Concept
The Sexual-Offense Exception
Other crimes, acts, transactions, and events
The Sexual-Offense Exception
Rule 404(b)(1) bars evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act offered to prove that a person acted in accordance with character on a particular occasion.1 A family of federal rules sets that bar aside on purpose, and seeing exactly where it does so sharpens the ban itself. Rule 413(a) provides that in a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of sexual assault, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other sexual assault, and that the evidence may be considered “on any matter to which it is relevant.”2 That phrase reaches propensity, the very use Rule 404(b)(1) forbids. The jury may reason that a defendant who committed sexual assaults before is more likely to have committed the one charged. Rule 414 parallels Rule 413 in content and structure for prosecutions of child molestation, and Rule 415 is a further companion.3
These rules remain highly controversial, and the states have not widely adopted them.4 Do not assume that a jurisdiction outside the federal system permits the propensity route.
The exception is confined to like offenses, and that confinement keeps it from swallowing the ban. Rule 413 applies only when the charge is sexual assault, and it lets in only other sexual assaults. Rule 413(d) defines sexual assault broadly: any nonconsensual sexual contact, any violent act from which the defendant derived sexual pleasure or gratification, and any attempt or conspiracy to engage in such conduct. An attempt that never ripened into a completed offense can therefore qualify.5
Move the same earlier act into a different trial and the exception vanishes. Rule 413 does not let in a prior sexual assault against a defendant prosecuted for armed robbery or homicide, so the offer falls back under Rule 404(b), where the propensity inference is barred.6 The limit also runs the other way. A prior criminal battery offered in a sexual-assault prosecution is a dissimilar offense, and Rules 413, 414, and 415 admit only sexual offenses of the same type as the charged offense.7
The other act must still be proved, and the standard is the one familiar from Rule 404(b). The judge treats the evidence as a question of conditional relevance and screens it only to ensure that a reasonable jury could conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the other assault occurred. Huddleston v. United States is the dispositive case under Rule 404(b), and the sexual-offense rules follow the same approach.8
The change that matters most for analysis is what happens at the Rule 403 balance. In an ordinary other-act case, the risk that jurors will convict because the defendant seems disposed to the crime counts on the prejudice side, as the four-step framework above teaches. Under these rules the jury may draw that inference, so it moves from the prejudice side of the scale to the probative side. The result, in one account, is that it becomes highly unlikely that a prior act of sexual misconduct will be found inadmissible.9 A defendant who argues that the other assault is remote, or unlike the charged one, is therefore pressing on a scale that already holds propensity as probative value.
The government also owes the accused notice. Rule 413 requires timely notice of its intention to offer evidence of similar sexual offenses, including a disclosure of what evidence it will offer.10
On an exam, the sorting question is what the charge is and what the other act is. If the charge is sexual assault or child molestation and the other act is an offense of the same type, propensity is a permitted use and the balance favors admission. In every other combination, the chapter’s ordinary analysis governs: a specific non-propensity purpose, proof sufficient for a jury finding, the Rule 403 balance with propensity counted as prejudice, and a limiting instruction on request.