Concept
The Listed Purposes
Other crimes, acts, transactions, and events
The Listed Purposes
Rule 404(b)(2) lists nine purposes for which evidence of another crime, wrong, or act may be admissible: motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, and lack of accident.1 The list follows the ban in the first sentence of the rule, which forbids using another act to prove character and then conduct in conformity with it.2 Each item names a way an earlier act can bear on a disputed fact without passing through the actor's supposed type. The rule introduces the list with “such as,” so the nine items illustrate the permitted routes and do not exhaust them. A proponent who finds a route outside the list may still use it, and a proponent who names a listed purpose must still show that the route is real.
The nine purposes fall into five groups, and each group draws on one kind of case-specific fact. Motive and opportunity supply a reason to commit this crime or the access to commit it. Preparation and plan show an earlier step toward the charged crime or a single scheme that includes it. Intent and knowledge concern awareness and purpose, which a defendant can deny without contradicting the physical facts. Absence of mistake and lack of accident answer a defense of innocent coincidence by asking how likely repeated coincidence is. Identity stands alone, because the other act must tie the defendant to this crime through a feature that sets it apart from other crimes of its kind.
The groups share one structure. The proponent names a disputed fact of consequence, such as why the defendant acted, what the defendant knew, or who did the act, and shows that the other act proves it through a link tied to this occasion. Whenever the stated purpose shrinks into the proposition that the defendant did it before and so probably did it again, the evidence has returned to the forbidden chain. Naming a purpose also opens the door without carrying the evidence through it, since the court still weighs probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice3 and, on request, instructs the jury to confine the evidence to its proper use.4 The sections below take the groups in order, beginning with motive and opportunity.
Motive and Opportunity
Motive and opportunity answer two questions that arise whenever the perpetrator is in doubt: why would this person have done it, and could this person have done it?5 Motive is a specific incentive that existed on the occasion charged, such as a debt, an addiction, or a need to silence a witness, and the other act matters because it creates or reveals that incentive. Opportunity is access to the scene or the victim, or an ability the crime demanded, and the other act matters because it shows the defendant could have been there or could have done the thing. Both reach the disputed fact through a feature of this situation, so neither depends on the forbidden step from earlier conduct to the actor's type.6
Motive evidence is a middle link, because motive is not an element of the crime in an ordinary prosecution, and the government may convict without proving why the defendant acted. The chain runs from the other act to an incentive, and from the incentive to the likelihood that this defendant acted, or acted with the required intent. Every link concerns a reason that existed when the crime occurred, so a juror can accept the chain without deciding that the defendant is a bad person. The evidence earns its place by separating this defendant from the other people who might have committed the offense.
The two proofs differ in what connects the earlier fact to the charge. The addiction explains why this nurse, in particular, would divert the drug, while the jewelry theft explains nothing about the missing Demerol beyond a supposed taste for taking things. The first is a fact about her situation on the occasion charged. The second describes her disposition, and Rule 404(b)(1) bars it.7
Drug cases apply the same logic. In United States v. Boyd, the defendant appealed a marijuana-trafficking conviction after witnesses testified that he personally used marijuana and cocaine.8 The government's theory was that he joined the charged conspiracies to support his own drug use, and the Fourth Circuit held the testimony admissible under Rule 404(b) as proof of motive.9 The court relied on United States v. Templeman, an Eighth Circuit decision reasoning that a defendant's own use suggests motives for distributing the drug: to finance the habit and to secure a steady supply.10 The use was conduct separate from the trafficking, yet the government's theory tied it to the reason this defendant would have taken part. The court also found the Rule 403 balance favorable, because personal use was no more sensational than the trafficking the jury had already heard about.11
The robbery and the killing resemble each other hardly at all, which shows that motive depends on the connection between the earlier act and the charged offense. Resemblance between two crimes is the currency of propensity reasoning, and it has no role in motive. Weller's pending testimony gave this defendant a reason to act, and the robbery matters because it created that reason.
Opportunity answers whether the defendant could have committed the act at all. The other act supplies physical access or an uncommon ability, and it narrows the field as a motive does.
The common error is to call any similar earlier act a motive or an opportunity. A prior theft gives a defendant no motive to steal again merely because he stole before, since that is disposition under another name. Motive requires an incentive specific to this occasion, and opportunity requires access or ability that the other act actually shows. Evidence that clears that bar still faces Rule 403, which weighs its probative value on the stated purpose against the danger of unfair prejudice,12 and the opponent may request a limiting instruction.13
Preparation and Plan
Preparation and plan name different distances from the charged crime.15 Preparation is an earlier step toward the charged crime itself, such as acquiring the tools or the weapon it required. Plan is the larger design of which the charged crime is one part, so that the other acts and the charged act are all moves in one scheme. The labels overlap, because a step toward a crime is often also a piece of a design. The working distinction is that preparation looks at one step that came before, while plan looks at the scheme the charged act belongs to. In both, the other act earns its place as an event in the story of this crime, so the factfinder can use it without inferring conduct from the defendant's type.16
Preparation is the easier of the two to see, because the earlier act sits on the road to the charged one. Suppose a defendant is charged with breaking into a pharmacy through its back door, and the prosecution proves that two days earlier he bought a pry bar and a glass cutter and that a pry-bar mark scars the door frame. Offered to show that he is the sort of person who owns burglary tools, the purchase is barred. Offered to show that he assembled the tools for this entry, it is admissible, because it proves a specific step of preparation on this occasion.17 The jury need find only that the tools were gathered for this break-in, and no view of his character is a step in that finding.
The revolver theft comes in because the revolver is the link. The earlier act put the instrument of the crime in the defendant's hands, so the prosecution can tie him to the weapon through a step in the same enterprise. The car theft has no such link. The question is whether the earlier act was a step on the way to this crime, and the degree of resemblance between the two crimes does not answer it.
Plan reaches further than preparation, because the other acts need not lead up to the charged act one step at a time. They need only belong with it in a single scheme. A tendency predicts that a person will act in similar ways whenever similar occasions arise, and that is the propensity chain. A plan is one design formed to reach a goal, and the acts that carry it out are tied together by that goal, so a juror can find them linked without deciding that the defendant is a bad person.18
An exam problem makes the point. Davis is charged with shooting Palmer, a member of a fraternity that had refused Davis admission, and the prosecution offers proof that Davis also shot other members of the same fraternity. Offered to show that Davis has a violent character and so shot Palmer as well, the evidence is barred. Offered to show a common plan, a campaign of revenge against everyone who had refused him, it is admissible, because the other shootings and Palmer's shooting are steps in one scheme.19 Palmer's membership in the fraternity, standing alone, does not make it more or less likely that Davis shot him. The judge may therefore admit the testimony subject to its being connected to other proof of the plan, and must strike it if the connection never comes.20
The limit lies in the word “plan.” A plan is a single scheme, and acts belong to it only if they serve the same end. Without that requirement any prosecutor could claim the label, since the argument that the defendant has done many bad things and so did this one is propensity under another name. A real link between the acts is what keeps the purpose from swallowing the ban.21
The second step does the real work. In the warehouse scenes, the recorded conversation and the insurance records supplied the scheme, while the shed fire had nothing to offer beyond resemblance. The listed purposes also overlap, as the fraternity problem shows, since a revenge scheme is both a plan and a motive. The choice of label matters little so long as the proponent names the specific purpose and the disputed fact it reaches.22
Intent and Knowledge
Intent and knowledge concern what was in the defendant's mind rather than what the defendant did.24 They matter most when the defendant admits, or cannot realistically deny, the physical act and says the guilty state of mind was missing: he handled the goods but did not know they were stolen, or he caused the injury but never meant to. No witness can look inside the defendant's head, so the factfinder infers the mental state from conduct, and earlier conduct is often the best material for that inference.
The two terms are neighbors but not twins. Knowledge is awareness of a fact, such as that goods are stolen or that a substance is a controlled drug. Intent is a purpose to bring about a result, such as selling the drug or injuring the victim. Someone who acts on purpose knows what he is doing, so proponents often name both. The label matters less than identifying which mental element the charged offense requires and which one the defense actually contests, because that element is the fact of consequence the other act must reach.
An earlier act can prove a mental state without passing through the banned step because of improbability. One suspicious transaction can befall an innocent person, and a single claim of ignorance is easy to believe. As similar dealings accumulate, each repetition makes the innocent explanation harder to accept, because the factfinder must believe in a run of unknowing involvement. The chain runs from the earlier dealings to the defendant's awareness, and from that awareness to his understanding of this transaction. Nobody is asked to decide that the defendant is a bad person by nature, which is the middle link the first sentence of the rule forbids.25
The central illustration is Huddleston v. United States. The defendant was charged with possessing and selling stolen Memorex videocassette tapes. Nobody disputed that the tapes were stolen, and the only material issue at trial was whether he knew it.26 The district court allowed the government to introduce “similar acts” evidence under Rule 404(b), concluding that it had clear relevance to his knowledge, and the first witness was Paul Toney, a record store owner.27 The defendant testified that Leroy Wesby had supplied the tapes, the televisions, and the appliances, that Wesby had represented all of it as legitimately obtained, and that he had sold for Wesby on commission without knowing anything was stolen.28 In closing, the prosecution explained that he was not on trial for the appliances or the televisions, and the district court instructed the jury to use the similar-acts evidence only to establish knowledge and not to prove character.29
The other dealings reach the contested fact through the defendant's own explanation. Wesby was his stated source for the tapes, and his testimony tied the televisions and appliances to the same source, so the other sales directly test his claim to be an innocent commission seller. If the jury could find that those goods were stolen too, a middleman who repeatedly handled one supplier's merchandise is less believable when he says he had no reason to doubt this load. The jury need not find that he is a thief by temperament to draw that conclusion.
The Supreme Court decided a narrower question: whether the trial court must itself find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the government proved the other act before the jury may consider it. The Court held that it need not.30 The section on proving the other act develops that holding. Here the case shows that the knowledge purpose rests on a factual link. If the jury could not find that the televisions and appliances were stolen, the sales would show only that the defendant dealt in goods, and the road to his awareness would collapse.
Both scenes involve cocaine and a plea of not guilty, and they differ in the mental element the defense disputes. The first defendant offers a story of ignorance, so awareness is the battleground. The second concedes awareness and contests purpose, so intent to distribute is. A proponent must name the mental element actually in play, and the court asks whether the other act reaches that element through a link specific to the case.
The mental state must be genuinely disputed, and United States v. Wright shows what happens when it is not. Plainclothes officers bought crack at curbside from a man they identified from police photographs as the defendant. Six months later, a wiretap on his telephone captured a conversation in which he bragged to an unidentified woman about being a drug dealer.31 The trial judge admitted the recording to establish identity and intent. Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, found no issue of intent in the case, since no one asked whether the seller knew what was in the packages he handed the officers.32 The recording could therefore be defended only on identity, a point taken up at the end of this unit.
The two cases differ in where the dispute lay. In Huddleston the selling was undisputed and knowledge was the only open question, so evidence aimed at knowledge met the dispute head on. In Wright the sales themselves were contested, and anyone who handed bags of crack through a car window knew what they held, so a mental-state label had no live dispute to attach to. A purpose with no dispute behind it adds no probative force, and what remains is the inference that a drug dealer probably sold the drugs. When an exam stem has a judge admitting other-act evidence to show intent, ask first whether the defense contests intent. A defense that someone else did the act, or that the transaction never happened, leaves intent uncontested, while a defense of innocent ignorance or accident puts the mental state in play. Even then the evidence stays subject to Rule 403 and a limiting instruction, as the district court's instruction in Huddleston illustrates.33
Absence of Mistake or Accident
Absence of mistake and lack of accident answer a defense that concedes the event and denies the wrongdoing.35 The defendant admits that the gun fired, the victim was hurt, or the contraband crossed the border, and calls it a mishap with no guilty purpose behind it. That defense puts one fact in dispute, whether the event was deliberate, and the prosecution may try to prove deliberateness with evidence of other incidents. The first sentence of the rule, however, bars reasoning from an earlier act to the defendant's character and from character to conduct.36 An earlier incident can rebut a claim of accident without taking that route because of frequency.
Courts and commentators call the reasoning the doctrine of chances. One accident of a given kind is an ordinary event, and the same accident befalling the same person again and again is highly unlikely. Nobody is surprised when a gun discharges once during cleaning. Each repetition, however, multiplies the odds against innocent coincidence, much as one lottery win is luck and a second win by the same player invites questions. The evidence suggests a lack of accident through the objective improbability of such incidents recurring, and it draws nothing from inferences about the defendant's propensities.37 Propensity asks what kind of person the defendant is and infers conduct from the answer. The doctrine of chances asks only whether the incidents are too numerous to be coincidence, so the jury counts events and passes no judgment on character.
The need for the evidence is plain. Standing alone, one mishap is believable, so a jury that hears only about the charged event must reject an explanation that sounds plausible on its face. The earlier incidents show how strained that explanation becomes once the whole history is in view.
The two offers differ in whether the earlier fact can be counted against the accident claim. The shouting incident displays a trait. The prior discharges are events of the same kind as the charged event, and their recurrence is what makes coincidence hard to accept.
Two features carry the inference, and each marks a limit on the doctrine. The first is number: the more incidents there are, the less believable innocence becomes, so a single earlier mishap carries far less weight than a cluster. The second is similarity: every shared feature narrows the room for coincidence, and an incident with few shared features leaves innocent coincidence fully believable. As the supporting facts thin out, the evidence drifts toward the argument that the defendant is accident-prone or dangerous, which is propensity, and a court will test the purpose more closely. Rule 403, discussed below, tests the same features.
This kind of evidence carries a precondition that is easy to overlook: the earlier incident must actually have happened. A traveler is charged with hiding an undeclared diamond bracelet behind a suitcase lining, and she says she put it there for safekeeping and forgot to declare it. The prosecution offers proof that a year earlier she hid an undeclared diamond ring in the toe of a shoe. The ring defeats the forgetfulness claim only if the jury first finds that she really hid it, because an event that never occurred teaches nothing about what she knew. Rule 104(b) treats that as a question of conditional relevance.38 The judge screens the evidence for sufficiency, asking whether a reasonable juror could find that the act more likely than not occurred, and the jury decides whether it did.39 The Supreme Court's decision in Huddleston v. United States is taken up in the section on proving the other act.
The usual error on an exam is to treat the words “accident” or “mistake” as enough, so that any similar-sounding earlier incident comes in. The purpose has footing when the defense has actually asserted accident or mistake, as when a defendant testifies that a death was a tragic accident, because that assertion makes deliberateness a disputed fact. The proponent must then point to incidents numerous and alike enough that coincidence becomes an implausible explanation. Evidence that clears that bar still faces the Rule 403 balance, and the opponent may ask for a Rule 105 instruction confining the jury to the accident issue.40
Identity and Signature
Identity is the listed purpose that courts and students most often stretch beyond what it can carry.42 It applies when the question at trial is who committed the charged act, as when the defendant concedes that the crime happened and denies being the person responsible, and the other act is offered because it points to one perpetrator. The temptation is to treat any earlier crime of the same kind as an identifier, because the two crimes look alike. That reasoning runs through the middle link the first sentence of the rule forbids, since the only thing joining the crimes is the kind of person who commits crimes of that kind.43 Identity evidence is admissible only when something about the other act ties the defendant to this crime in particular.
The tie must be distinctive because a shared feature identifies a perpetrator only to the extent that few people share it. A trait common to thousands of people who commit this kind of offense leaves the defendant as one suspect among thousands. A trait found in only one offender's crimes leaves the defendant as the suspect, much as a fingerprint matches one person. When the feature is widely shared, the evidence adds almost nothing on who did it, yet the juror remains free to convict the defendant for being a criminal, so the full risk of prejudice remains. One commentator observes that identification by fingerprints rests on the assumption that physical characteristics stay constant over time, and that identification by bad acts likewise needs an unchanging feature, the assumed continuity of the defendant's character.44
Courts accept three kinds of connection, and each supplies the distinguishing link in a different way:
- A signature, or modus operandi, so unusual that it marks the charged crime and the other act as the work of one person.
- A distinctive linking object or fact, such as an unusual weapon, that ties the defendant to the charged crime.
- Prior dealings that give a witness the ability to recognize the defendant.
The signature route comes first because it is the one students expect. A modus operandi is the characteristic way a particular person carries out crimes, and evidence of it is admissible when the features marking the crimes are unusual enough to separate the defendant from other people committing the same class of crime.45 A robber who always wears a rubber Nixon mask and a superhero's cape has adopted a disguise that works as a name tag. Proof that the defendant robbed a bank in that outfit last year tells the jury who is probably behind this year's robbery without requiring any opinion about his character.46 The comparison always runs against everyone else who commits the offense. Using a gun, choosing a bank, wearing a mask, and leaving by car describe a great many robberies, so a prosecutor who lists those features has described how bank robberies are usually done. The claim that the defendant committed three earlier similar crimes and so must have committed this one is the propensity inference under another name.47
The first scene works because the revolver is one particular object that both events share, and the earlier act matters for what it shows about who held that object. The second scene fails because a common pistol model identifies a category of shooter and not a person. Linking objects and facts of this kind are the second route, and they explain what the court in the Wright decision, discussed below, said would have made the evidence admissible.
The third route differs from the first two because the earlier acts need not resemble the charged crime in any distinctive way. They matter for what they explain about a witness's ability to identify the defendant. Suppose police arrest a drug dealer during a sale, the buyer escapes, and the buyer later denies being present. The dealer's testimony that he sold drugs to that buyer on a number of earlier occasions is admissible on identity, because the repeated dealings gave the dealer the ability to recognize the buyer again.48 The jury is asked to credit the dealer's identification as reliable, and it can do so without forming any view that the buyer is a drug user by temperament. In the signature route the resemblance between the crimes is the evidence, and here the history between two people is the evidence. The testimony adds nothing if the buyer admits being at the scene and disputes only what happened there, since recognition is then no longer in question.
All three routes assume that who did it is a live question at trial. Identity evidence answers a defense that someone else committed the act or that the wrong person was charged. A defendant who admits the act and contests only its legality, for example by claiming self-defense or consent, has conceded the very fact the evidence would prove. A proponent who names identity in that setting has chosen a label with no dispute behind it, and the evidence is left with only the road through the defendant's type. The Seventh Circuit made the parallel point about intent in Wright, where it found no issue of intent because nobody questioned whether the seller knew what was in the packages he handed to the buyers.49
The failure cases show what happens when the connection runs only through membership in a class. In Wright, plainclothes officers bought crack at curbside and identified the seller from police photographs, and six months later a wiretapped call captured the defendant bragging to an unidentified woman about being a drug dealer.50 The trial judge admitted the recording to establish identity and intent. Judge Posner read the trial judge's use of “identity” as a synonym for guilt, an impermissible equation, because the boast might show the defendant to be more likely guilty than the average person, who is not a drug dealer, but it did not show that the man at the curb was the defendant.51 Drug dealers are a large class, and the boast places the defendant inside it without separating him from the others in it. The court also said what would have changed the answer: a conversation indicating that the defendant was then selling drugs on the streets near the transactions, or one in which he said something that only a party to those sales would know.52 Each of those is a linking fact of the second kind.
A social media page failed for the same underlying reason in United States v. Phaknikone, a prosecution for armed bank robberies that the government said were committed in a “gangster style,” including the way the robbers held their weapons.53 To show that the defendant was one of the robbers, the government offered his MySpace page, which carried the nickname “Trigga” and a photograph of him holding a handgun sideways in a car with a child and another man.54 The Eleventh Circuit held that the page did not prove identity. It showed a nickname, and the photograph showed only that on an earlier occasion the defendant possessed a handgun in a child's presence.55 The photograph might portray a “gangster-type personality,” but it did not show a modus operandi marked by a signature trait of the charged robberies.56 The conviction nonetheless stood, because the other evidence of guilt, including the defendant's own confession, was overwhelming.57
The two decisions share a structure that an exam stem will usually disguise. Wright's recording described crimes in words, and Phaknikone's page displayed a pose and a nickname, yet each item described a type, the drug dealer or the gangster, and nothing in either was a feature of the charged crimes that only their perpetrator would share. A posture picks out a defendant only if few others adopt it and the charged robberies also displayed it, and the court found no such showing. When a stem offers an earlier crime to prove identity, ask two questions: is identity truly disputed, and what feature of the charged crime does the defendant share with the other act and with almost no one else? Evidence that clears both questions still faces the Rule 403 balance and, on request, a limiting instruction.