Concept
The Habit Rule
Habit and routine practice
Habit Evidence Under Rule 406
The Habit Rule
Federal Rule of Evidence 406 admits what the character rules shut out. Its first sentence provides that evidence of a person's habit or an organization's routine practice may be admitted to prove that on a particular occasion the person or organization acted in accordance with the habit or routine practice. Its second sentence adds that the court may admit this evidence regardless of whether it is corroborated or whether there was an eyewitness.1 The first sentence is the substantive rule, and it covers two kinds of actors, individuals and organizations. The second removes two conditions that some courts once attached to habit proof, and it is taken up again below. To see why the rule exists, start with the rule it carves out of.
Character is used circumstantially when the inference is that a person's character or trait of character makes it more probable that the person acted consistently with it than would be so without the evidence. Rule 404(a)(1) bars that use in civil cases, with only narrow exceptions, and in criminal cases it is admissible only in limited situations.2 The bar rests on a basic commitment: a trial should decide whether the party committed the violent act or the negligent one, not what kind of person the party is. A defendant can be a bad person and innocent, or a good person and negligent.3 Habit of a person, as distinguished from character, and the routine practice of an organization are treated differently, and Rule 406 recognizes their relevance in civil and criminal cases alike.4
Habit is related to character but is not the same thing. It refers not to a general trait such as cautiousness but to a specific, repeated response to a particular situation, such as always fastening one's seatbelt when driving. Suppose that in a negligence case a witness testifies that X fastens a seatbelt every time X drives. If the testimony is offered to show that X is a careful person, it is excluded. If the same testimony is offered to show that X fastened the belt on the day in question, it is admissible habit evidence.5 The same source offers a second pair: X may have a character trait of punctuality and, separately, a habit of returning to her office from lunch between 12:50 and 1:00 p.m. The facts about X's conduct are identical in both uses. What differs is the inference the proponent asks the jury to draw. The first inference runs from a specific, repeated response to a specific act of the same kind. The second runs from a general disposition to conduct on one occasion. When an exam stem describes testimony about someone's regular conduct, the first question to ask is which inference the proponent is urging, because that answer decides the ruling.
Habit evidence usually appears in civil negligence cases, but the rule applies in criminal cases as well. In the Arkansas murder prosecution Derring v. State, the victim's body was never found. The prosecution was permitted to prove that the victim was very dependable in his routine, kept a fairly rigid schedule, always had breakfast with the same person each day, attended school regularly, and returned home to his apartment at the same time each evening. That pattern was offered to show that he had not disappeared on his own.6 The contrast with the character rules is sharp: Rule 404(a) opens only limited doors in criminal proceedings, while Rule 406 recognizes habit as relevant in both civil and criminal cases.7
Two separate reasons explain why habit is received so much more freely than character. The first is probative force. Habit describes particular behavior in a specific setting and is by nature at least regular, if not invariable, so it proves conduct on a particular occasion better than evidence of more general propensities does.8 The second is prejudice. Character evidence tends to carry moral overtones, while the detailed patterns of situation-specific behavior that make up a habit are unlikely to provoke the sympathy or antipathy that would distort the evaluation of the evidence.9 The first reason tells the court that the inference is sound, and the second tells it that a jury can be trusted with that inference. The same liberality extends to proof of an organization's routine practice.10
Rule 406 is unusual in form as well. It stands out in Article IV because it states a rule of admissibility rather than a limit.11 Relevance under Rule 402 would make habit and custom evidence admissible even if Rule 406 did not exist. The rule's real work is to make judges and lawyers separate admissible habit from inadmissible character and to reject certain common law restrictions.12 Those restrictions were real: some jurisdictions excluded habit evidence altogether, and others admitted it only when no eyewitness could testify about the events said to have triggered the habitual behavior.13 The second sentence of Rule 406 rejects both kinds of condition. Corroboration is an especially poor requirement because it goes to the sufficiency of the evidence, not to its admissibility.14
Admission under Rule 406 does not shield habit evidence from the rest of the rules. Evidence sufficient to establish a habit or routine practice remains subject to exclusion on any of the grounds stated in Rule 403.15 The sections that follow take up what separates habit from character, how an organization's routine practice is treated, how either is proved, and which limits survive.