Concept
Scope of Protected Testimony
Spousal immunity
Scope of Protected Testimony
Trammel v. United States settled who decides: the witness-spouse alone holds the privilege against adverse spousal testimony. A spouse who wants to testify against the defendant may do so, and a spouse who does not cannot be compelled to. The defendant can stop a willing spouse only by objecting that a question calls for a confidential marital communication.1 The earlier sections added that the holder must be married to the defendant on the day the testimony is demanded. Neither point says what a qualified holder may actually withhold, and an answer that cannot locate that edge either claims too much for the witness or concedes too much to the prosecution.
Three questions mark the edge, and each looks at a different feature of the demand:
- In what kind of proceeding is the spouse called? The privilege belongs to criminal cases.
- What would the spouse say? The privilege reaches adverse testimony on any subject.
- In what form does the government want the evidence? The privilege protects testimony in the courtroom, not every request the government might make of a spouse.
One rationale ties the three answers together. The Court placed the privilege in the witness-spouse's hands because that arrangement "furthers the important public interest in marital harmony without unduly burdening legitimate law enforcement needs."2 Read each answer below as an application of that interest, and you can reason through facts that a list of rules would not cover.
Criminal Proceedings Only
The privilege against adverse spousal testimony applies in criminal cases, so the first question in any problem is what kind of proceeding has called the spouse. The federal system and most states recognize the privilege, and it is usually confined to criminal proceedings such as trials and grand jury investigations.3 The confidential marital communications privilege reaches further, because it may be invoked in civil and criminal cases alike.4 The adverse testimonial privilege therefore needs a criminal forum, and the communications privilege does not.
History and rationale both point toward the criminal case. The privilege descends from a spousal disqualification that sprang from two medieval canons: an accused could not testify in his own behalf, and husband and wife were one.5 The first canon was a rule about the criminal defendant. The Court's modern justification is the public interest in marital harmony,6 and that interest is under its most direct pressure when a spouse testifies to help the government convict the person at home.
A grand jury investigation counts as a criminal proceeding, so a spouse may claim the privilege there. The Koecher litigation shows what that looks like. Mrs. Koecher asserted marital privilege before a federal grand jury, which authorized the United States Attorney to seek civil contempt. The district judge overruled her claim and committed her to jail for 18 months, for the life of the grand jury, or until she purged herself by answering, whichever period was shortest.7 The judge did not reason that a grand jury is the wrong forum. He held that the marital privilege is subject to an exception for joint participation in criminal activity, a rule that some circuits follow and at least one rejects, and that this chapter takes up under exceptions below.8
Outside criminal proceedings the privilege is much weaker. It is only rarely claimed in civil litigation, and in federal courts it is doubtful that it applies in civil suits at all.9 In Ryan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Seventh Circuit left the question open in a civil suit but denied the privilege.10 State law points the same way: in most jurisdictions, statutes make a husband or wife fully competent to testify for or against the party-spouse in civil cases.11
The civil limit is easy to remember by what a civil case lacks. The state is not prosecuting, and a spouse's answer is unlikely to send the other spouse to prison, so the likely reason for the limit is that the marital-harmony interest is weaker there while the privilege still costs the factfinder a witness.
A civil stem therefore tests the forum limit, and the answer starts with the criminal-or-civil question before any question about who holds the privilege. The communications privilege survives where the testimonial privilege does not. Paul could not refuse to take the stand in the bank's suit, but he could object to a question asking him to repeat a confidence Marisol shared with him.12 That privilege is claimed selectively, question by question, during testimony, whereas the testimonial privilege, when it applies, keeps the witness-spouse off the stand altogether.13
State law varies on top of the federal baseline. Some states have gone beyond Trammel and abolished the privilege in criminal cases, so that a spouse is called to the stand like any other witness.14 In others, the prosecution may not call the spouse without the accused spouse's consent, which leaves the privilege with the accused.15 A state-court problem therefore requires you to identify the local rule, while a federal problem can apply the Trammel allocation.
All Adverse Testimony
Trammel modified the earlier federal rule so that the witness-spouse alone may refuse to testify adversely, and the word the Court chose, adversely, carries no limit on subject matter.17 The privilege is not confined to confidential communications. It protects against disclosure of all adverse information, provided the parties are married when the testimony is demanded.18 A witness-spouse may therefore decline to describe a private conversation, an act she saw, or an object she noticed. The only test is whether the testimony hurts the defendant-spouse.
Four kinds of adverse testimony show how far that reaches, and the privilege covers each for the same reason:
- acts the witness-spouse watched the defendant perform, such as driving away from the scene or handling stolen money;
- physical observations, such as injuries on the defendant's body or objects in the home;
- statements the defendant made in front of third persons, which were never confidences between the spouses; and
- private statements between the spouses, which the defendant can also block under the separate confidential communications privilege.
The Court described the old accused-held version of the privilege in the same terms. That version was invoked not to exclude private marital communications, which an independent rule already protects, but to exclude evidence of criminal acts and of communications made in the presence of third persons.19
The communications privilege covers a narrower field, and United States v. Estes shows where its edge falls. A husband had told his wife of his theft and afterward counted, hid, and laundered the money. She testified about his handling of the funds, and the court held the testimony proper because the acts conveyed no confidential message.20 Acts do not become privileged communications merely because the actor's spouse is present. Conduct is protected only in the rare case where the actor meant it to carry a confidential message to the observer.21
The testimonial privilege is a separate question. The husband in Estes could not invoke it against a wife who chose to testify, so he was left with a communications objection that acts do not support.22 Had she been unwilling, she could have declined to testify about the counting, hiding, and laundering at all, subject to the exceptions discussed below.
Statements made before others test the same distinction. A defendant's boast at a family dinner tempts you to treat any words a husband speaks to a wife as marital communications, and that instinct confuses two privileges that protect different things.
The same words therefore receive different treatment depending on who holds the choice. The defendant can keep out only what was said in confidence, while the witness-spouse can keep out everything adverse by declining to testify.
The breadth was the old privilege's weakness. When the accused held it, the accused could exclude all adverse spousal testimony. Bentham observed that such a privilege goes far beyond making "every man's house his castle" and permits a person to convert his house into "a den of thieves."23 The Court answered by keeping the privilege and changing its holder, so that the witness may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying.24
The privilege is defined by the direction of the testimony, not by its subject, and direction marks its outer edge. It protects against adverse testimony and has no application when a spouse is called to give favorable testimony. A spouse who testifies for the party on direct is cross-examined like any other witness, and any question within the scope of the direct that calls for adverse testimony will be permitted.25
The privilege protects a spouse from being made an adverse witness, and a spouse who has come to help is not one.
Testimony Versus Other Evidence
The right Trammel gave the witness-spouse is a right to refuse to take the stand and testify against the defendant-spouse. The Court showed how narrow that right is when it answered the worry that abolishing the accused's privilege would let the Government come between husband and wife. No privilege, it observed, prevents the Government from enlisting one spouse to give information about the other or to aid in the other's apprehension, and only the spouse's testimony in the courtroom is prohibited.27 The privilege attaches to one act, testifying in court, and it does not follow the spouse into every request the government makes.
The line is easy to defend. A fingerprint or a handwriting exemplar is physical material, and an examiner, not the spouse, draws any conclusion from it. The spouse who supplies it asserts nothing about the defendant and does not appear as an accuser, so what the spouse provides is not testimony.
The question an exam will put is whether a spouse who may refuse to take the stand may also refuse anything else the prosecution wants. Two scenes answer it.
The common error is to reason that a spouse who can refuse to testify can refuse to help the prosecution in any way at all. Whatever other rules limit compelled exemplars, the spousal privilege is not among them, so the question in every such problem is whether the government is demanding testimony. Trammel's footnote supports the same boundary from the other side. A spouse who tells investigators what she knows before trial, or who helps agents find the defendant, has not testified in a courtroom, and no privilege prevented the government from asking.28
Out-of-court statements are the unsettled area. The problem arises when the spouse invokes the privilege and the prosecution tries to prove what the spouse said earlier through someone else, such as the agent who heard it. The privilege is sometimes extended to a spouse's extra-judicial statements, but Trammel indicated that the federal version is limited to in-court testimony.29 The broader view worries that a spouse who refused to take the stand has still become the source of the case if an agent can recite the earlier statement to the jury. The narrower view ties the privilege to the act it protects against, a spouse accusing the defendant in court. Because the authorities differ, an answer to a problem like this should say which view it applies and should not treat either as settled.
The Confrontation Clause is a separate limit and operates whichever view prevails. In Crawford v. Washington, a wife refused to testify against her husband under a state marital privilege, and the state then offered her previously recorded statement. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires actual confrontation where testimonial out-of-court statements are at issue.30 The privilege runs to the witness and the Confrontation Clause runs to the accused. A defendant whose spouse invoked the privilege therefore cannot assume the earlier statement is out because of the privilege, and a prosecutor cannot assume it is in because the privilege does not reach it. The hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause each have to be satisfied on their own terms.