Concept
What Counts as Communication
Marital communications
What Counts as Communication
The marital communications privilege protects what one spouse says or signals to the other. It does not protect everything a spouse learns by living with the other. The line starts with Pereira v. United States, where the Supreme Court stated that the privilege, generally, extends only to utterances and not to acts. The Court then reviewed the wife's testimony and found that it involved primarily statements made in the presence of third parties, acts of her husband that did not amount to communications, trips taken with third parties, and her own acts.1
Federal formulations follow that line. One confines the privilege to utterances or expressions that a spouse intends to convey as a message to the other.2 Another extends it to words and acts intended to be a communication.3 Both ask whether the speaker meant to send something.
The limit rests on the policy of fostering communication between spouses. A spouse who watches the other act has received no message, only an impression.4 Many courts are also hostile to privileges that deprive the legal system of relevant information, and there may be a trend toward limiting 'communication' to verbal and nonverbal acts meant to convey information.5 The subsections below take up the intent test, the states that go further, the line between a communication and the facts it concerns, and the timing of the communication.
Intended Messages
Communications are written or spoken statements, together with gestures that stand in for words, such as a nod of the head or a hand signal.6 A letter between spouses qualifies without argument. In Montgomery, no one disputed that a wife's letter to her husband was a communication, and the fight was over whether the information in it was meant to stay confidential.7 The route a message travels can complicate matters, too. When spouses send a confidential message through an intermediary whom no privilege protects, such as a stenographer, the question is how far the privilege embraces that transmission. That question belongs with confidentiality.8
The test asks what the actor meant to do by acting. A gesture counts when it works the way a word works. An act that merely reveals something to an onlooker conveys nothing the actor intended to send.
The same witness is often asked about both kinds of evidence. A defendant can keep his wife from repeating that he told her in confidence that he robbed a bank, but he cannot stop her from testifying that he came home with a ski mask and a gun.9 The first is a message addressed to her. The second is something she saw.
The line is harder to see when an act answers a spoken question or accompanies a confession. In one illustration, a wife accuses her husband of taking the bank's money, and he responds by opening a drawer to show her the cash. If the marriage is valid and no one else is present, the remaining issue is whether his conduct was a communication. Because he acted in response to her words, there is a strong argument that the conduct was the equivalent of a verbal reply and should be treated as a statement.10 The Second Circuit reached a comparable result in United States v. Estes, where a husband poured a bag of stolen cash onto the marital bed while discussing his crime. The court treated the act as communicative and therefore privileged.11
Conduct that carries no message stays on the other side of the line. In U.S. v. Abram, a wife testified that she saw her husband and Parker counting a large sum of money. The court held that admitting the testimony was not an abuse of discretion, because she described what she observed and the marital communications privilege did not bar it.12 The same opinion refused to bar her testimony that her husband asked her to check for activity at a bank across from her workplace, but for a different reason. He made that request in Parker's presence.13 What separates Abram from Estes is whether the conduct formed part of a message to the spouse. The cash in Estes was displayed to the wife while the husband discussed his crime, and the counting in Abram was an activity she observed.
The privilege also operates question by question. In United States v. Burks, the court held it wrong to let a witness refuse to take the stand at all when some of her testimony plainly fell outside the confidential communications privilege.14 If counsel's questions strayed toward actual confidences, the remedy was an objection to the question as asked, or a voir dire of the witness outside the jury's presence to keep such questions from reaching the jury.15
Disclosive Acts
Some state courts define the privilege more broadly than the federal courts do. They extend it to noncommunicative acts that one spouse performs in the other's presence, at least where it can reasonably be inferred that the actor did not want the activity revealed. Unpacking firearms is the usual example.16 Federal courts generally refuse to follow. They confine the privilege to confidential communications and protect private acts only when the acts are communicative in nature.17
The split reflects two theories of what the privilege protects. If it protects communication between spouses, an act that conveys nothing falls outside it. If it protects a zone of marital privacy and freedom from fear of disclosure, it reaches much more.18 A wife who hides stolen property at home while her husband watches, and who then invokes the confidence of marriage to keep him from testifying, shows the difference. The communications theory gives her no protection, and whether the objection is sustained depends on which theory the jurisdiction adopts.19
The federal position has a reason beyond the label. Extending the privilege to disclosive acts goes past its policy of fostering communication between the spouses. If watching such conduct deserves protection at all, the other spousal privilege is the place to supply it.20 An answer on hidden property should therefore give the federal result, an observation and not a communication, and flag that a state following the disclosive-acts approach could protect the same testimony.
Facts Beyond the Privilege
The privilege protects the communication and leaves the facts it happens to concern open to proof. In In re Grand Jury Investigation (Hipes), a wife was questioned before a grand jury about her husband's job responsibilities. The government made no showing that her information came from any source other than his conversations with her, and both the government's counsel and her counsel assumed that whatever she knew about his job came from what he told her.21 The prosecutor argued that his duties were carried on at a place of business among many employees, so the facts about his employment were not private. The court said the argument missed the point. His job may have been in the public eye, but his conversations with his wife were presumptively confidential. The government carried the burden of showing that those conversations were not conducted in private. That other employees or members of the public could testify about his job was irrelevant to whether the privilege existed.22
The ruling has two halves. The wife could not be made to repeat what her husband told her, and the duties themselves remained provable by anyone with independent knowledge. The structure of the privilege explains the result. It attaches to the exchange between the spouses. If it also hid every fact a spouse mentioned, a defendant could put any fact beyond proof just by telling it to a husband or wife.
The same logic keeps a holder from losing the privilege just by talking about the facts. One court put the point this way, quoting a commentary: only the communication is privileged, not the holder's knowledge of the facts, so the holder may disclose the facts to third persons without waiving the privilege. The commentary's own example is a client who may speak freely about the facts of an automobile accident without giving up the right to keep the attorney from being questioned about the client's specific communications.23
Subject matter does not take a communication out of the privilege either. A court applying Oregon Evidence Code 505(2) rejected the argument that a spouse's statements were not confidential because they concerned 'routine matters.' The privilege extends to any confidential communication between spouses, and the subject matter is only one circumstance bearing on the speaker's intent.24
Made During the Marriage
A message is privileged only if the spouses were married when they exchanged it, and state law decides whether they were.25 Common-law marriage shows why that matters. States vary widely, so people living together in identical arrangements may be married in one state and not in another, and that family-law answer controls whether the privilege applies.26 Timing can also separate protected statements from unprotected ones. In Pereira, much of the wife's testimony related to matters occurring before the marriage.27