Concept
Outside Data
Bases of testimony
Outside Data
Rule 703 lets an expert rest an opinion on information that would be inadmissible if a lay witness offered it, on one condition: “If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.”1 The rule's first sentence covers the sources taught above, facts the expert personally observed or was made aware of in the case. The second sentence reaches material gathered outside the courtroom, including statements by people who never testify.
The hearsay rules train an instinct to object the moment an expert repeats what someone else reported. Under the ordinary rules, an out-of-court statement offered to prove what it asserts is hearsay, and a lay witness may not use it that way. Rule 703 asks a different question. It does not ask whether the underlying material would be admissible; it asks whether practitioners in the expert's discipline treat that type of material as a sound basis for their own professional judgments.2
The four subsections below move from the rule to the dispute about its limit. The first shows what the rule allows and what it leaves unchanged. The second develops the reasonable-reliance condition through sources that courts have accepted and rejected. The last two present competing views on who decides, and how freely, whether reliance is reasonable. The condition governs only what the expert may use. Whether the jury may hear inadmissible basis data is a separate question, controlled by the rule's last sentence and taken up in the next section.3
Inadmissible Facts Allowed
Rule 703's second sentence settles a question that courts once answered the other way: may an expert build an opinion on information that could not itself be put before the jury? The rule says yes. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, the facts or data “need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.”4 The sentence reaches material a court would exclude if a lay witness offered it, hearsay above all, and it attaches one condition to the departure: reasonable reliance by experts in the field.
The former majority view held the opposite. It treated a question as improper if it called for an opinion based on out-of-court reports that were inadmissible under the hearsay rule, on the logic that a jury could not accept an opinion built on facts when the only evidence of those facts was itself inadmissible. That view applied even when the witness added personal observation to the reports.5 The logic has force, since a conclusion is only as good as the premises under it. Its weakness was practical: experts necessarily rely on facts and data that are never mentioned at trial. Rule 703, adopted with the Federal Rules in 1975, gave formal recognition to that reality,6 and its intent is to be generous in admitting expert testimony.7
The Advisory Committee's note gives the main reason for the change: in the real world, experts follow this practice. “The physician makes life-and-death decisions in reliance upon” such reports, and Rule 703 “bring[s] the judicial practice into line with the practice of the experts themselves when not in court.”8 If a report is an acceptable basis for critical decisions in the operating room, it seems silly to forbid an expert to rely on it in the courtroom.9
The jury is not left without protection. It may consider the reports in evaluating the quality of the expert's reasoning: are the stated bases adequate to support the opinion, and did the expert commit any obvious logical fallacies in reasoning about them?10
Reliance has a boundary. Rule 703 does not obviate the hearsay objection to the use of such statements, even where a testifying witness relies on them: an out-of-court statement that would be hearsay if introduced to prove what it asserts remains hearsay for that purpose.11 The framers did not mean to make underlying data admissible for all purposes or to create a hearsay exception covering it. They recognized only that experts do rely on outside data in forming opinions and that one cannot ignore the reality.12
The same pattern runs through the mental health professions, where experts routinely rely on hearsay that might or might not be admissible in court: clinical records, test results, documents prepared by police and social services agencies, and the patient's history. A mental health professional acts properly in basing testimony on such material.13 A psychiatrist who also interviews a party's friends and relatives presents the same question. The accounts would be hearsay if offered for their truth, but the issue under Rule 703 is whether psychiatrists in the field reasonably rely on such interviews. The rule's formulation is broad enough to cover them, for it embraces facts the witness personally perceived, facts of which the expert has been “made aware,” and out-of-court facts of the sort professionals in the field use.14 It also sets no time frame, so the expert may rely on information obtained at or before trial.15
The principle is not limited to clinicians. In United States v. Brown, a DEA agent testified that cocaine base was worth $217,000 in Bermuda, a figure he had learned from another DEA agent, who had it from Bermudan police. Experts in his position regularly rely on such sources, so the chain of secondhand reports did not bar his opinion.16
Reasonable reliance nonetheless remains a real limit, because courts have not always accepted expert opinions as reasonably based, as the next subsection shows.17
The “facts or data” an expert relies on may include other people's opinions. Opinions not in evidence, even inadmissible ones, may form the basis of an expert's opinion if experts in the particular field reasonably rely on them.18
Not every jurisdiction follows the federal approach. In Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., the Massachusetts court upheld a trial judge's ruling that kept the defendants' experts, like the plaintiffs' experts, from testifying on direct examination to the out-of-court opinions of other scientists, because no hearsay exception had been shown.19 The court followed its own earlier decision declining to adopt the equivalent of Rule 703. That decision permits an expert to base an opinion on facts or data not in evidence only if they are independently admissible and are a permissible basis for an expert to consider.20 The concern behind the stricter rule is that inadmissible evidence might otherwise enter the trial in the guise of expert opinion.21 The federal rule drops the independent-admissibility requirement for data that experts in the field reasonably rely on.
Reasonable Reliance Standard
Rule 703 makes outside data usable through one condition: experts in the particular field must “reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject.”23 That condition takes over the screening job that admissibility would otherwise perform. Ordinarily the rules of evidence decide what a jury may rely on, and an out-of-court statement stays out because no one can cross-examine its maker. An opinion built on such a statement slips past that screen, so the law needs another reason to trust the foundation, and the rule finds it in the profession's own practice. A kind of information on which practitioners stake serious decisions carries some assurance of dependability. A kind they would not trust carries none, and an opinion resting on it would deliver unreliable hearsay to the jury under an expert's name.
Three phrases in the rule shape the inquiry. “Those kinds of facts or data” makes the question one about a category of information, such as routine firefighter reports or laboratory results, and not about whether one statement happens to be accurate. “Experts in the particular field” identifies whose practice counts, the discipline's, so the testifying witness's personal preference settles nothing. And “rely” points to actual dependence in the field's real work outside court. Quality and quantity are separate questions. An expert whose information is of industry-standard quality, and who has an adequate amount of it, may reasonably give an opinion based on it.24 Reasonable reliance asks what kind of information the expert used. Rule 702(b), which requires that the testimony be based on sufficient facts or data, asks whether there is enough of it.25 The underlying information itself ordinarily is not admitted as part of the opinion, a point the next major section develops.26
The Advisory Committee's arson example shows the standard at work. Suppose an arson expert will testify that a fire was deliberately set. He relies on four things: a firefighter's oral account of what he saw in the first minutes of the fire; laboratory tests on material firefighters removed from the wreckage; one firefighter's report that a bystander calmly said he saw a man run out of the building shortly before it caught fire; and another firefighter's statement that Bob Jones was watching from the corner and is rumored among the firefighters to be a professional arsonist.27
The first two sources pass. The firefighter spoke from personal knowledge and under a business duty to report, and the laboratory tests were produced in the course of regular professional work.28 The last two fail. A bystander is under no business duty to report and offers no indicia of trustworthiness beyond that of hearsay statements at large. The rumor, although it came from a member of the expert's own organization, was not based on personal knowledge of the underlying facts.29 Both statements may be of a type investigators customarily hear, yet neither is trustworthy enough to make reliance reasonable.30
The illustration treats the failing statements as too untrustworthy even if investigators customarily hear that kind of talk, and how far a judge may overrule a field's own customs is contested. The next two subsections take up the competing views. On either view the pattern is plain: behind each source that passes stands someone with a professional duty and firsthand knowledge, and behind each source that fails stands a passerby or a piece of gossip.
Reported decisions sort sources the same way. Courts have accepted a fire marshal's opinion that a person caused the fire, based in part on information from other marshals on the fire inspection team. They have accepted a psychiatrist's opinion on the sanity of the accused, based in part on conversations with IRS agents who described their dealings with the accused. And they have accepted a biomechanical engineer's opinion that an infant car seat was improperly designed, based on an automaker-sponsored seminar, papers from the Society of Automotive Engineers, and the biomechanics literature.31 Reviewing courts rejected an investigative agent's opinion that a plaintiff knew about and authorized setting a fire, which rested on a voice stress analysis, and an opinion that a fuel system fire probably did not cause a crash, which rested on a truck company safety director's summary of 3,000 accident reports.32 The accepted sources are what colleagues and professional literature supply in the ordinary course of the work. The rejected sources sound technical, yet a technical label does not decide the question. What decides it is whether experts in the field reasonably rely on that kind of data.
A second pair shows the same sorting within one field. An air-crash investigator who bases an opinion on statements from people who work at airports is on solid ground if the investigator persuades the court that crash investigators reasonably rely on such statements. The rule's legislative history keeps ordinary eyewitness statements out as a basis, but airport personnel would probably be treated differently from casual observers.33 The word “persuade” matters here, because reliance is something the proponent shows the court about the field, and the expert's say-so does not establish it.
The reconstructionist's comfort fails as a justification because the standard measures the type of data against the field's real work. A witness who insists a source is dependable is describing a personal preference, and the answer turns on what the profession does.
Passing the reasonable-reliance condition settles only what the expert may use in forming the opinion. Whether the jury may hear the underlying data is a separate question under the last sentence of Rule 703: if the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent may disclose them only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.34 The firefighter's account and the laboratory results in the arson illustration therefore support the opinion without automatically becoming evidence the jury receives. Rule 703 did not make the underlying data admissible for all purposes or create a new hearsay exception, so data an expert reasonably relied on may still be unavailable to the jury.35
Customary Practice Approach
Rule 703 allows an expert to rest an opinion on inadmissible facts or data when “experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject.”37 The text does not say who decides whether reliance is reasonable or how far a judge may disagree with the field, and courts have filled the gap in competing ways. The liberal approach, taught first here, gives the profession's practice nearly decisive weight. Courts following it equate “reasonably” with “customarily,” so the judge's task becomes a factual finding under Rule 104(a): is it the customary practice of the expert's specialty to consider this type of report? If it is, the judge's hands are tied, and the expert must be allowed to rely on that type of report, whatever the judge thinks of its quality.38
The approach rests on the judge's limited expertise. The judge must accept the expert community's view at least in matters the judge is not equipped to second-guess, and a judge untrained in toxicology, accident reconstruction, or valuation has little basis for telling practitioners that a kind of information they use every working day is not good enough.39 The approach also turns a loose standard into a preliminary question of fact. The proponent must prove the custom, and the judge finds it as any other Rule 104(a) fact.
The hypothetical also exposes the cost of the approach. The feature that spares the judge from second-guessing the field means that any kind of report the field customarily consults can reach the case through an expert, even if the field's habit is lax or the particular report is sloppy. A party can employ an expert to place untrustworthy facts, data, or opinions before the jury, which is why critics describe the liberal approach as a backdoor hearsay exception.40 The rule's last sentence offers a separate check, because it controls whether the jury may hear inadmissible basis data at all, a question taken up in a later section.41
The approach does not excuse the proponent from proving the custom. An expert who says only that a source seemed helpful and the opinion felt right has skipped the one finding the approach requires, and the foundation fails.
Courts differ on how far to defer to the field. In re Japanese Electric Products Antitrust Litigation, a Third Circuit decision, found error where the lower court substituted its own opinion for experts' testimony that the underlying data were of a type reasonably relied upon by similar experts.42 A contrary decision, taken up in the next subsection, reads the rule differently.43 The competing view, in which the judge keeps residual power to reject a field's practice as unreasonable, is the subject of that subsection.
Restrictive Reasonableness Approach
Rule 703 makes inadmissible outside data usable when “experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject.”45 The restrictive approach treats “reasonably” as a standard the judge actually applies, so proof of what the field customarily does is relevant but does not close the question. Even when it is the field's customary practice to consider a type of report, the judge keeps a residual discretion to decide that such reports are too unreliable to support an expert opinion.46 The customary-practice approach gives the judge a single task, finding the custom and then deferring. Here the judge gets a second look after the custom is shown, and that second look is the main difference between the two views.
The restrictive approach comes in two versions, which differ in how much weight they give custom:
- In the first version, proof of the field's custom is relevant, but the finding the judge must make is that relying on that type of information is reasonable.
- In the second version, the standard is higher: the judge must find that the practice is both customary and reasonable.47
The two versions diverge only for a practice that is reasonable but uncommon. The first lets it through, since custom is evidence of reasonableness and not a separate element, while the second bars it for want of custom. A practice that is customary but unreasonable fails under both, and that is the situation the restrictive approach exists to catch.
Two arguments support giving the judge the second look. The first is an analogy to tort law. When the question is whether an industrial practice is negligent, courts consider evidence of the industry's customary practice, but the custom is not dispositive. At most the custom should give rise to a presumption, and the presumption ought to be rebuttable.48 The second is textual. The restrictive approach is also sounder as a matter of statutory interpretation, since the rule's own word is “reasonably,” which the liberal approach rewrites as “customarily.”49
The same wariness toward a field's description of itself appears in the remand opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Each of the plaintiffs' experts asserted by affidavit that he had used “the type of data that is generally and reasonably relied upon by scientists” in the field, which echoes Rule 703's own vocabulary.50 The court answered that federal judges are gatekeepers who must satisfy themselves that the evidence is reliable, so “the expert's bald assurance of validity is not enough.”51 The party presenting the expert must show that the findings rest on sound science, which requires some objective, independent validation of the methodology.52 That passage concerned the validity of a scientific method and not outside data as such, but its logic carries over to the reliance question. A testifying expert who recites that the field relies on this kind of data is vouching for the very practice the judge is entitled to examine. The Fifth Circuit took the same view in Soden v. Freightliner Corp., which recognized that experts have “wide latitude in picking and choosing” their sources while holding that Rule 703 requires courts to examine the “reliability of those sources.”53
The arson example in the Advisory Committee's note shows what the second look asks. Rule 703 does not specify a standard of trustworthiness, but the example indicates that reliance is reasonable only if the facts, data, or opinions possess trustworthiness in excess of that possessed by the ordinary hearsay statement.54 Circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness identical or equivalent to those of statements admissible under a hearsay exception are apparently contemplated. This better view is known as the restrictive approach, in contrast to the liberal approach, which finds customary reliance by experts in the field alone sufficient.55 Applied to the arson squad member, the firefighter's account and the laboratory tests pass, while the bystander's remark and the rumor fail even if investigators customarily hear such talk.56 The sources that pass show that the second look costs a proponent little when the source is dependable, because custom and trustworthiness then point the same way.
The judge and the attorneys may litigate the question at a hearing under Rule 104. In a criminal case, one potential question at such a Rule 703 hearing is whether, before trial, the defendant should or must have the opportunity to cross-examine the persons who originated the data on which a prosecution expert relies.57
Each approach pays for its strength with a weakness. The customary-practice approach risks a backdoor hearsay exception, since a party can use an expert to put untrustworthy information before the jury. The restrictive approach risks presumption, since a non-expert judge is telling a qualified expert what information she may rely on.58 Whichever view a court takes, passing the reliance test only makes the data usable as a basis for the opinion, and whether the jury may hear it is the separate disclosure question that Rule 703's last sentence governs.59