Concept
The Authentication Standard
Authentication and identification
Authenticating Evidence
The Authentication Standard
A party who offers a document, an object, or testimony about a conversation must first show that the item is what the party says it is.1 Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) states the requirement in a single sentence: the proponent “must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”2 The showing is called authentication (the rule also uses the word identification), and the testimony that supplies it is often called foundation testimony.3 Three features of that sentence govern everything that follows. The burden of producing evidence falls on the proponent. The evidence need only be sufficient to support a finding, not to compel one. And the proponent’s own description of the item fixes what the evidence must connect.
Authentication refines the requirement of relevance. An exhibit proves something only through its claimed connection to a person, a thing, or an event: a letter shows that an offer was made only if the claimed author wrote it, and a broken bulb shows a defect only if it is the bulb that failed. The Advisory Committee called authentication and identification “a special aspect of relevancy.” It illustrated the point with a telephone conversation that may be irrelevant because the speaker is not identified, and it noted that Wigmore described the need as “an inherent logical necessity.”4 The Committee therefore placed the requirement among questions of relevancy that depend on a condition of fact, governed by Rule 104(b).5 United States v. Sliker discusses how Rules 104 and 901 interact.6 Under that procedure, the judge asks only whether the proponent has offered enough evidence to support a finding of the connecting fact. A proponent who offers none, or too little, loses the exhibit; one who offers enough gets it admitted, and the jury makes the ultimate decision on authenticity.7 The opponent remains free to offer rebuttal evidence and to urge the jury to reject the exhibit as not authentic.8
A signature on a document cannot vouch for itself. Without some minimal additional proof that the signature is genuine, the appearance of a name on the page does not carry the proponent’s burden.9 Suppose a plaintiff offers a letter signed “R. Marlow” to prove that Marlow agreed to a deal. Marlow could testify that he signed it, a coworker could say she watched him sign it, or someone with even minimal acquaintance with his signature could recognize it. An expert could also compare it with a proven exemplar. Circumstantial proof counts too, such as peculiar penmanship, peculiar knowledge on the writer’s part, or proper business custody. So do certain government certificates of authenticity, stipulation, and admission.10
What counts as enough depends on what the proponent claims the item is. The type and quantum of evidence relate to the purpose for which the item is offered, and the question is a context-specific one: whether the proof is sufficient to support a finding that the item is what its proponent claims.11 A proponent who claims only that a page exists online makes a narrower claim than one who says a particular person wrote it, and the foundation must match the claim. One foundation that satisfied an appeals court shows the scale. The defendant objected to Exhibit 8, and before it was admitted a witness, Natalie Sterling, testified that a domain name remains under the registrant’s exclusive control until the registration expires, that the defendant registered boplaw.com in May 2004, and that the registration did not expire until May 2010. The court of appeals held that the district court acted within its discretion in ruling that the objection went to weight rather than admissibility. The district court, it explained, need only assess whether the proponent has offered a satisfactory foundation from which the jury could reasonably find the evidence authentic; whether the evidence is what the proponent claims is ultimately reserved for the jury.12
Once the claim is fixed, the bar is low. Courts say Rule 901 “does not erect a particularly high hurdle,” and the proponent need not rule out all possibilities inconsistent with authenticity or prove beyond any doubt that the evidence is what it purports to be.13 In another court’s words, “[t]he bar for authentication of evidence is not particularly high.”14 The judge therefore asks whether a reasonable juror could find the item authentic, not whether the judge is persuaded.15 Clearing that hurdle does not guarantee admission, because authentication is only one requirement an item of evidence must satisfy.16
Proof of authenticity may be direct or circumstantial.17 The simplest and likely most common direct method is testimony from a witness with knowledge that the item is what it is claimed to be.18 Rule 901(b) lists illustrations of accepted methods, but the Advisory Committee stressed that the examples are not an exclusive enumeration; they are meant to guide and suggest, leaving room for growth and development.19 Later sections take the methods up one at a time. Two decisions show first how a handful of connecting facts can decide the question, and then how the absence of any such fact can.
In Bruther v. General Electric Co., circumstances alone tied a broken bulb to an accident. Mr. Riley found a broken bulb in a small cabinet next to the spot where the accident occurred. He could not positively identify it as the bulb involved, but he believed, with some reservations, that it was, because the company would not have kept a broken bulb without a reason. Only six people had access to the area and the cabinet.20 Given that limited access, the cabinet’s nearness to the accident site, Riley’s statement, and the plaintiff’s own statement that he had installed a G.E. bulb in the same socket two weeks earlier, the court concluded that a jury reasonably could find the bulb was the one that came apart and injured the plaintiff.21 No single fact was conclusive and no witness could be certain; together, the facts supported the finding.
The result went the other way in United States v. Zhyltsou, which involved a profile page on the VK site. The government first described the page only as what Special Agent Cline was observing on the Internet that day, and it conceded that the agent did not know who created it. His testimony matched: the page, which contained information related to Zhyltsou, was currently accessible online, and he offered no extrinsic information showing that Zhyltsou authored it or otherwise tying it to him.22 The page’s own contents did not fill the gap. Everything on it that supposedly pointed to Zhyltsou was also known to Timku and likely to others, some of whom may have had reason to create a profile falsely attributed to him. No evidence showed that Zhyltsou even had a VK profile page, much less that this was it, and none showed that verifying identity was necessary to create such a page, which might have made the attribution more than speculation.23 A state appellate court, applying its own Rule 5-901(b)(4), found a similar gap in a MySpace printout: a photograph of the account holder, her birth date, and her location were not sufficient distinctive characteristics, because someone else could have created the profile and posted the incriminating comment.24 Because social networking sites invite abuse and manipulation by someone other than the purported creator, a printout from one requires a greater degree of authentication than that.25 In Bruther, several independent circumstances linked the bulb to the accident; in Zhyltsou, nothing beyond the page itself tied it to the defendant.