Concept
Sufficient Facts or Data
Bases of testimony
Bases of Expert Testimony
Sufficient Facts or Data
Rule 702(b) requires that expert testimony be “based on sufficient facts or data.”1 The requirement is quantitative: an expert must gather enough information to support the opinion.2 It is one of several conditions the proponent must establish. A witness qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may give an opinion only if the proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that each listed requirement is met.3 Within that framework, sufficiency asks one narrow question: did the expert have enough information to reason from? Whether the expert reasoned well from it is a separate question, answered by other subdivisions of Rule 702.
Experts differ from eyewitnesses, and that difference explains why the law polices the foundation. Eyewitnesses and participants testify to events they perceived; experts testify from their own general experience and knowledge and apply that expertise to the facts of the case.4 Rule 703 goes further and lets an expert base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed, so the opinion need not rest on anything the expert perceived firsthand.5 That freedom carries a risk, because jurors “may . . . lack specialized knowledge to determine whether the conclusions of an expert go beyond what the expert’s basis and methodology may reliably support.”6 Rule 702(b) therefore puts the check with the judge, who must be satisfied that the foundation is adequate before the opinion reaches the jury.
Sufficiency has companions. Rule 703 governs what kinds of information an expert may rely on, a subject taken up later in this chapter.7 The requirements that the testimony be the product of reliable principles and methods, and that it reflect their reliable application to the case, are taught separately, but they interlock with sufficiency: a sound method applied to a thin record yields an opinion no one should trust, and ample data run through an unsound method does no better. The subsections below ask in turn what counts as facts or data, how much is enough, and who must prove it.
Meaning of Facts or Data
Rule 702(b) tests the expert’s “facts or data,” and Rule 703 shows what the phrase covers: facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed.8 Treat the phrase as shorthand for the expert’s inputs, meaning whatever the expert saw or learned before forming the opinion. Rule 702(b) examines those inputs; whether the expert reasoned soundly from them is a separate inquiry under the rest of the rule.9
The inputs can arrive by more than one route. An expert may know the facts because of what the expert has seen or heard at the current trial, or because of observations made outside the trial.10 Either way, the facts do essential work. Training gives the expert general knowledge, and the facts of the particular dispute let the expert apply it.11 Without them the testimony would be a lecture on the field.
The inputs need not themselves be admissible. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion, the facts or data need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.12 An expert investigating an air crash illustrates the point. If the expert persuades the court that air crash investigators reasonably rely on statements from people who work at airports, an opinion built on those statements is admissible. The same source cautions that, according to the rule’s legislative history, ordinary eyewitness statements may not serve as a basis, though airport personnel would probably be treated differently from casual observers.13 Later subsections return to this reliance standard and to when the jury may hear the underlying material.
The word “data” also reaches the opinions of other experts. Analyses often run in stages, and the specialist who performs the last stage seldom performed the earlier ones. The basis of an opinion may therefore include facts, data, or opinions reasonably relied upon under Rule 703, so long as they are sufficiently established to exist.14 That condition does real work. Jurors cannot audit a borrowed opinion, and the second expert’s credentials say nothing about whether the first expert’s work was sound. The court must therefore be satisfied that the borrowed opinion is itself reliable, since the rule requires sufficient assurances of trustworthiness in the result the jury is asked to accept.15
The second expert’s testimony survives in that scene because the opinion she borrowed has been tested, so her statistics rest on a foundation the court has checked. The converse is what examiners press.
The statistician’s qualifications and arithmetic are identical in both scenes. Only the reliability of the borrowed opinion changes, and it decides the result: every figure assumes that the tests were done properly, and nothing the court accepts supports that assumption.16 Keep the two inquiries apart. A challenge to the inputs belongs under Rule 702(b). A challenge to how the expert handled sound inputs belongs under the reliability requirements. Confusing them answers a methods problem with a foundation rule, or the reverse.
Enough Facts
The word “sufficient” carries no numerical threshold. Rule 702 was amended in December 2000, in response to Daubert and Kumho, to require a showing that the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, that it is the product of reliable principles and methods, and that the witness applied those methods reliably to the facts of the case. The terms are flexible and unquantified, and the rule never says how sufficient or how reliable the showing must be, which gives lawyers an array of arguments and leaves much to the trial court’s judgment.18 In practice the court compares what the expert had with what the expert concludes: the information must support this opinion about this subject. The prior subsection identified the expert’s inputs; this one asks whether they can bear the weight of the conclusion built on them.
The plainest failure is an expert who has never looked at the thing the opinion describes. In Pelletier v. Main Street Textiles, LP, the First Circuit affirmed the exclusion of a safety-practices expert because he never inspected the facilities and equipment at issue, which left him without sufficient facts and data on which to base an opinion.19 His general knowledge of safety practice could tell him what a well-run facility looks like. Whether this facility fell short depended on what was actually there, and nothing in his preparation connected his knowledge to that place.
A foundation can also come from systematic research. In Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, the Supreme Court held that the district court acted within its legal authority in admitting Dr. Grossman’s testimony. His opinion rested on his participation, with other university researchers, in research that tracked the number of open abortion-care facilities in Texas by requesting information from the state health department, interviewing clinic staff, and reviewing publicly available information.20 The figure came with a documented trail to identifiable sources covering the subject of the opinion, and that trail is what gave it footing.
A projection fails when its starting figures come from assumption instead of evidence. The discussion of helpfulness under Rule 702(a) makes the point with an economist who projects lost future income in a wrongful death case from assumptions about the deceased’s past earnings that have no basis in fact: the testimony is irrelevant and helps no one.21 Sufficiency asks the same question from the side of the inputs.22 The arithmetic may be flawless, yet every output inherits the defect of its inputs.
Contested inputs raise a related problem. In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the tire expert asserted that the remaining tread was 3/32 of an inch deep, while the opposing expert’s apparently undisputed measurements ranged from 0.5/32 to 4/32 of an inch around the tire.23 A single figure set against a record showing wide variation illustrates why the Court’s general instruction matters: where the testimony’s factual basis, data, principles, methods, or their application are called sufficiently into question, the trial judge must determine whether the testimony has “a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of [the relevant] discipline.”24
The same example shows how closely sufficiency sits beside the other requirements. Rule 702 also demands that the testimony be the product of reliable principles and methods and that the opinion reflect a reliable application of those methods to the facts of the case.25 In the tire example, the expert’s explanatory theory used signs of defect, and the fourth sign was never established. If the three requirements are treated separately, one can argue that the theory rests on reliable methods but lacks a sufficient factual basis, because the fourth sign is missing. Alternatively, one can argue that the testimony is not the product of reliable methods, because a theory employing only three signs has not been shown to be trustworthy.26 The same defect supports either objection, so a careful advocate raises both.
Burden and Weight
Sufficiency of the foundation is a condition of admissibility, so the next questions are who must prove it, how convincingly, and what happens to objections that fall short of exclusion. The proponent of the expert testimony bears the burden of establishing the admissibility requirements to be more probably true than not true.28 The rule’s own text says the same: the proponent must demonstrate to the court that it is more likely than not that each requirement is met.29 The 2023 amendment clarified that Rule 104(a)’s requirement applies to expert opinions under Rule 702; it imposed no new procedures.30 The allocation tracks who holds the information. The party who calls the expert chose the witness and supplied the materials, while the opponent usually learns the basis only through disclosure and questioning.
After the court permits the testimony, its weight is for the trier of fact to determine, and the testimony remains subject to exclusion under Rule 403.31 Three layers result. The proponent must clear the threshold with the court. Even testimony that clears it may be excluded under Rule 403. What survives goes to the jury, which weighs it.
The threshold runs opinion by opinion. The amended rule asks whether “the expert’s opinion” reflects a reliable application of the methods, so each separate opinion offered must be assessed against Rule 702 individually.32 One witness may therefore keep some opinions and lose others. For each opinion, the facts, data, or opinions on which it depends must be sufficiently established to exist.33 A proponent who cannot show by a preponderance that a fact the opinion depends on exists has not shown a sufficient basis for that opinion.34
The threshold does not demand perfection. Nothing in the amendment requires the court to nitpick an expert’s opinion in order to reach a perfect expression of what the basis and methodology can support, and the Rule 104(a) standard does not require perfection.35 An objection that the metallurgist overlooked one of several dozen published fatigue studies therefore describes an imperfection, not a missing foundation. Once the court permits the testimony, criticism of that kind goes to weight.36
The threshold also asks for reliability, not correctness. Multiple conflicting expert opinions may each be reliable, though only one, or neither, may be correct, and counsel must still establish whether an opinion, once found reliable, is credible.37
A judge who excluded one accountant because the other seemed more plausible would be deciding the merits, which belong to the trier of fact.38 The metallurgist’s case differs in kind. Each accountant’s assumption has evidence behind it, while the metallurgist’s repeated loading has none. A gap in the record leads to exclusion; a dispute over supported facts leads to the jury.