child of either spouse, and it is unclear whether they apply when the abuse targets both a child of the spouses (or of one of them) and an outsider.37
The mixed case is harder because the authorities do not settle it. A child victim places the case inside the family and brings in the policy of enforcing the law against harm within the household, while an outsider victim lacks the family tie on which the exception rests. Oregon’s clause for a crime against a third person committed in the course of an offense against the other spouse shows one way a legislature can handle a related mix. Where authority is thin, identify each victim, say that the mixed case is unsettled, and argue from the purposes of the exception instead of announcing a firm rule.
Suits Between Spouses
The privilege also gives way when the spouses are the opposing sides of the lawsuit. Divorce and child custody litigation are the usual examples.40 Oregon’s evidence code states the rule in a single clause: there is no privilege “in any civil action where the spouses are adverse parties.”41 A Missouri case, Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, is cited for the rule: a husband’s “unnatural sexual demands” were not privileged. The treatise’s parenthetical adds that the demands were not made verbally, so the case also touches the communication requirement, a reminder to check each element even when an exception is in view.42
The closest parallel comes from attorney-client law. Clients who consult one lawyer together are held to have no privilege for that consultation in a controversy between themselves. Spouses stand in the same position: they want their confidences shielded from the outside world, but they would ordinarily expect that if a dispute arose between them in which their conversations shed light on the merits, the interests of both would be served by full disclosure.43 A structural point reinforces the analogy. Because either spouse may assert the privilege, applying it in a suit between the spouses would let each silence an exchange the other took part in.44
The exception depends on adversity between the spouses, so it does not follow a spouse into every lawsuit. Confidential statements made during a viable marriage keep their privileged status however the relationship ends, so even a witness who is divorced from the party at the time of trial cannot be made to reveal them.45 Haddad v. Lockheed Cal. Corp. shows the contrast. An employee sued his employer for national-origin and age discrimination, and the employer put his ex-wife on the stand to testify about a marital communication. The Ninth Circuit held that the privilege protected the communication, that the employer had not overcome the presumption of confidentiality, and that the testimony should have been excluded, although the error was harmless because the evidence was cumulative. The divorce did not end the privilege, and the opponent was an employer, an outsider, and not the other spouse. In such a case the ordinary elements decide the question, and the opponent can defeat the privilege only by showing that an element failed, as when the speaker voluntarily disclosed the communication to a third person.46
The question to ask of any civil stem that puts a spouse or former spouse on the witness stand is who sits on the other side of the case. An opponent who is the other spouse triggers the exception, while an employer, a lender, or any other outsider leaves the privilege in force. Statutes add their own details. Oregon’s civil clause covers actions in which the spouses are adverse parties, and the same section separately removes the privilege as to matters occurring before the marriage.47 Some states add exceptions that fit none of the three categories above. A criminal prosecution of one spouse may admit a declaration the other spouse made confidentially to the accused when it would tend to justify the offense or reduce its grade, and an action by one spouse against an outsider for intentionally injuring the marital relation, chiefly alienation of affection or criminal conversation, may admit declarations expressing the alienated spouse’s state of affection.48 Because those exceptions come from statutes and local tradition, learn them from the jurisdiction’s own rules.