Concept
Kinds of Tangible Evidence
Real, demonstrative, and experimental evidence
Real, Demonstrative, and Experimental Evidence
Kinds of Tangible Evidence
Testimony reaches the jury through a witness's perception, memory, and narration. An exhibit lets the jury examine the thing itself, and some exhibits convey information to jurors whether or not any witness describes it.1 That directness does not excuse the proponent from laying a foundation. Rule 901(a) requires the proponent to produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.2
The rule therefore turns on the claim, and exhibits make different claims. A lawyer who offers the pistol said to have been fired that night claims that this very pistol took part in the events. A lawyer who offers a diagram of the intersection claims only that the drawing depicts the scene accurately enough to help the jury follow the testimony. Different claims call for different foundations, so this chapter sorts exhibits by claim before it asks anything else about them.
The usual vocabulary does little of that sorting. Lawyers use "demonstrative" for any evidence from which the trier of fact gets a firsthand sense impression, as distinct from oral testimony and documentary exhibits, but the definition is so broad that it explains almost nothing.3 Analysis improves when the component parts are treated separately: real evidence, illustrative aids (now governed by Rule 107), and experiments and views.4 A single label hides the differences, because nontestimonial evidence is not all offered for the same purpose or received on the same theory.5
Two theories matter most. Some exhibits are substantive: the jury learns something about a fact of consequence just by perceiving them, as with a weapon allegedly used in the crime charged, a day-in-the-life film of an injured plaintiff, or a computer-generated simulation of a collision's cause.6 Others matter only because they help the jury understand testimony, and the testimony is what makes a fact more or less probable.7
| Kind of exhibit | What the exhibit claims | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Real evidence | This object took part in the events in dispute, or was generated by them. | The gun said to have been fired |
| Illustrative aid | This depiction fairly represents testimony or evidence already in the case. | A diagram of the room where the victim was found |
| Experiment or demonstration | Its conditions are similar enough to the disputed event that the result bears on what happened. | A braking test on a road like the accident road |
The categories are not watertight. A surveillance video offered to illustrate a witness's account may also convey data the witness never perceived, and it then works as substantive proof whatever label the proponent chose.8 Marking an exhibit does not put it into evidence, either. A merely marked exhibit cannot be relied upon by the jury in reaching a verdict; to serve that role it must be introduced into evidence.9 An illustrative aid, by contrast, is never evidence at all.
Real Evidence
Real evidence is the category in which Rule 901(a) takes its plainest form, because the exhibit claims to be the very thing that took part in the events. An item qualifies when it played a direct or indirect part in the incident or was generated by it: a murder weapon, a fragment of an exploding bottle, an article of clothing. The exhibition of an injured part of the body belongs here too.10 Writings often qualify as well, since so many transactions that end in lawsuits involve documents.11
The proponent's showing is only a threshold. Once a witness's testimony supplies it, a document can be admitted, but the jury need not believe the document is genuine, and the opposing party remains free to introduce testimony that it is a forgery.12 The rule's wording marks that division of labor: it asks the judge only for evidence sufficient to support a finding, and the jury decides whether the finding is true.13
In United States v. Johnson, the victim of an assault identified a long-handled ax, seized from the defendant's residence five days after the attack, as the weapon used on him; the ax was real evidence because it was the very object in the underlying event.14
The prop needs no showing of identity. An item offered only to illustrate is judged by whether it helps explain relevant testimony, and its specific identity or source is generally of no significance.15 The next section develops that lighter foundation. A knife offered as the robber's own would carry the identity burden described above.
Real evidence can bear on a fact of consequence directly or by inference. Direct real evidence puts the condition of the object itself in issue: in a suit over a defective bottle, a fragment of the exploding bottle proves its point just by being what it is. Circumstantial real evidence supports an inference. A shirt the defendant wore at arrest, shown to the jury to demonstrate that it matches an eyewitness's description, does not establish the robbery, but the match makes it more probable that the defendant is the person the eyewitness saw.16 Direct real evidence requires a showing that the item is genuinely what it purports to be and, when its condition is essential to its probative value, that the condition is unchanged. Circumstantial real evidence shares the problems of circumstantial evidence generally.17 Later sections of this chapter show how a proponent makes the first showing.
A party may also exhibit an injury to the jury. Judges customarily treat real evidence as highly probative, and they have upheld even gruesome objects when those objects played a part in the litigated events.18 That deference is a custom rather than a rule, and it sometimes rests on little analysis of what the jury would learn about a fact of consequence, so the proponent should still be ready to say which fact the exhibit helps decide.19 Rule 403 remains available: the court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or undue delay.20 Asking the injured person to perform acts or submit to manipulation goes beyond exhibition and raises separate problems, taken up with the demonstrations below.21
An instrument of crime offered against the accused carries an additional burden. Suppose that in a homicide prosecution an officer testifies that he found a revolver on the bedroom floor near the victim and that the revolver the prosecutor now offers is the one he found. His testimony identifies the gun, but it says nothing about whether the gun was fired in the homicide or belonged to the defendant. A trial judge may admit the revolver anyway, on the prosecutor's assurance that ballistics and forensic proof will follow, and may do so without evidence of precautions against a switch when the officer says in effect that none occurred. If the promised proof never arrives, the defense may move to strike the revolver.22 That patience has limits, because an instrument offered to prove that the accused committed the crime must be connected with the crime and with the accused, so that it furnishes a link between them.23 A gun tied to the crime alone shows only that someone fired a gun; a gun tied to the accused alone shows only that he owns one.
The connection to the crime may be circumstantial, as when the defendant possessed masks, burglary tools, or a quantity of weapons, or direct, as with possession of bait money from the robbed bank or an eyewitness's positive identification of the items used. Similarity to the item the accused used also suffices, and an object connected with the defendant need only be suitable for the offense charged, or otherwise related to it, rather than shown to have been used in it.24
An instrumentality that is sufficiently shown to have been used in the crime but is not connected to the defendant, such as a bloody knife found at the scene of a murder, may still be admitted for another purpose, for example to show how the victim was wounded. It cannot be offered to prove that the defendant committed the crime, and like all tangible evidence it remains subject to exclusion under Rule 403.25
Demonstrative Evidence and Illustrative Aids
Real evidence claims to be the thing that took part in the events, but much of what jurors see makes no such claim. A map, diagram, chart, model, or animation exists because someone prepared it for the lawsuit, and Rule 107 now regulates the group directly.27 The rule calls these exhibits illustrative aids and defines the category by function: an aid helps the trier of fact understand evidence or argument. The court may allow one when its usefulness for comprehension is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or wasting time.28 The commentary lists drawings, photographs, diagrams, video depictions, charts, graphs, and computer simulations as examples.29
Traditional usage calls such exhibits demonstrative evidence: charts, photographs, diagrams, models, or video presentations that lawyers generate specifically for trial to clarify their case or make it more vivid.30 The commentary to Rule 107 prefers "illustrative aids" and calls "demonstrative presentations" the less helpful term, because the purpose of these exhibits is not to demonstrate how an event occurred but to help the trier of fact understand evidence or argument.31 Because "demonstrative" has long been used loosely, an older case or an exam question may say demonstrative where Rule 107 says illustrative aid.32
The two groups follow different rules. Evidence offered to prove a disputed fact must satisfy Rule 403, the hearsay rule, and the other evidentiary screens, and the jury is usually allowed to take it to the jury room. An illustrative aid is judged under Rule 107 instead, and it usually stays out of the jury room.33 Experiments and demonstrations get their own section below; this section concerns the aid.
An illustrative aid proves nothing on its own. The visual representation is neither proof that the witness's description was accurate nor independent or corroborative evidence; it is merely the witness's testimony rendered visually.34 A diagram of a burglarized apartment, for example, does not make it more or less probable that the defendant is the burglar. It clarifies testimony about what the apartment looked like. The aid's relevance is therefore derivative: an aid that promotes understanding of other relevant evidence meets the relevance requirement, so long as that evidence itself bears on a fact of consequence.35
The drawing now helps the jury picture the officer's testimony, but it has no more support than his word. That is why some judges instruct jurors accordingly, and why some courts keep such material out of the jury room or even decline to display it: jurors may treat the drawing as evidence and uncritically accept what it represents as established. Computer-aided reconstructions raise the same risk.36
The job an exhibit performs decides its category, and one bank lobby can supply both kinds.
The footage is judged like any other exhibit, and the jury usually takes substantive evidence of that kind to the jury room. The lobby photograph stays tied to the testimony it accompanies.37 Format does not decide the category: a photograph or a chart can fall on either side of the line.
An illustrative aid needs a lighter foundation than real evidence because it claims something different. It does not claim to have taken part in the events. It claims to be a fair and accurate representation of testimony or documentary evidence already in the case, so its source and the way it was made may be of no significance.38 Typically, a witness who perceived the thing depicted identifies the aid as a substantially correct representation of what the witness saw and is now describing, which satisfies the sufficiency standard of Rule 901(b)(1).39 The officer in the drawing example did exactly that.40 Only someone who knows the room can say whether a drawing matches it, which is why the witness, rather than the person who prepared the aid, is the natural sponsor. Demonstrative evidence of this kind is usually thought subject to neither the authentication requirement nor the best evidence rule;41 where Rule 901 is applied, a witness's confirmation meets it.
The same physical object can face either foundation. A worker who offers a screwdriver as the tool that injured him must support a finding that it is that tool. If his testimony cannot, the screwdriver is not properly authenticated and is excluded on that theory. He may still describe it as very similar to the one that hurt him, and the screwdriver can then come in for the limited purpose of illustrating his testimony.42 The costume-shop knife in the robbery example is an illustration of the same kind.
Even a properly founded aid must help. Whether a particular aid will in fact assist the trier or instead confuse or mislead it is a matter within the trial court's sound discretion, in most jurisdictions decided under Rules 403 and 611(a).43 Rule 107(a) writes that weighing into the rule: the aid's usefulness for comprehension must not be substantially outweighed by dangers that largely track those listed in Rule 403.44 The rule reaches aids that help jurors understand argument as well as evidence.
Rule 107(b) draws the line at the jury room. An illustrative aid is not evidence and must not be given to the jury during deliberations unless all parties consent or the court, for good cause, orders otherwise.45 Courts that keep aids away from jurors do so because jurors may treat an aid as proof and accept what it depicts without the support that only testimony can supply.46
An aid that is not evidence must still be preserved. Rule 107(c) requires that, when practicable, an illustrative aid used at trial be entered into the record.47 Entering an aid into the record is not the same as introducing it into evidence, because a merely marked exhibit cannot be relied upon by the jury in reaching a verdict.48
One more boundary separates an illustrative aid from a summary that is itself evidence. The commentary draws the line by purpose. A summary of voluminous admissible evidence offered to prove a fact is subject to Rule 1006, while a summary offered solely to help the trier of fact understand evidence already presented is an illustrative aid under Rule 107.49
Summaries laden with the proponent's conclusions blur the line, because they read more like argument than proof. Rule 1006 summaries must be shown to the court to be accurate and nonprejudicial. Courts have resolved the tension between the helpfulness of conclusion-laden summaries and the risk of undue influence by giving explicit limiting instructions that such summaries are not themselves evidence and may not be relied on by the jury as substantive proof.50
Experiments and Demonstrations
An experiment or demonstration is something a witness does, in the courtroom or elsewhere, so that the fact-finder perceives a result. Both depend on relevance under Rule 401(a): evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.52 A test offered to show how an event happened can have that tendency only if it resembles the event in the respects that control the outcome. Courts therefore measure the probative value of an in-court experiment by the similarity between its conditions and those of the alleged out-of-court event, and the requirement applies to experimental evidence generally.53 A test run under different conditions answers a question about the test and says little about the disputed event.
No formal line separates an in-court demonstration from an in-court experiment, although a demonstration becomes an experiment when a witness, particularly an expert, reenacts some aspect of an event to show a specific result that is at issue in the trial. The experimenting witness generally proves the result by testifying to what the experiment is and what is occurring.54 Experiments performed out of court generally reach the jury through expert testimony about their results, but the same similarity requirement governs them.55
The dry-track test fails at the first step of relevance, because a stopping distance on dry pavement cannot make any fact about braking on ice more or less probable. The second test earns its probative value from correspondence in vehicle, load, and surface, the very variables that decide the result. Courts put the same question to any comparison: are the similarities strong enough to affect the probabilities of a fact of consequence, or are the differences so great that the comparison is irrelevant?56
The standard is substantial similarity, which does not demand identity. In the related setting of other-accident evidence, courts treat substantial similarity as a matter for the trial court's sound discretion, reversible only for abuse. In balancing probative value against Rule 403 dangers, the court may admit the accidents deemed most similar and exclude the rest.57 Demonstrations receive similar latitude. In Roland v. Langlois, a carnival-ride injury case, the court of appeals upheld the admission of a life-size model of part of the fence around the ride even though the plaintiffs said it was not completely accurate; demonstrative evidence need not be perfectly accurate, and the model came in on the condition that the jury be told of the perceived inaccuracies.58 The case illustrates the general rule that whether an exhibit will in fact help or instead confuse or mislead the trier is a matter within the trial court's sound discretion.59 Differences that are disclosed to the jury and leave the inference intact go to weight, and cross-examination can expose them.
Filming an experiment does not relax the similarity requirement. Courts press it hardest when the recording visually reproduces the event itself, because the risk of jury confusion is greatest then. An experiment that only shows the nature or capacity of a physical object, or a general principle of science, does not reproduce the event, so similarity is imposed less strictly, although the court may still exclude it as a veiled re-creation of the event or as prejudicial.60
Computer animations follow the same logic. An animation is admissible once a foundation of sufficient similarity is laid, subject to Rule 403. An animation that goes beyond illustration by building in experimental elements, commonly called a simulation, raises added concerns about similarity and about the reliability of the explanatory theory it embodies.61 An animation that merely walks the jury through a witness's account works as an illustrative aid, as the previous section explained. A simulation asserts that the event unfolded in a particular way, and it carries the burden of an experiment.
Courtroom demonstrations are permitted to explain, and the trial judge polices the line between explanation and theater. A medical expert's use of a model of a human foot or skeleton to explain an injury is clearly proper, and counsel may, within appropriate bounds, reuse demonstrative evidence in closing argument to illustrate and explain. Demonstrations aimed at dramatic effect or emotional appeal are not allowed.62 Because the dividing line is not sharp, considerable discretion rests with the trial judge under Rule 403, which permits exclusion when probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger such as unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or wasting time.63 The discretion fits because in-court experimentation can bring considerable confusion and delay, and the judge is best placed to weigh those costs. Courtroom conditions also make similarity hard to achieve, which is why many proposed in-court experiments have been properly excluded.64 A simple demonstration by a witness is usually permitted and can add vividness to the spoken word, though that vividness carries the risk of an undue emotional response.65
Demonstrations by an injured party need the most care. Showing an injury to the jury is the familiar case, but asking the injured person to perform acts or to be manipulated by a physician goes further. The trial court has discretion to allow it, though judicial opinion is more divided about going beyond mere exhibition.66 Three dangers explain the division: the impairment may be feigned, cross-examination has little to work with, and visible pain can provoke an undue emotional response from the jury.67
A jury view, in which jurors visit the scene, falls under the same judicial discretion. When the scene is forty miles from the courthouse and its physical surroundings can be accurately conveyed by testimony, photographs, diagrams, or other means, the judge will probably deny the request as a waste of time or an undue delay.68