Concept
The Mental State Exception
Ultimate issue rule
The Mental State Exception
Rule 704(a) abolished the general ban on ultimate-issue opinions, and Rule 704(b) revives a narrow slice of it. In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense; those matters are for the trier of fact alone.1 The other limits covered so far, such as bottom-line opinions, legal conclusions, and unexplored legal labels, all turn on a judgment about helpfulness and prejudice, so a lawyer can often cure the problem by rephrasing the question or laying more foundation. Rule 704(b) is categorical. It removes a defined class of expert opinion whatever the witness's qualifications and however carefully the question is worded, so a clearer or better-supported version of a forbidden opinion remains forbidden.
The prohibition has four parts, and all four must be present. The case must be criminal, the witness must be an expert, the opinion must concern the defendant's own mental state or condition, and that mental state or condition must be an element of the crime charged or of a defense. If any part is missing (a civil case, a lay witness, someone else's mental state, a condition that is not an element of anything), Rule 704(b) drops away and the opinion faces the ordinary tests of Rules 701 through 703 and Rule 403. Because the rule reaches only the last step of an expert's reasoning, a mental-health expert keeps most of what the expert has to say. The subsections below explain why Congress wrote the rule, work through each of its parts, and mark what remains open to the expert.
Why Congress Added the Exception
John Hinckley's trial explains the rule. Hinckley shot and nearly killed President Ronald Reagan in 1981 and raised the insanity defense.2 Numerous experts testified for and against him, the jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity, and Congress and much of the country were outraged, although Hinckley was in fact confined at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington for decades.3 Congress responded in 1984 by amending Rule 704 to limit expert testimony.4 The Seventh Circuit later described subsection (b) as adopted in the aftermath of Hinckley's attempt on the President's life,5 and the amendment was one part of a wider reaction, since Congress also codified the insanity defense in dissatisfaction with the same verdict.6
What Congress thought had gone wrong appears in the Senate report. The purpose of the amendment, it says, was “to eliminate the confusing spectacle of competing expert witnesses testifying to directly contradictory conclusions as to the ultimate legal issue to be found by the trier of fact.”7 Psychiatric testimony would be limited to presenting and explaining diagnoses, such as whether the defendant had a severe mental disease or defect and what the characteristics of that disease or defect may have been.8 The target, then, was a way of asking and answering questions. Testimony about the defendant's condition stayed open.
The limit rests on a difference between medical and legal questions. A psychiatrist is an expert in medicine, so the expert's first job is to present medical information and opinion about the defendant's mental state and motivation and to explain the reasons for the medical conclusions.9 The insanity test asks a different kind of question. It takes the clinical facts and asks whether they add up to a legal status, such as an inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of one's acts. When a lawyer frames that question in the law's own terms and demands a yes or a no, the expert must make what the American Psychiatric Association, quoted in the Senate report, called a “leap in logic,” because the answer depends on the probable relationship between medical concepts and legal or moral constructs such as free will.10 Medical training supplies no method for crossing from one side to the other, so the witness must infer or intuit the connection, and the answer carries the authority of medicine without resting on medical expertise.11
The cost shows up in front of the jury. When both sides put the question in the law's language, jurors hear two credentialed witnesses declare the defendant sane and insane, and testimony couched in the language of the insanity defense can go a long way with jurors.12 The labels can also hide common ground, because in many criminal trials the prosecution and defense psychiatrists agree about the nature and even the extent of the disorder the defendant exhibited at the time of the act.13 Limiting experts to diagnosis and characteristics leaves the legal conclusion with the body the law assigns to reach it, the jury.
The committee's reasoning was not confined to insanity. The same leap occurs whenever the law's question is about a mental state, so the committee fashioned the provision to reach every such ultimate issue, giving premeditation in a homicide case and lack of predisposition in entrapment as examples.14 Premeditation shows why. It is a legal category applied to what went on in the defendant's mind, so an expert who says the defendant did not premeditate has moved from clinical description to legal characterization. The text of the rule matches that logic: it covers any mental state or condition that is an element of the crime charged or of a defense,15 and an opinion that a defendant lacked the capacity to form a specific intent falls within the bar even when no insanity defense is raised.16
Courts had voiced the same concern before the amendment. In Washington v. United States, the D.C. Circuit, applying a test under which insanity turned on whether the crime was a product of mental illness, said that psychiatrists should explain how the defendant's disease or defect relates to the alleged offense, meaning how it may have influenced the defendant's behavior, and should not testify on the ultimate issue.17 A concurring judge worried that letting a witness give an opinion in exact “product” language was likely to give “undue weight to his view on the ultimate issue,” which could detract from the jury's responsibility.18 The American Bar Association took a parallel position that experts should not give opinions on any question requiring a conclusion of law or a moral or social value judgment reserved to a court or jury.19 The 1984 amendment turned that kind of guidance into a mandatory rule for expert opinions on the mental state of a criminal defendant.20
That history also explains why a rule that abolished the general ultimate-issue ban was followed by a narrow revival of it. Subsection (b) to a degree resurrects the prohibition that subsection (a) abolished, and it was enacted in part as a backlash against the Hinckley acquittal.21 The two fit together because they rest on different reasons. The general ban failed because it swept in every opinion touching a fact the jury must find, including opinions that carry information a jury can use. Subsection (b) takes a single class, the expert's conclusion on the defendant's own mental-state element, where the last step adds a legal or moral judgment and no further medical information. The provision also apparently reflects an effort to reduce the potential impact of psychiatric testimony in criminal cases.22 Because the bar is categorical, a judge applying it does not weigh helpfulness against prejudice case by case.
Whether the rule has done what Congress wanted remains debated. It has moderated courtroom battles among mental-health experts only to some extent, because many courts still let experts give diametrically opposed opinions on penultimate questions such as the defendant's illness, its classic symptoms, and its likely effect on cognition and volition.23 An expert can go right to the brink of the prohibition and stop before the opinion it forbids. The Hinckley trial itself suggests the limits of a diagnosis-only rule, since the defense diagnosed schizophrenia and the prosecution diagnosed a personality disorder, a disagreement about the clinical picture that the rule would not have reached.24 Enforcement is also uneven. Experts in insanity cases sometimes still speak to what was going through the defendant's mind and whether the defendant knew the nature or wrongfulness of the act, and unless the judge sustains a proper objection, exposing that testimony falls to the cross-examiner.25 The rule's effect is best described as moving the dispute back one step, from competing verdicts to competing diagnoses, with the legal conclusion left to the jury.
What the Exception Forbids
The prohibition is categorical, and it pays to read it as four parts: a criminal case, an expert witness, a mental state or condition of the defendant, and an element of the crime charged or of a defense.27 When any part is missing, the opinion falls outside Rule 704(b) and returns to Rule 704(a), which removes the ultimate-issue objection but leaves the ordinary tests of helpfulness and reliability in place.28 Because each part can end the analysis, an exam answer should move through them in order.
The first two gates mark the outer boundary of the rule, which a later subsection examines. A civil case or a lay witness is outside the text, so the analysis stops there and the opinion is judged by the ordinary rules. Inside the boundary, the rule does not care which side calls the expert. It bars an opinion that the defendant did have the mental state and an opinion that the defendant did not, and both halves of that phrase matter.29 The reason is the same for both. When the law's question about the defendant's mind is put to a mental-health expert as a yes-or-no question, the expert must stop describing medical concepts and make the “leap in logic” to a legal or moral construct such as free will, a step that medical training does not equip anyone to take.30 That leap is identical whether a prosecutor or a defense lawyer asked for it, and the confusing spectacle of competing experts reaching contradictory conclusions on the legal issue needs experts on both sides to produce it.31
The third and fourth gates sort mental-state opinions from everything else, and they reach well beyond insanity. Insanity is the clearest case. The federal definition asks whether, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, the defendant was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of the defendant's acts,32 so an expert may not say whether the accused was able to appreciate either one.33 The same bar covers premeditation in a homicide case and lack of predisposition in an entrapment defense, and it reaches the mental-state elements that arise often in tax evasion, drug, and child pornography prosecutions.34 The reasoning behind the rule extends to any ultimate mental state of the defendant that bears on the legal conclusion the prosecution or defense is trying to establish.35
Capacity opinions are the form most likely to slip past an inattentive reader. An expert who says the defendant lacked the capacity to form a specific intent has not literally said the defendant lacked the intent, and it is tempting to treat the difference as important. The rule does not. In United States v. Christian, the Ninth Circuit applied the rule to a mental-health opinion that the defendant lacked the capacity to form specific intent, and the opinion was barred.36 The reasoning follows from the rule's purpose: a capacity opinion answers the jury's question about the intent element as directly as a statement that the intent was absent, so permitting it would turn the categorical bar into a matter of how counsel words the question. A state decision points the same way, though it is only an analogy because it does not apply the federal rule. In Edwards v. State, the defendant killed one person and tried to kill another with a shotgun, and the defense offered an expert to say that mental illness prevented the formation of specific intent to kill. The Arkansas Court of Appeals rejected the testimony, because whether the defendant had the requisite intent was an ultimate issue for the jury on which no witness, even an expert, could testify.37
The fourth gate ties the prohibition to the definition of the offense or the defense, because only mental states that the law makes an element are covered. Common-law burglary shows how an offense definition divides the case: breaking, entering, the dwelling house of another, and nighttime are physical facts, while the intent to commit a felony inside is the mental-state element.38 Everything on the physical side stays under Rule 704(a). In a rape prosecution, penetration is an ultimate fact, and a medical expert may testify that it occurred, because penetration is not a mental state or condition.39 An exam stem that puts two experts in one murder trial invites you to treat them alike, so the ruling must depend on what each opinion is about and not on how central it is to the case.
The bar removes only the final step, the opinion that the defendant did or did not have the element-level mental state. The next subsection takes up what the expert may still say.
What Experts May Still Say
Rule 704(b) forbids a single opinion. Subsection (b) is an exception to the general rule in subsection (a), which removes the objection that an opinion embraces an ultimate issue, so everything outside the forbidden opinion stays under the general rule and faces only the ordinary tests for expert testimony.41 An expert may state opinions and conclusions in any form the expert chooses, subject only to the limit in criminal cases that prevents the expert from saying explicitly whether a defendant possessed a specific mental state that is an element of a charged crime.42 The forbidden opinion is the one the rule describes: that the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime or of a defense.43 A mental-health expert therefore has a good deal left to say, and the practical task is to locate the last step.
The line falls where it does because its two sides call on different kinds of knowledge. A diagnosis, an account of how the disorder usually shows itself, and a description of how it bends perception and judgment are clinical matters that a psychiatrist or psychologist is trained to supply, and they give the jury the material it needs to decide what was going on in the defendant's mind. The final step is of another order. Deciding that a person was unable to appreciate wrongfulness, or lacked the intent a statute requires, applies a legal definition to the clinical picture, and the law assigns that application to the jury. A psychiatrist must therefore be allowed to testify fully about diagnosis, mental state, and motivation in clinical and commonsense terms, so that the jury can reach the ultimate conclusion itself.44 The rule keeps the expertise and removes only the conclusion.
The permitted side is easiest to see as a set of questions. Where a defendant's mental capacity is in issue, a mental-health expert may presumably answer four kinds of question.45
- Whether the defendant was suffering from a mental disease or defect, or from a specific disorder.
- What the characteristics of that disease or defect are.
- Whether the defendant's act was the product of the disease or defect, or was at least the type of conduct that can be a product of it.
- What effect the disease or defect has on the person's mental state.
Each of these asks about the condition, its features, or its effects, and none asks whether the defendant met the law's definition of a mental state. The question the expert may not answer applies the definition: whether the accused was able to appreciate the nature and quality of the acts or the wrongfulness of them.46 The third permitted question shows that linking the condition to the charged conduct is allowed. The usual formulation asks whether the act was the type of conduct that can be a product of the disorder, which describes what the disorder can produce and leaves the jury to decide whether it did.47
The working instruction for an expert is to stay one step back from the legal elements: explain the basis for the diagnosis, describe the condition and its characteristics, and say how such a condition would or might affect an ordinary person's ability to appreciate wrongfulness or to conform conduct to the law.48 Those last points sit so close to the ultimate issue that courts sometimes balk at them.49 Testimony becomes improper when it crosses a line, admittedly a vague one, from describing the condition to making a specific statement about the crucial mental state at issue in the prosecution.50 Most trial judges allow testimony about the defendant's mental illness, its classic symptoms, and its likely impact on cognitive and volitional capabilities, and the objection arises when the answer is built to hand the jury the element.51
Vocabulary is a useful signal that an expert has drifted: experts should describe the defendant's mental functioning, symptoms, and thought processes and avoid stating opinions in the language of the law.52 The signal is imperfect, since the bar follows the substance of the opinion. An opinion that a disorder left the defendant without the capacity to form specific intent avoids the word intent yet answers the same question, and the rule bars it.53
United States v. Finley shows the permitted side in a federal appellate court. Finley was tried for attempted bank fraud after he submitted phony instruments resembling checks as payment on a mortgage, along with a demand for a refund of the difference between the phony check and the debt, and to support his claim that he lacked intent he offered a psychologist who would testify that he held an “atypical belief system” that was “fixed and rigid.”54 The Ninth Circuit held the testimony admissible, because an expert may testify about a defendant's mental state as long as the expert does not “draw the ultimate inference or conclusion.”55 The psychologist described how Finley's mind worked and left to the jury the question whether that belief system meant he lacked intent, so the jury could credit the description and still find that he intended to defraud.
United States v. Bennett, decided by the Third Circuit, supplies the forbidden side on a similar subject. Bennett was tried over a Ponzi scheme in which he encouraged charities and donors to deposit money with New Era by promising that the deposits would be matched by other donors after a holding period, and he offered psychiatric testimony that mental disorders kept him from forming an intent to defraud, or made it unlikely that he had that purpose.56 The court excluded the testimony because the expert would have gone beyond explaining the nature of the mental disease or describing its typical effect, and would have stated expressly whether Bennett had the requisite intent.57 Both defendants offered a mental condition against the same kind of charge, so the subject matter is the same. The decisions diverge at the final step: Finley's psychologist stopped at the description, and Bennett's psychiatrist was prepared to announce the answer to the intent question.
A California statute that parallels the federal rule provides that, in the guilt phase of a criminal action, an expert testifying about a defendant's mental illness, disorder, or defect shall not testify as to whether the defendant had or did not have the required mental states.58 People v. Erickson applied that statute, so it is an analogy to Rule 704(b) and not an application of it. The defendant offered an expert on battered woman's syndrome, and the trial judge allowed testimony on the syndrome, including its physical, emotional, and mental effects on the defendant's beliefs, perceptions, or behavior, but refused to let the expert say what the defendant's belief was or was not.59 The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant's state of mind on the night the batterer died was for the jury to determine and not for an expert.60 The permitted testimony has real value, because an expert can help the jury understand how a battered woman picks up subtle clues of impending violence that outsiders miss, so that conduct that does not look to an observer like an imminent attack may appear to be one in the context of that relationship.61 The expert supplies the lens, and the jury decides whether the defendant, looking through it, actually held the belief on which self-defense depends.
Together the decisions yield the line an exam answer needs: diagnosis and effects yes, did-or-did-not-have-the-element no. Students go wrong in two directions. One treats the rule as a bar on mental-health testimony altogether and excludes a diagnosis or a description of symptoms because it bears on intent, which overlooks that the rule reaches only the opinion on whether the defendant had or lacked the element. The other treats any testimony in clinical dress as safe, which overlooks that an opinion that the defendant could not appreciate wrongfulness, lacked the capacity to form intent, or held a particular belief on the night in question is the forbidden conclusion in whatever vocabulary it arrives. The next subsection takes up a way of phrasing questions that tries to reach that conclusion indirectly.
Mirroring Hypothetical Questions
A lawyer who cannot ask the forbidden question directly has an incentive to ask it in disguise, and the usual disguise is the hypothetical. Counsel describes a person who has the same disorder as the defendant and does everything the defendant is accused of doing, then asks what that person would have intended. The imaginary person is the defendant in all but name, and the answer is the opinion Rule 704(b) forbids, with a different grammatical subject.63 Courts therefore ask not whether the question is hypothetical but what its answer would necessarily say.
A rule that forbade only the direct question would be easy to evade, since counsel could extract the opinion by swapping “the defendant” for “a person with this disorder.” At the same time, hypotheticals are an ordinary way for an expert to connect clinical knowledge to the evidence, and the rule leaves the expert free to describe the disorder, its characteristics, and its typical effects. Courts therefore sort mirroring questions by the inference their answers carry. In United States v. Levine, the Fifth Circuit held that a hypothetical that mirrors the evidence violates Rule 704(b) when the answering testimony contains a “necessary inference” about whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition that is an element of the crime or defense.64 The court drew on decisions of the District of Columbia, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits for that approach, with a comparison to a Ninth Circuit decision.65
Levine shows the permitted side. The defendant, tried for bank robbery, raised an insanity defense and offered expert testimony that he suffered from bipolar disorder, a severe mental disease, at the time of the crime, and the government rebutted with a clinical psychologist who opined that he was not suffering from bipolar disorder during the robbery.66 On redirect the prosecutor asked hypotheticals closely tracking the robbery, including whether a person in a severe manic episode would have had the wherewithal to think, before entering the bank, about putting on a disguise, and whether such a person inside the bank would think about getting out quickly before the guard arrived. The psychologist answered no to each.67 Defense counsel conceded at oral argument that asking whether acts matching the case's facts are consistent with the characteristics of a manic episode is proper, but argued that asking whether such a person would “think to act” in that way went one step too far because it referred to intent.68 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, because the answers contained no opinion or inference about whether the defendant had the mental state or condition that is an element of the crime or a defense; the testimony focused on whether facts like those in evidence were consistent with the conduct of a hypothetical person in a severe manic episode.69 It found no abuse of discretion in overruling the objections.70
Two features of that ruling deserve attention. The answers described what a severe manic episode does to a person's planning, and they left the jury to decide whether the defendant was in such an episode and whether he appreciated the wrongfulness of the robbery. The word “think” in the questions did not decide the outcome either, because the court looked at what the answers conveyed and not at the vocabulary of the questions. The standard of review matters too. The court held only that the trial judge did not abuse discretion on these facts, so Levine does not guarantee admission of every question that uses similar language.
Bennett, the Ponzi-scheme case from the last subsection, supplies the barred side. The court excluded the psychiatric testimony because the expert would have gone beyond explaining the disease or describing its typical effect and would have stated expressly whether Bennett had the requisite intent.71 In discussing the techniques lawyers use in cases like this, the court described the mirroring hypothetical, which asks whether a person who suffers from the disorder attributed to the defendant would intend to defraud people if he set up the scheme that the defendant set up,72 and it cited Levine for the rule that such questions violate Rule 704(b) when the answers reflect a necessary inference about the defendant's mental state.73
The Bennett question and the Levine questions share a form, since each describes a person with a disorder doing what the defendant did. They differ in what they ask the expert to supply. Levine's questions asked about functioning: whether a person in a severe manic episode could plan a disguise or think about escape. Bennett's question asked about the element itself: whether such a person would intend to defraud. Once the question says the person has the disorder and ran the same scheme, a yes or no answers the intent question about the defendant. A consistency answer stops one step earlier and leaves the jury to find what the defendant actually had in mind.
Students tend to err in two directions. One assumes that calling a question a hypothetical removes it from Rule 704(b), which overlooks that a mirroring question with an intent-laden answer is the forbidden opinion in disguise. The other assumes that any hypothetical tracking the facts is barred, which overlooks that Levine allowed such questions because the answers addressed consistency. A question that passes Rule 704(b) still faces the ordinary tests for opinion testimony, since Rule 704(a) removes only the ultimate-issue objection and leaves the other grounds of exclusion in place.74
Lay Witnesses and Civil Cases
Rule 704(b) announces its boundaries in its first words. It governs only “a criminal case,” and it restrains only “an expert witness,” who must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense.76 Rule 704(a) has no comparable limits. It says only that an opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue, whoever offers the opinion and in whatever kind of proceeding.77 Subsection (b), by its terms, applies only to expert testimony.78 An opinion outside those limits returns to the general rule and the ordinary tests of helpfulness and reliability, so each limit deserves separate attention.
The first limit concerns who is testifying. In Schmidt, the court, citing Tenth Circuit authority, said that the restrictions in Rule 704(b) do not apply to lay witnesses, although a lay witness's testimony must still be helpful to the trier of fact under Rule 701.79 The reason follows from what the bar targets. An expert asked whether the defendant was insane or premeditated must leave the medical findings and move to a legal or moral construct, a step medical training does not supply, and the answer still arrives carrying the authority of medicine.80 A lay witness carries no such credential, and Rule 701 confines what a lay witness may say: the opinion must be rationally based on the witness's perception and helpful to the trier of fact, and it may not reflect “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” within Rule 702.81 A lay opinion about a defendant's state of mind therefore comes in on the strength of observation, and the jury weighs it as it weighs any other impression of how a person was behaving.
That ruling turns on the identity of the witness and says nothing about every remark the neighbor might add. A neighbor who goes on to say that the defendant was legally insane has moved from observation to a legal conclusion, and the limits taught earlier on bottom-line opinions and questions of law exclude that remark, with Rule 704(b) playing no part in the ruling. The objection a lawyer should make to a lay mental-state opinion is therefore a Rule 701 objection, that the opinion lacks a basis in perception or fails to help the jury. The Rule 704(b) objection belongs to expert testimony.
The harder question is whether a party can use the lay-witness exemption to get around the expert bar. A prosecutor who wants a mental-health professional's view on premeditation might call the professional and describe the witness as a lay witness, hoping that subsection (b) will not reach the answer.
The proviso in Rule 701 closes this route. Rule 704(b) does not limit lay testimony on the mental condition of the accused, but Rule 701 blocks lay testimony based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge, which prevents an end run around the restrictions on experts.82 The court asks what the opinion rests on, whatever label the party attaches to the witness. A person with a clinical degree who simply watched the defendant behave may describe what was seen, while an opinion drawn from testing, diagnosis, or clinical training is expert opinion, and expert opinion on the defendant's mental-state element is exactly what subsection (b) forbids.
The second limit concerns the kind of proceeding, and the text of subsection (b) is again the guide. Because the bar attaches only in a criminal case, an expert's opinion about a party's mental condition in a civil case is governed by Rule 704(a), and the opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue.83 A Montana civil-commitment decision shows the contrast, although it applies state law and serves only as an analogy. In In re B.O.T., whether the respondent was mentally ill was the ultimate fact the proceeding had to decide, and the Montana Supreme Court wrote that the professional person may testify as to the ultimate issue of whether the respondent suffers from a mental disorder and requires commitment.84 The text confines the federal bar to criminal cases, and the history fits that choice, since subsection (b) was enacted in part as a reaction to an insanity acquittal in a criminal prosecution.85
Freedom from the categorical bar does not make a civil expert's opinion automatically admissible. A psychiatrist in a will contest who is asked whether the testator had testamentary capacity meets no categorical bar, but the question still has to get past the helpfulness requirements and the objection that the legal label's criteria have not been explored.86 The same psychiatrist, asked in a federal prosecution whether the defendant premeditated, meets the categorical bar however the question is phrased.87
State Law and Constitutional Limits
Rule 704(b) is part of the Federal Rules of Evidence, so it governs federal trials.89 Congress adopted it as a matter of evidence policy, which makes the rule one lawmaker's answer to a question that other lawmakers may answer differently. Two questions follow. How do state courts, which apply their own evidence rules, treat the same testimony? And does the Constitution require the federal answer, or forbid it? States differ among themselves, and the Constitution has not been read to dictate either choice.
Oklahoma shows the permissive alternative. In Diestel v. Hines, a separate opinion compared Oklahoma's rule with Rule 704(b) and observed that, unlike the Federal Rules of Evidence, Oklahoma law permits experts to testify about whether a criminal defendant did or did not have the mental state the crime requires.90 An expert there may speak to the ultimate issue of fact.91 Oklahoma keeps a limit you saw earlier in the discussion of bottom-line opinions, because it does not permit opinion testimony that merely tells a jury what result to reach.92 An expert's answer about a defendant's mental capacity is therefore an ordinary helpfulness question in Oklahoma, and the state has no categorical bar for mental states.
Because the Oklahoma material comes from a separate opinion, it reports one judge's description of state law and decides nothing. The opinion found it troubling that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals relied heavily on the lay testimony of strangers, people who did not know the defendant or had only a casual brush with him.93 It also observed that the State's own expert, Dr. John Call, chose not to testify as to the ultimate issue even though Oklahoma law allows it,94 which shows that the state rule grants permission and leaves its use to counsel. The comparison exposes the interests at stake. A direct answer from a qualified expert can help the jury, and the same answer carries a risk that jurors will defer to a conclusion about the accused's mind. Rule 704(b) resolves that tension by reserving the conclusion for the jury, and Oklahoma resolves it by trusting the ordinary helpfulness screen.
Other jurisdictions fall at different points on that spectrum. A footnote in Clark v. Arizona observes that Arizona permits capacity evidence and has a Rule 704 allowing otherwise admissible testimony that “embrac[es] an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact,” though not every jurisdiction permits such evidence on the ultimate issue of insanity.95 Arkansas sits on the restrictive side. In the decision discussed earlier, Edwards v. State, the Arkansas Court of Appeals rejected expert testimony that mental illness prevented the defendant from forming the specific intent to kill, reasoning that intent was an ultimate issue for the jury and that no witness, even an expert, could testify about it.96 That reasoning speaks of any witness and rests on the ultimate-issue label that Rule 704(a) removed in federal court, so it follows a different path from subsection (b), which addresses only experts in criminal cases.
The constitutional challenge has been tried, and the courts that have addressed it have upheld the limits. In Keith v. Schaub, a federal habeas petitioner attacked Wisconsin's limits on expert testimony about a defendant's mental state, and the Seventh Circuit wrote that Rule 704(b), “which treats a defendant's intent as a matter for lay rather than expert decision,” has been sustained against constitutional challenge, citing decisions of the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.97 The court added that its own earlier decisions had held Wisconsin's limits constitutional as well.98 Keith urged a distinction between the use of expert evidence in specific-intent and general-intent situations. The court answered that the Supreme Court has never clearly established that distinction, and has not clearly established that expert testimony about a defendant's mental state and the reasons leading to it must be admitted in any non-capital prosecution.99
Two cautions keep that holding in proportion. The case arose on habeas review, where only clearly established Supreme Court law counts, so it reports the absence of a recognized constitutional right and does not record a Supreme Court endorsement of every limit. The rule's structure also explains why challenges struggle. Rule 704(b) withholds only the final inference about whether the defendant had the element-level mental state, and the jury still hears the diagnosis, the symptoms, and the likely effects of the condition. A rule that withholds so little leaves a constitutional claim little to rest on, and each jurisdiction remains free to weigh the competing interests as it sees fit.
An exam stem that places the same opinion in different courtrooms tests whether you identify the forum before you apply a rule.
The federal answer is therefore correct only in federal court. In a state-court fact pattern, apply the forum's own rule, and where the stem supplies no state rule, say that Rule 704(b) is the federal answer and that the result depends on the state's evidence law.