Concept
When the Bar Does Not Apply
Admissibility of character
When the Bar Does Not Apply
Rule 404(a)(1) blocks one inference: that a person, because of a character or trait, acted in accordance with it on a particular occasion.1 The rule does not exclude evidence merely because it mentions temperament, honesty, or an earlier misdeed. It excludes evidence when the proponent needs the jury to reason from the kind of person someone is to what that person did at one moment. That reasoning passes through a middle conclusion (the defendant is a criminal type who disrespects property, say, and so probably robbed this store), and Rule 404(a)(1) rejects the whole chain.2
Two concerns support the bar. Even a well-proved trait such as honesty bears only weakly on what a person did on one occasion,3 and a major reason for excluding character evidence is apprehension about its prejudicial effect.4 Both concerns attach to the step from disposition to conduct. A theory of relevance that never takes that step escapes them, and the evidence faces only the ordinary tests of relevance and Rule 403.
Three situations recur. In the first, the substantive law makes a trait the very fact the jury must decide. In the second, another crime, wrong, or act is offered for a purpose such as motive or intent. In the third, habit or routine practice is offered to prove conformity, because a regular and specific response predicts conduct far better than a general trait does. Each situation has a limit that keeps it from swallowing the bar, and the question that sorts them is the same every time: what is this evidence offered to prove?
Character as an Essential Element
Sometimes the substantive law makes the nature of a person’s character a dispositive issue at trial, so that the existence or nonexistence of a trait itself determines the outcome. Lawyers say that character is “in issue.”5 Rule 405(b) allows a trait that is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense to be proved by specific instances of conduct, in addition to reputation and opinion, despite the disadvantages that such proof carries.6 The test belongs to the substantive law: does the jury have to find that someone has a particular trait in order to decide the case? A court answers by reading the elements of the claim or defense, not by asking how much the person’s character matters to the jury.
The bar falls away because the propensity chain loses its second half. Propensity reasoning moves from past facts to a conclusion about the kind of person someone is, and then to a conclusion about what that person did on the occasion in dispute.7 When character is an essential element, the jury’s work ends at the middle conclusion: it decides whether the person has the trait and never asks what the person did at a particular moment.8 The weak and prejudicial step is gone, and the substantive law itself requires proof of the trait.
Defamation with a truth defense is the clearest civil example. Shylock sues Antonio for calling him a “usurious cheat” in front of others, and Antonio pleads that the statement was true. Antonio offers a witness to Shylock’s reputation for charging exorbitant interest and misleading borrowers, two former employees who will give their opinions that Shylock lends deceptively and dishonestly, and three borrowers who will describe specific loans on which Shylock gave false information about the interest rate.9 The jury must decide whether Shylock really is the cheat Antonio described, so all three kinds of proof come in.10 Decided cases follow the pattern. In Faigin v. Kelly, a book suggested that an athletic agent was untrustworthy, and the defendant could prove truth through testimony from other athletes describing their dealings with the agent. The breadth of the accusation shapes the proof: a story that a player shaves points for cash is proved true by evidence of point-shaving in particular games, while a general charge such as “thief” puts the plaintiff’s character as a thief in issue and opens reputation and opinion testimony as well.11
Negligent hiring and negligent entrustment supply the second civil category. The Advisory Committee’s note to Rule 404 offers the competency of the driver in an action for negligently entrusting a motor vehicle to an incompetent driver, and negligent hiring works the same way.12 The plaintiff claims that the employer disregarded traits that made the worker unfit, so a conclusion about the worker’s traits is required to decide the case, and reputation, opinion, and specific instances all qualify.13
Change the theory and the trait drops out. If the plaintiff sues the employer only for the worker’s careless performance on the day of the injury, nothing in the claim requires the jury to reach any conclusion about the worker’s personal traits. Evidence that the worker is a careless type then connects to the case only through the forbidden inference that such a person probably acted carelessly this time.14 The trait offered must also be the trait the claim makes consequential: if the claim is that a lender negligently hired a dishonest teller, proof of a hot temper proves nothing that matters.
Criminal cases almost never make character an element. The criminal law could define battery as beating up a good person, which would make the victim’s goodness an element and excuse the beating of a bad person. It has not gone that way, and constitutional principles such as equal protection and substantive due process would likely block the move.15 The accused’s own character stands in the same position. A peaceable reputation matters only because it makes the charged conduct less likely, which is a circumstantial use proved by reputation or opinion.16 The jury’s view of the defendant may decide the case without making the trait an element, because the test is whether the charge or defense requires a finding about a trait, and importance to the verdict is not the test. The alleged victim’s violent disposition in a self-defense case likewise comes in as circumstantial evidence of who started the fight, under Rule 404(a)(2)(B).17
Entrapment is sometimes argued as another example, because the accused’s predisposition to commit the crime becomes contested once the defense is raised. The Court observed in Sorrells v. United States that a defendant who raises entrapment cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition.18 The prosecutor’s proof of earlier similar crimes, however, is admitted as specific-act evidence under Rule 404(b)(2), and character is not truly an element of the defense.19
True essential-element cases are rare. The Advisory Committee’s note names the chastity of the victim under a seduction statute that makes chastity an element, and the competency of the driver in a negligent entrustment action; defamation and negligent hiring complete the list.20 Other candidates sometimes argued, such as a plaintiff’s character as it bears on damages, truthfulness in a perjury prosecution, or the force of threats in a Hobbs Act case, involve specific acts used circumstantially for another purpose. That is Rule 404(b)(2) territory, not Rule 405(b).21
Step 2 filters out most exam stems. A stem that describes a party’s temper, honesty, or carelessness usually concerns what the party did on one occasion, so the trait is the route to the conclusion and not the conclusion itself. A criminal defendant’s good character and a victim’s violence in a self-defense case both fail the step.
Other Acts for Other Purposes
Rule 404(b)(1) extends the propensity bar to a person’s other crimes, wrongs, and acts: such evidence is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with it.24 Rule 404(b)(2) states what the bar leaves open. The evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.25 Read together, the two paragraphs sort one item of evidence by the use the jury is asked to make of it, so a prior act is neither admissible nor inadmissible in the abstract. The first question is what the proponent says the act proves.
Rule 404(b)(2) is best understood as a distinction and not as one more exception. The exceptions in Rule 404(a)(2) let a criminal defendant offer a pertinent trait to support an inference about conduct, whereas Rule 404(b)(2) asks the jury to draw no inference from character at all. An uncharged offense will almost always reflect badly on the defendant, but that by-product does not defeat admissibility when the jury can draw inferences about the charged crime without moving from other-crimes evidence to propensity to conduct.26 The listed purposes illustrate and do not exhaust. Courts have admitted other acts to show a conspiracy or a person’s participation in one, consciousness of guilt, and corroboration of crucial testimony, and to rebut an entrapment defense, and the proponent must identify the specific purpose it relies on.27
The practical test is the chain of inference. The forbidden chain has a middle link: the defendant did something bad before, so the defendant is a bad type of person, so the defendant probably did it this time.28 A permitted chain reaches the charged offense without that link, and the proponent must connect the defendant to the past act and the past act to the charged offense.29 Motive shows the shape. In a homicide prosecution of a defendant whose henchman, Cairo, disappeared shortly before he was to testify against the defendant in an extortion case, proof of the defendant’s illegal commercial activities and of Cairo’s intention to testify may be admitted to prove motive.30 The defendant’s criminal business gave him a reason to want Cairo silenced, and the jury can accept that reason without deciding that he is a criminal type. Offered on the theory that a person with an extortion record is likely to kill, the same proof would be barred. The purpose, and not the content, decides admissibility.
A defense lawyer’s first objection to a prior fight is usually that it shows only that the defendant is a violent person. Take a prosecution for injuring a bar patron with a wineglass, in which the defendant testifies that he jumped out of the way of another patron and the glass struck the victim in the mouth by accident. A witness who saw the defendant deliberately use a wineglass against a different patron earlier answers the objection.32 The earlier incident suggests more than a violent disposition. It shows a willingness to use a wineglass as a weapon in a similar situation despite knowing the injury it can cause, which tends to prove intent and to refute the claim of accident.33 The accident defense gives the evidence its force, because it puts intent in dispute and the earlier act speaks directly to it.
Identity is the purpose most often used as a label for plain propensity, so the link between the past act and the charged offense has to do real work. The claim that the defendant committed three similar crimes before and so must have committed this one is the propensity inference under another name.34 The link holds when the collateral crime and the charged crime share unusual characteristics, a signature or modus operandi, because the jury can then move directly from the collateral misconduct to identity.35 If a burglar disabled an alarm with a rare technique and the defendant, who says someone else did it, used that technique in earlier burglaries, the earlier acts help identify him. If many burglars use the technique, the unknown burglar’s use of it does not tie the offense to this defendant, and only propensity remains.36
Past acts often prove something unrelated to disposition, such as why the defendant acted, what the defendant knew, or how the crime was carried out, and excluding them merely because they also reflect badly on him would leave the jury without proof on the points in dispute. The danger is that a stated purpose is a pretext for the propensity inference, and three safeguards answer it. First, the proponent must name a specific permitted purpose, which forces the court to test whether the chain reaches that purpose without the character conclusion.37 Second, Rule 403 requires the court to weigh the evidence’s value for that purpose against the risk of unfair prejudice, considering how well the other act is proved, how similar and recent it is, how much the proponent needs it, whether other proof is available, and how likely it is to rouse the jury to overmastering hostility.38 Third, in a criminal case the prosecutor must give reasonable written notice before trial that states the permitted purpose and the reasoning behind it, unless the court excuses the lack of pretrial notice for good cause.39 The notice gives the defendant a fair chance to meet the evidence, either by contesting that the act happened or by contesting that it proves the stated point. On request, the court also instructs the jury to disregard the propensity inference the evidence might otherwise invite.40
Step 2 does most of the work. A stem will name a respectable-sounding purpose such as intent or identity while offering a prior act whose only real route to the charge is the bad-type conclusion.
Habit Versus Character
Rule 406 allows evidence of a person’s habit or an organization’s routine practice to prove that on a particular occasion the person or organization acted in accordance with it, and the court may admit the evidence whether or not it is corroborated and whether or not an eyewitness saw the occasion.42 The rule applies in civil and criminal cases alike.43 Habit differs from the first two situations in this unit. Character-as-element evidence and other-purpose evidence avoid the step from disposition to conduct; habit evidence takes the step, asking the jury to infer that the person acted on this occasion as the person regularly acts. The rules permit that inference for habit and forbid it for character because the past predicts the present far more reliably in the first case.
The distinction rests on specificity. Character is a generalized description of a person’s disposition, overall or with respect to a trait such as honesty, temperance, or peacefulness. Habit is a regular response to a repeated specific situation, one that has become semi-automatic and extremely regular.44 A witness who says a friend is careful has described a tendency spread across many situations. A witness who says the friend locks his car door every time he leaves the car has described conduct so specific that it leaves little room for ambiguity, and ambiguity is what a trait such as calmness or honesty invites.45 The line between the two descriptions is far from distinct, so the specificity of the description and the proof of regularity decide which rule controls.46
Stop signs show how one set of facts can serve two theories. If the proponent needed the jury to find that a driver is a careful, law-abiding type and then infer careful driving on the day in question, the propensity bar would apply. A decision that a driver with the habit of stopping at stop signs really did stop at a particular sign need not rest on any inference about the driver’s character in a broad sense.47 The habit leads to the conduct directly: the driver has the habit, so the driver stopped. That is the propensity chain with its middle link removed.48
Habit earns this treatment because the evidence is more reliable. Once a habit such as locking a door or obeying stop signs is proved as well as it can be, its relationship to conduct on a specific occasion is strong. Even a well-proved trait like honesty has a bound-to-be weak relationship to conduct on one occasion.49 It is the extreme regularity of the response that gives habit and routine practice their probative force.50 For these reasons the propensity prohibition does not exclude habit, and habit can be proved with any relevant evidence, including specific past conduct, so a witness may describe the repeated occasions themselves.51 That freedom suits habit because the repeated instances are the habit.
The middle ground is harder. In a civil dispute over a valuable vase, Aunt Louise claims that her niece Alice stole it at the end of a week-long visit, and Alice says that her uncle Herbert gave it to her as she left. Herbert died two days later.53 Friends and family who will testify that Herbert was exceedingly generous with his nieces and nephews, citing Christmas gifts and expensive presents over the years, describe a trait spread across many kinds of gifts and occasions, and a judge will probably treat that testimony as character evidence.54 Alice’s own testimony comes closer to habit: she visited twice a year for ten years, and at the end of each visit Herbert gave her a valuable family heirloom, a repeated response to one particular situation.55 Trial courts might differ on that testimony, and probably would not abuse their discretion whichever way they ruled. Her stake in the outcome affects how far the jury believes her but not admissibility, and if the conduct is habit, the testimony cannot be excluded for lack of corroboration.56
Routine practice is the organizational counterpart of habit. A business runs by procedure and not by personal whim, so its routines will often show even greater regularity than an individual’s habits.57
Two cautions keep Rule 406 within bounds. A lawyer’s label does not control: calling someone’s carefulness or honesty a “habit” does not turn a general disposition into a specific response to a repeated situation, and a court will treat the offer as character evidence. And habit evidence that qualifies remains subject to exclusion under Rule 403 on the usual grounds.58