Concept
Rule 705 Order of Presentation
Bases of testimony
Rule 705 Order of Presentation
Rule 705 decides who puts an expert’s basis before the jury, and when. It says: “Unless the court orders otherwise, an expert may state an opinion—and give the reasons for it—without first testifying to the underlying facts or data. But the expert may be required to disclose those facts or data on cross-examination.”1 The first sentence lets the proponent, the party who called the expert, open with the conclusion. The second lets the opponent force the foundation into the open. The opening clause keeps one more option in the judge’s hands: the court may order the basis presented first.
Rule 705 works alongside Rule 703, but the two answer different questions. Rule 703 asks what an expert may rely on. The expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert was made aware of or personally observed, and otherwise inadmissible material qualifies if experts in the field would reasonably rely on it. The proponent may disclose that inadmissible material to the jury only if its probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.2 Rule 705 asks about sequence and initiative: must the jury hear the basis before the opinion, and who must take the step of bringing it out? The expert may rest an opinion on facts learned at the current trial or through observations outside it, and Rule 705 lets the court require disclosure of the data the expert relied on.3 An expert can therefore rely properly on a broad body of material under Rule 703 and never recite it on direct under Rule 705. It is a mistake to read the freedom to skip the basis as permission to tell the jury everything the expert relied on.
The division of labor follows who controls the testimony at each stage. A rule requiring the foundation first would force a recital of facts before every opinion, and the proponent would shape that recital. Rule 705 makes the recital optional, so the proponent decides how much foundation to give on direct, while the opponent receives a guaranteed route to the basis through cross-examination. The two subsections below follow the same division. The first takes up the proponent’s side, stating the opinion directly. The second takes up the opponent’s side, cross-examining on the basis.
Opinion Without Prior Basis
The first sentence of Rule 705 lets the party who calls an expert go straight to the conclusion and the reasons, without first testifying to the underlying facts or data.4 The rule speaks only to the order of proof, yet it reshapes direct examination, because the facts behind an opinion need not be built up before the opinion arrives. It grants a permission and imposes no command. A proponent may still present the basis first, and for tactical reasons often does when the underlying material is admissible. The one limit is that otherwise inadmissible facts, data, or opinions reasonably relied on may not go to the jury on direct unless the court finds that their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.5
A warehouse-fire case shows the permission at work. The defendant qualifies a fire marshal as an expert on the cause and origin of fires and asks whether he is familiar with, and investigated, the fire at 914 Cargo Street on August 23, 2017. Counsel then asks, “Do you have an opinion on what caused this fire?” The plaintiff objects that defense counsel must use a hypothetical question. The marshal answers over the objection that he has an opinion, and when asked what it is, he says the source of the fire was arson.6 The ruling is correct. Rule 705 lets an expert state an opinion without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, so no hypothetical question is needed unless the court orders otherwise. The plaintiff may then use cross-examination to elicit the factual basis, as the next subsection explains.7
The hypothetical question shows what the rule made optional. In a hypothetical, counsel recites facts for the expert to assume and then asks for an opinion. A plaintiff’s lawyer might say, “Assuming, Doctor, that during the four weeks before the plaintiff was hospitalized, and while he was working in close proximity to the liquid chemical known as Benzene, he experienced, with increasing frequency, persistent headaches, dizziness, and nausea, do you have an opinion, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, as to what caused these symptoms?” The question informs the witness of the pertinent facts and identifies the assumed facts on which the opinion rests.8 That identification is exactly what Rule 705 no longer requires on direct.
The device also invites abuse. The lawyer asking a hypothetical often crafts it in partisan terms, adds extraneous facts, omits unfavorable ones, or states the facts so argumentatively that the question partakes of closing argument. Some questions run to several or even a dozen pages of transcript.9 Rule 705 does not cure the partisanship, because the question and the answer on direct are still the proponent’s. It does simplify the examination and removes the occasion for reversing a judgment on appeal over technical deficiencies in the form of hypothetical questions.10 The hypothetical remains permissible and popular all the same. Because the proponent specifies the hypothesis, a short, clean one gives maximum control and lets the jury see the factual basis clearly.11
The older rule on out-of-court reports shows what changed. The former majority view held a question improper if it called for an opinion resting on out-of-court reports that were inadmissible under the hearsay rule. As a matter of logic, the jury could not accept an opinion based on facts when the only evidence of the facts was inadmissible.12 Rule 703 removed that premise by allowing an expert to rely on inadmissible facts or data that experts in the field would reasonably rely on.13 Once such material may support an opinion, a recital meant to confirm admissible support for every basis fact loses much of its point.
Opinion-first examination changes only the timing, so the other limits on expert testimony stay in force. The testimony must still rest on sufficient facts or data under Rule 702(b).14 After Kumho, the reliability requirement of Daubert applies to all expert testimony, at least in federal court.15 Courts have also struggled to separate adequately explained criteria in a legal standard from inadequately explained ones. One court excluded a tax professor’s opinion that a taxpayer’s theory was not implausible, because evidence of the “uncertainty of the controlling law” is excludable under Rule 403.16
The opening clause, “unless the court orders otherwise,” makes the default adjustable. Opinion-first examination works best when the opponent already knows the foundation, so a judge who sees that the opponent cannot prepare may require the proponent to bring out the basic facts first. Judges tend to do so when there has been no adequate pretrial opportunity to discover the facts, especially in criminal cases.17 Where the cross-examiner has not been given the information needed for an effective cross-examination, a situation most likely in criminal cases, the court may exercise its Rule 705 discretion and require a full foundation on direct.18 What triggers such an order is the opponent’s ability to meet the testimony, not any defect in the opinion.
The exam point is that Rule 705 allocates timing and initiative and does not decide admissibility. A stem in which counsel asks for the opinion without a hypothetical, and the expert answers without reciting a basis, describes a permitted examination. A stem in which the judge requires the foundation first describes an exercise of the power to order otherwise. Neither stem tells you whether the basis is adequate, whether inadmissible data may be disclosed to the jury, or whether the Confrontation Clause is satisfied, because other rules govern those questions.
Cross-Examining the Basis
The second sentence of Rule 705 gives the opponent a route to the foundation that the first sentence let the proponent skip: the expert “may be required to disclose those facts or data on cross-examination.”20 The initiative belongs to the cross-examiner. The proponent need not volunteer the basis on direct, so whether the jury ever hears it depends on whether opposing counsel brings it out.21 A lawyer who has studied the expert’s report knows where the opinion is thinnest and can go straight to those points, instead of sitting through a recital that the proponent has shaped.
The freedom carries a price. Rule 705 places a heavy burden on the cross-examiner, who must know enough about the subject to bring out the underlying facts in a way that exposes any weakness in the opinion.22 Consider counsel who asks whether the opinion rests partly on conversations with eyewitnesses and then asks, “What did they say?” without knowing the answer. The reply may supply a damaging fact as readily as a helpful one.
Discovery is what makes the burden bearable. The discovery rules in civil cases, and to a lesser degree in criminal cases, give the cross-examiner advance knowledge of the nature of the expert’s opinion and its bases. The cross-examiner may also have an expert of his own in the courtroom to assist, under Rule 615. Where discovery leaves the gap, a situation most likely in criminal cases, the court may require a full foundation on direct, as the prior subsection explained.23
Once the cross-examiner decides to go into the basis, the best line of attack depends on how the direct was conducted. If the direct examiner did not use a hypothetical or did not fully explore the bases, the cross-examiner may ask questions that reveal the underlying basis. If the expert himself supplied the underlying facts or data, the cross-examiner may ask questions that reveal a lack of thoroughness, or defects in the expert’s observations or memory.24 In the fire case, plaintiff’s counsel did the first of these, asking questions that elicited the factual basis for the marshal’s opinion.25
The scene does not tell you whether the foundation was adequate. Rule 705 allocates who brings the basis out and when, while the question whether the expert had sufficient facts or data stays with Rule 702(b).26
Cross-examination can do more than expose a basis. It can destroy one. When the testimony or other evidence reveals that the expert’s basis for the opinion is inadequate, the opinion should be stricken as based on conjecture or speculation.27 Rule 702(b) makes sufficient facts or data a condition of the testimony, so an opinion whose foundation collapses under questioning no longer meets the condition on which it was heard.28
An attack on the basis also carries a risk for the attacker. Otherwise inadmissible facts, data, or opinions that the expert reasonably relied on can reach the jury in three ways: through the balancing test, through the adverse party’s cross-examination, or through “door opening.”29 A cross-examiner who suggests that the opinion rests on something weak invites the proponent to answer by showing what the expert actually relied on. Once such data reaches the jury, Rule 703 operates, for some practical though not theoretical purposes, as an additional exception to the rule against hearsay.30
The survey would likely have stayed out had defense counsel left the basis alone, since the balancing ruling would still have governed. The cross-examiner therefore decides, with the possible rebuttal in mind, how far to press an attack on the foundation.
Because Rule 705 governs only timing and initiative, the right to require disclosure on cross does not enlarge what may serve as a basis. The Rule 703 requirements for reliance and disclosure stay where they were.31 The back-door limits stay too. Rule 703 exists to let experts base opinions on reliable hearsay and other facts that are inadmissible because the declarant is absent or for some other reason. Even so, a prosecution witness may not base an opinion on evidence seized from the defendant in violation of the Fourth Amendment or Miranda, because the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine mandates that result. Likewise, where the policies behind privileges, subsequent remedial measures, and compromises or offers to compromise require that certain matters stay out of the trial, the same evidence may not enter through the back door as the basis of an expert’s opinion.32 The Confrontation Clause adds its own limits, taken up earlier in this chapter.