Concept
Authenticating Real Evidence
Real, demonstrative, and experimental evidence
Authenticating Real Evidence
A revolver proves nothing about a shooting unless the jury can believe it is the revolver from the shooting. Rule 901(a) states the requirement: the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.1 For real evidence that claim is one of identity: this object, and not another like it, took part in the events in dispute. What evidence can carry the claim depends on whether the item can be told apart from others of its kind.
Unique items are the easy case. A person with knowledge of the item testifies that it is what the proponent says it is: a witness to a contract identifies the document, or a ballistics expert testifies that the bullet that killed the victim was fired by the gun in evidence.2 Generic items are harder, because one gun looks like any other gun. To show that the gun offered at trial is the one taken from the defendant, the proponent traces its movement from the place of seizure to the courtroom, and that tracing is a chain of custody.3
The two methods overlap, and neither stands outside Rule 901(a). The Rules do not mention chain of custody by name; it is one use of circumstantial proof to establish genuineness.4 A third showing sometimes joins them. When an item's value as evidence depends on its condition, the proponent must also support a finding that the condition is unchanged. The three sections below take up recognition, custody, and condition in that order.
Ready Identifiability
Rule 901(b)(1) supplies the simplest method: testimony that an item is what it is claimed to be.5 It is the first of ten illustrations, and the list is not exhaustive.6 The first illustration itself shows that parties may use a wide variety of methods to supply the necessary information.7 Whatever the method, the measure is the sufficiency standard of Rule 901(a).8
When an item carries a feature that sets it apart from others of its kind, a witness can supply the whole foundation by naming the feature and saying the exhibit bears it. The model testimony runs: “I recognize the carved handle on this weapon; it is the same as the handle of the weapon I found at the crime scene; this is the weapon I found.”9 That testimony supports a finding that the weapon is what it is claimed to be. The item is readily identifiable, and the witness is the person with knowledge that the method requires.10 If an item is not readily identifiable, the foundation must be substantially more elaborate.11
One witness is enough here because of what the foundation guards against. The danger with a physical exhibit is that it is a look-alike of the original, or that the original has changed since the event. A recognized unique feature answers that danger directly: a substitute would have to carry the same feature, and the witness who knows the feature is best placed to say whether it is there. The recognition can still be contested. Admission does not mean the jury must believe the item is genuine, and the opposing party remains free to offer testimony that it is not.12 Foundational requirements are requirements of logic and not rules of art, so a showing that answers the actual risk is enough.13
A homicide prosecution shows the method at work. The prosecutor, Ms. Phipps, offers a gun, and the defense objects that she has not established a chain of custody. She answers that such proof should be unnecessary because the lieutenant who found the weapon at the scene will testify, from his own mark and his personal recollection, that this is the very weapon he found.14 The answer rests on the point just made: if the lieutenant's mark is on the gun, a substitute would have to bear it too. Her other points do different work. That the gun lay in the same room as the victim, that ballistics will show the fatal bullet came from it, and that Forensics found the defendant's fingerprints on it all tie the gun to the killing and to the defendant.15 Those facts show why the gun matters; only the lieutenant's testimony shows that the exhibit is the gun.
An identification need not be perfect to authenticate. In an assault prosecution, the victim, Papse, identified an ax as the weapon used on him. The court held that on his testimony a reasonable juror could find the ax was the weapon, and that Papse's ability or inability to specify identifying features went to the weight the jury should give the exhibit, not to its admissibility. The jury remained free to reject the government's claim that this ax was used in the assault, but the requirements of Rule 901(a) had been met.16
Recognition can also fail. A screwdriver that the plaintiff cannot properly authenticate as the one that hurt him is excluded as real evidence. It may still come in on another theory: if the plaintiff describes it as very similar to the one that injured him, it is admissible for the limited purpose of illustrating his testimony.17
The most common error is to demand custody proof for every real exhibit. The standard asks whether a reasonable juror could find the item is what the proponent claims, and a witness's recognition of a distinctive feature can meet it directly,18 so custody proof becomes necessary when no such feature exists. Recognition also has limits. The witness must have knowledge of the item; someone who sees the exhibit for the first time in court has nothing to compare. And recognition shows only that the exhibit is the object the witness found or saw, not why that object matters, which depends on other evidence, as the ballistics and fingerprints did in the gun example. Where the exhibit's condition is the point, as with a substance or a damaged part, the witness must also support a finding that it is unchanged, a showing taken up below.
Chain of Custody
Chain of custody is the usual way to authenticate an item that cannot be told apart from others of its kind. The Federal Rules do not mention it by name; it applies circumstantial proof to establish genuineness,20 so it operates within the Rule 901(a) standard and not beside it.21 In United States v. Howard-Arias, a marijuana prosecution, the court called the rule a variation of the principle that real evidence must be authenticated before admission. Its purpose is to establish that the item offered is what it purports to be, there marijuana seized from the “Don Frank.” The ultimate question is whether the authentication testimony is complete enough to make it improbable that the item was exchanged for another or otherwise tampered with.22
The method is needed because a generic item gives a witness nothing to recognize. Shown an ordinary gun or a plain bag of powder in the courtroom, no witness can say from its look that it is the object recovered. The proponent therefore traces the item from the place of seizure to the courtroom, and the jury infers from the trail that the exhibit is the thing recovered.23 Courts may require that trail when the evidence is fungible, not readily identifiable, or susceptible to tampering or alteration.24 The more readily an item can be adulterated, as with illegal drugs and other chemicals, the more rigorous the showing may need to be, and a technician who tests the item becomes part of the chain.25
In its fullest form the foundation calls each person who had custody from the relevant event until trial. Each witness says when and from whom the witness took custody, what precautions the witness took to preserve the item, that the item was not changed, substituted, or tampered with while the witness had it, and when and to whom the witness gave it up. Each also says the exhibit appears to be in the same condition as when the witness held it.26 In a drug case the testimony runs like a relay. The officer who took the substance from the defendant seals it in a container, marks it, and says what was done with it next. A second witness describes obtaining the marked container and says what he or she did with it. In this way a chemical analysis report becomes testimony about the substance that was taken from the defendant.27 The same device serves other exhibits. A technician who made a videotape knows how it was made, and where tampering is a concern, witnesses on custody let the opponent explore the opportunities for it. Internal evidence, such as superimposed time and date markings, can do similar work.28
The complete chain is the model, but the test is sufficiency. If a gun sat in an evidence locker that several officers could open, or beside other guns, the opponent can dispute whether it is the same gun. The gun is nonetheless admissible so long as a reasonable juror could believe that the gun in the locker is the gun offered at trial.29 Cases decided under Rule 901 make clear that a complete chain need not always be proved.30 In Howard-Arias the court said precision in developing the chain is not an iron-clad requirement, and that a missing link does not prevent admission of real evidence so long as there is sufficient proof that the evidence is what it purports to be and has not been altered in any material aspect.31 A major break is different. If the officer who first seized and tested the marijuana were the missing link, a court would presumably hesitate to admit it without a clear connection between the drugs and the defendant.32
A gap matters most when the opponent identifies a specific risk of misidentification or alteration. The proponent should then produce evidence to overcome that risk or suffer exclusion, because foundational requirements are requirements of logic and not rules of art.33
The hypothetical differs from Howard-Arias in the size of the gap and in what surrounds it. In Howard-Arias the chain had a missing link, yet enough proof remained to make an exchange improbable. In the powder example the whole stretch from laboratory to courtroom is blank, and the exhibit carries nothing that would let the jury rule out a look-alike.
Circumstantial facts can fill a gap that no custodian can. In a civil case over an accident involving a light bulb, the plaintiff's proof that a bulb found in a cabinet was the bulb in question rested on three things. Riley testified in a deposition that he believed, with some reservations, that it was the bulb, reasoning that “we wouldn't keep broken bulbs; so if it was there, it had a specific purpose to be there.” The record showed that only six people had access to the area where the accident occurred and to the cabinet where the bulb was found. And the plaintiff stated in an affidavit that two weeks before the accident he had installed General Electric bulbs in the sockets where he was working, and that to the best of his knowledge no other brand was ever used in them.34 Limited access, the plant's habit, and the brand each make a substitution less likely, and together they can let a reasonable juror find the bulb authentic.
Unchanged Condition
Some exhibits prove their point through the state they are in. A tire offered to show tread wear is probative only if it still shows the wear it had when the blowout occurred. Rule 401(a) measures relevance by an item's tendency to make a fact more or less probable,36 and a changed tire loses that tendency. For such an item the Rule 901(a) claim has two parts: that this is the object, and that it still has the features that matter.37 Where the condition of a real exhibit is important to its identity, proof that the condition is unchanged is part of authentication.38 Put the other way, if probative value depends on similarity of condition in a particular respect, that condition must be proved unchanged.39
The proof can take whatever form logic suggests. A witness who saw the object at the relevant time can testify that it is the same now, and for some objects the inference comes from the nature of the object, since a steel part or a signed contract is relatively impervious to change.40 Items that are easily altered call for the more rigorous custody showing described in the last section.41
A change in condition does not by itself bar the exhibit. A changed condition does not require exclusion where, after the change is explained, the jury will not be misled.42 An altered item may even be admissible if the pertinent features that make it probative remain unchanged, because foundation requirements are matters of logic and not rules of art.43 The reason follows from what the foundation protects, which is an inference from the object to a fact. A change the jury has been told about, or one that leaves the relevant feature untouched, leaves that inference as sound as before. The same ax opinion applied this logic. Papse's inability to specify identifying features and the evidence that the ax's condition had changed went to the weight of the exhibit, because his testimony would let a reasonable juror find the ax was the weapon.44
Explaining a change settles authentication but not Rule 403, which lets the court exclude relevant evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger such as misleading the jury or confusing the issues.45 Photographs show the point most clearly. A photograph of a scene is received despite changed conditions when the changes are explained and the jury can still grasp a correct and helpful representation. But the nature of a photograph makes it difficult to separate illustration from assertion, so a change may leave the picture so confusing or misleading that Rule 403 requires exclusion.46 The same balance is available for any exhibit whose changed condition would mislead the jury. The usual error is to treat any difference from the original as fatal. The sound questions are whether the changed feature is the one that makes the exhibit probative and whether an explanation lets the jury correct for it.