Concept
Judge and Jury Roles
Authentication and identification
Judge and Jury Roles
Rule 901(a) asks the proponent for evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.1 Someone must make that finding, and the rule leaves it to the jury. The judge's task comes first and is narrower. An exhibit matters only if it connects to the person, thing, or event the proponent claims, so authentication is a question of conditional relevance, meaning relevance that depends on proof of a further fact. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. the court read the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 901 as placing authentication in the category of “relevancy dependent upon fulfillment of a condition of fact.” That category falls under Rule 104(b), not Rule 104(a).2 Three rules follow. The judge screens the foundation, counts only admissible evidence while screening, and leaves doubts that survive admission to the jury as questions of weight.
The Screening Question
Under Rule 104(b), the judge makes a preliminary determination whether the foundation evidence is sufficient to permit a factfinder to conclude that the condition has been fulfilled.3 For authentication, the judge asks whether the proponent has offered a satisfactory foundation from which the jury could reasonably find the evidence authentic. Whether the item is in fact what the proponent claims is ultimately reserved for the jury.4 The required showing is prima facie, and it need not consist of a preponderance of the evidence. Zenith put the test as substantial evidence from which the trier of fact might conclude that the document is authentic.5 The judge therefore asks whether the proof could carry the finding. The judge does not ask whether the judge believes it.
Rule 104(a) allocates the decision differently, and the contrast explains why. It gives the judge alone certain preliminary facts: a person's competence to testify, whether a witness qualifies as an expert, the existence and application of privileges, and whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay and, if so, whether it meets an exception.6 Authenticity is not on that list, because the jury must stay free to decide critical questions of fact. The Zenith court illustrated the point with a diary attributed to Yajima. If serious questions arose whether the diary was a forgery, evidence so critical could not be decided solely by the court, since that would greatly restrict the jury's function as trier of fact.7 A judge who resolved authenticity by a personal preponderance finding would take that function from the jury. A judge who asks only whether a reasonable juror could find authenticity leaves it where Rule 104(b) puts it.
The same general standard governs evidence taken from the Internet. A court of appeals facing a web page noted that some courts demand “greater scrutiny” for such evidence. It doubted that more was required and decided the case under Rule 901's general requirement.8 The same opinion noted that Rule 902 identifies classes of self-authenticating evidence, which require no extrinsic evidence of authenticity to be admitted. The web page fit none of them, so Rule 901 applied.9
United States v. Johnson applies the screening question to an imperfect identification. Papse's testimony would have let a reasonable juror find that the ax offered at trial was the weapon allegedly used in the assault. His ability or inability to specify particular identifying features, and the evidence that the ax's condition had changed, went to the weight of the evidence, as the trial court ruled. The jury remained free to reject the government's claim that this ax was used in the assault. The requirements for admissibility under Rule 901(a) had still been met.10
A witness's uncertainty is not the same as the absence of any connecting proof. Papse's testimony supplied the link between the ax and the assault, and the jury could decide how far to trust it. The VK web page in Zhyltsou shows the opposite result. The Second Circuit held that admitting the printout was an abuse of discretion, because the government gave no sufficient basis for concluding that the printout was what the government claimed, Zhyltsou's profile page.11 Admission follows when the testimony, taken as true, would let a reasonable juror find the connection. Exclusion follows when nothing connects the item to its claimed source.
Only Admissible Evidence Counts
The screening question raises a second one: which evidence may the judge count toward the jury's finding? In Zenith, the parties disagreed whether admissible evidence is necessary to authenticate. Defendants said yes and plaintiffs said no.13 The court sided with the defendants. Under Rule 104(a), Rule 104(b), and Goichman, its task in ruling on authenticity was “limited to determining whether there is substantial admissible evidence to support a finding of authentication by the trier of fact.”14 Because only admissible evidence can form the basis for the determination, inadmissible material cannot supply the foundation. A proponent whose only link between a document and its claimed source is inadmissible has produced nothing the screening question can count.
This rule creates a circularity problem when a proponent uses some of its own documents to authenticate others. The court observed that in some cases it is more logical to decide other aspects of admissibility before reaching the Rule 901 determination.15 Those other aspects are often Rule 104(a) questions, such as hearsay, which the judge decides alone.16
The habit to build is to ask what admissible evidence supports the authenticity finding. The proponent's other documents count only if the jury could properly consider them.
Weight After Admission
Admission does not end the dispute about genuineness. Once the proponent makes a prima facie showing, the document should be admitted, and the burden of going forward shifts to the opponent. The opponent may then present evidence to the trier of fact that raises questions about whether the document is genuine.18 The rebuttal is addressed to the jury, not the judge. The jury weighs it against the authenticating evidence, because the factual determination whether the item is what the proponent claims is reserved for the jury.19 An opponent with strong rebuttal evidence therefore argues it to the jury, which may reject the item as not authentic.
The same division explains why many attacks on reliability never affect admissibility. In Zhyltsou the Second Circuit recalled that authentication merely renders evidence admissible and leaves its ultimate reliability to the jury. After the proponent supports a finding that the item is what it is claimed to be, the opponent “remains free to challenge the reliability of the evidence, to minimize its importance, or to argue alternative interpretations of its meaning.” These challenges go to weight, not admissibility.20 In United States v. Kieffer the court of appeals applied that division to an exhibit. The trial court need only assess whether the proponent offered a satisfactory foundation from which a jury could reasonably find the evidence authentic. The appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the defendant's objection to Exhibit 8 went to weight rather than admissibility.21
A weight argument cannot save a foundation that fails the threshold. The Zhyltsou printout was excluded from the jury's consideration for that reason. The government did not provide a sufficient basis for concluding that the printout was the claimed profile page, so the court found insufficient evidence to authenticate it and to permit the jury to consider it.22
The sorting question is whether the proponent's admissible evidence, taken as true, would let a reasonable juror find the item authentic. If it would, every remaining attack belongs to weight. That includes the Johnson objections about the witness's inability to specify identifying features and the ax's changed condition, and any argument that someone else might have created the item. If it would not, the item is excluded.