Concept
Alleged Victim's Character
Admissibility of character
Alleged Victim's Character
A criminal defendant may draw the disposition-to-conduct inference about someone other than himself. Rule 404(a)(2)(B) provides that, subject to the limitations in Rule 412, the defendant may offer evidence of an alleged victim's pertinent trait, and that if the evidence is admitted the prosecutor may respond in either of two ways.1 The option parallels the one covered earlier, in which the defendant offers a pertinent trait of his own character and the prosecutor may rebut it,2 and like that option it belongs among the exceptions that apply in a criminal case.3
The four sections below follow the exchange in order: the defendant's offer, the prosecutor's rebuttal of the victim's trait, the prosecutor's separate right to answer with the defendant's own trait, and a different route by which a victim's violence reaches the jury, to show what the defendant knew and feared. Each route has its own conditions, and the exam traps live in the differences.
Defendant Offers Victim's Trait
In a homicide or assault prosecution, a defendant who claims self-defense may want the jury to believe the alleged victim started the violence. Evidence that the alleged victim was a violent or aggressive person supports that belief by inference: a person with that disposition more probably began the fight.4 The inference is the one Rule 404(a)(1) forbids as a general matter, that a person acted on a particular occasion in accordance with a character trait,5 and it is one people draw every day: employers, lenders, and sports executives all rely on assessments of character.6 Rule 404(a)(2)(B) permits the defendant to ask the jury to draw it about the alleged victim.
The trait must be pertinent, and pertinence is relevance by another name. The logic that limits a defendant's own character evidence applies here too: a trait that has no bearing on the conduct in dispute has no probative value on it.7 Where the dispute is who started the fight, a violent or aggressive disposition qualifies. A reputation as a swindler or a drug user does not, because neither makes it likelier that the alleged victim, rather than the defendant, threw the first punch.
Ernie's opinion is an acceptable form of proof, and a witness who spoke to Vince's reputation would serve equally well. Rule 405(a) allows a pertinent trait to be proved by reputation or opinion, and it does not allow specific acts offered to show character.8 A defense witness who recounts particular earlier fights Vince started has left the permitted form.
The defendant need not have known of the trait. When the evidence is offered to show that the alleged victim was the aggressor, reputation or opinion testimony is admissible whether or not the defendant knew of the reputation or had formed his own opinion.9 The inference runs from the alleged victim's disposition to the alleged victim's conduct, and the defendant's state of mind never enters the chain.
A defendant who did know of the trait has a second argument, because knowledge of the alleged victim's violence is a factor in deciding whether the defendant reasonably apprehended bodily harm.10 That theory is separate from the propensity inference, and the last section of this unit develops it. Its existence shows what a defendant's ignorance of the trait forecloses: the second theory, and not the first.
The rule's opening clause subjects every such offer to Rule 412.11 The Advisory Committee note explains that evidence otherwise admissible under Rule 404(a)(2) may nevertheless be excluded in a criminal case involving sexual misconduct.12 Rule 412 governs sexual-assault trials, and it generally bars defense proof of the complaining witness's character to show such things as consent.13 The sexual-offense section below takes up those rules and their reasons.
Rebutting the Victim's Trait
Rule 404(a)(2)(B)(i) supplies the first of the prosecutor's two responses: when the defendant's evidence of the alleged victim's pertinent trait is admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence to rebut it.15 The clause lets the prosecutor answer; it never lets him open. It presupposes that the victim's trait is already before the jury, as when a defense witness has described the alleged victim as violent.
The rebuttal mirrors the defense proof. If the defense showed a violent disposition, the prosecutor typically offers reputation or opinion testimony that the alleged victim was peaceable, because Rule 405(a) fixes reputation and opinion as the forms of proof for a pertinent trait.16 Two tools serve him: rigorous cross-examination of the defense character witnesses, and character witnesses of his own who testify to the alleged victim's good and pertinent character.17
Admission of the defendant's trait evidence is the trigger, and a defense claim that the alleged victim struck first does not supply it. An eyewitness who saw the alleged victim swing first describes an event and not a trait, so the rebuttal clause has nothing to answer.
Homicide cases offer a different path. Rule 404(a)(2)(C) lets the prosecutor offer evidence of the alleged victim's trait of peacefulness to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor.18 The defense evidence that triggers it need not take the form of character testimony, and whichever form it takes, the prosecutor may answer with reputation or opinion testimony on peacefulness.19 That rule has its own trigger and its own section below. Reserve subparagraph (B)(i) for the case in which the defense has actually offered victim-trait evidence and the court has admitted it.
Defendant's Same Trait
Rule 404(a)(2)(B)(ii) gives the prosecutor a second response: once the defendant's evidence of the alleged victim's pertinent trait is admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence of the defendant's same trait.21 The first response stays on the victim and lets the prosecutor answer the defense's portrait of him.22 The second moves to the defendant. Its only condition is that the defendant offered evidence of the victim's trait and the court admitted it under the exception.23 The defendant need not have said a word about his own character. When a defendant offers his own trait, the prosecutor's answer depends on that offer;24 here the answer depends on what he said about the victim.
Parity explains the rule. In a murder case with a claim of self-defense, the defendant may bolster the claim with evidence of the alleged victim's violent disposition, and the Rules then let the prosecutor show that the defendant is violent too.25 The defendant is not permitted to attack the alleged victim's character and yet remain shielded from equally relevant evidence of the same trait in himself.26 Should Don's attack on Vince's character open the door to an attack on Don's? The rule says yes: a jury asked to judge who began the fight would otherwise hear about one participant's disposition and not the other's.
Two limits follow from the text and from the rule on form. The trait must be the same one: a defendant who proves that the victim was violent faces proof of his own violence, and evidence that he is dishonest is a different trait that does not come in under this provision.27 And the proof must be reputation or opinion testimony, because proof of specific instances of conduct is not permitted under Rule 405(a).28 A defendant deciding whether to prove the victim's violence should first ask what the prosecutor could say about his own. A defendant with a history of violence may decide the trade is not worth making.
The trigger is narrower than students expect. A defendant who claims self-defense often testifies that he knew the victim was reputed to be violent and that this knowledge made him afraid. The temptation is to treat that testimony as an attack on the victim's character that opens the door to the defendant's own. Resist it. The testimony is offered not to prove the victim's character but to show that the defendant could have thought the victim posed a threat,29 so it is not victim-trait evidence admitted under the exception, and the condition of the subparagraph is never met.30
The narrow trigger tracks the bargain the exception offers. A defendant who proves the victim's trait gains an inference about the victim and accepts the risk of the matching inference about himself. A defendant who only explains his own state of mind has not asked for the first benefit, so charging him the second cost would penalize ordinary testimony about why he acted.
Step 1 is where testimony about what the defendant knew and feared drops out, because it asks the jury to infer nothing about the victim's conduct.
Character Versus Knowledge
The same fact about an alleged victim, that he was violent, can reach the jury on two different theories, and the theory the proponent chooses decides which rules govern. On the first, the evidence is character evidence under Rule 404(a)(2)(B): the defendant offers it so the jury will infer that the alleged victim was the aggressor.32 The inference runs from the victim's disposition to the victim's conduct, so the defendant's awareness is irrelevant, and the proof must take the form of opinion or reputation. In State v. Hutchinson, a murder trial in which the defendant claimed self-defense, the defendant could offer only opinion or reputation evidence about the victim's character.33 On the second theory, the same fact explains the defendant's state of mind.
The knowledge theory asks what the defendant had reason to fear. The evidence is admissible even if the victim was in truth a peaceable person, because it is offered not to prove the victim's character but to show that the defendant could have thought the victim posed a threat.34 Reputation for violence, prior threats against the defendant, and violent conduct toward others all serve that purpose, because they give the defendant a reasonable basis for fearing the victim and so justify protective steps. The key is the defendant's knowledge of the reputation, the threats, or the violent activity.35
Because the theory depends on what the defendant knew when he acted, he must have known of the reputation, threats, or violent conduct before the incident. Awareness gained during or after the event does not count, since knowledge does not work backward.36 A fear felt on the night of the incident cannot have been shaped by facts the defendant learned later.
The same logic frees the knowledge theory from the limit to reputation and opinion. When the point is what reached the defendant, the particular episodes he heard about are the facts that shaped his fear. In United States v. Burks, the D.C. Circuit recognized that a victim's violent acts were admissible, if the defendant knew of them, on whether he reasonably feared he was in danger of imminent great bodily injury.37 Whether Rules 404 and 405 even apply to such an offer is doubtful, because the proponent is not trying to prove a trait.
Specific earlier fights that the defendant never heard of fit neither route. As proof of the victim's violent disposition they take the wrong form, and as evidence of fear they come too late to have shaped it.38
The knowledge theory also bears on what the prosecutor may do next. The responses in Rule 404(a)(2)(B) attach to evidence admitted under that rule, and testimony about what the defendant knew is offered for his state of mind and not to show that the victim acted in line with a disposition.39 It therefore gives the prosecutor no right to respond with the defendant's own character. A defendant who wants both theories may offer both, with different evidence on each: reputation or opinion testimony for the aggressor theory, and proof of what he knew for the fear theory.
A threat the victim made against the defendant belongs with the knowledge theory when the defendant learned of it before the incident, since a known threat gives him a reasonable basis for fearing the victim.40 If a friend who heard the victim's plan warns the defendant of it, the warning is offered to show that the defendant could have thought the victim posed a threat and not to prove the victim's character, and it counts even if the victim is in fact peaceable.41
Steps 2 and 3 run on different facts, so one piece of testimony can pass one and fail the other. A neighbor's opinion that the victim was violent satisfies the aggressor theory even if the defendant never heard of the victim, while the same neighbor's account of three barroom fights satisfies the fear theory only if the defendant had heard about them in advance.