Concept
Old Chief v. United States
Exclusion for unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time
Old Chief v. United States
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), is the Supreme Court’s leading application of Rule 403. The Court held that a trial court abused its discretion by admitting the record of a defendant’s prior conviction, with the name of the offense, to prove felon status after the defendant offered to admit that status.1 The holding travels because of the method behind it: the Court measured the record’s probative value against the alternative proof actually available on the same point, and once the record was weighed that way it had almost nothing to set against the risk of unfair prejudice.2
The method answers a structural problem. If relevance alone entitled a party to offer the most vivid version of every fact, that party could pick, from among equally probative items, the one with the greatest threat of improper influence. The worst result would be a sustained objection, after which the party could simply offer the cleaner substitute.3 Weighing the item against its alternatives puts the choice on the scale, where the judge can see it.
Old Chief also shows the first limit on Rule 403 at work. The rule lets a court exclude relevant evidence only when it fits one of three enumerated dangers: unfair prejudice; inaccuracy, meaning confusing the issues or misleading the jury; or inefficiency, meaning delay, wasted time, or needless repetition. Those dangers mirror the fairness, accuracy, and efficiency that Rule 102 sets out as evidentiary virtues.4 In Old Chief the danger was unfair prejudice, and the question was how much value the record had to set against it.
The decision is narrower than its reputation. A party ordinarily may prove its case with evidence of its own choosing, and the Court limited its holding to proof of felon status.5 An exam answer therefore has two jobs: apply the comparison when a status element is at stake, and recognize when the facts fall outside that setting. The subsections that follow take the opinion in the order the Court reasoned, beginning with relevance, because the offered stipulation had to be shown not to strip the record of relevance before anything could be weighed. They then turn to the prejudice the record carried, the discount the stipulation earned, the prosecution’s usual freedom to tell its story, and finally the dissent and the limits of the holding.
Stipulation Offer and Relevance
Old Chief was arrested in 1993 after a fracas involving at least one gunshot. The federal charges included assault with a dangerous weapon, using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, and violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which makes it unlawful for a person previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year to possess a firearm in or affecting commerce.6 The prior conviction is therefore an element of the third count. The government meant to prove it with the order of judgment and commitment from Old Chief’s 1988 conviction for assaulting Rory Dean Fenner and causing serious bodily injury, a conviction that carried a five-year sentence.7
Old Chief “sensibly worried” that this record would take on added weight from the pending assault charge, so he offered to stipulate “that the Government has proven one of the essential elements of the offense.”8 The assistant United States attorney refused to join in a stipulation, insisting on his right to prove his case his own way, and the district court agreed: “If he doesn’t want to stipulate, he doesn’t have to.” Over renewed objection, the government introduced the record, and the jury convicted Old Chief on all counts.9 The Ninth Circuit addressed the point briefly, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari because the courts of appeals had divided sharply over defendants’ efforts to exclude the names and natures of prior offenses in cases like this.10
The weighing comes later. The Court first had to decide whether the offer left the name of the offense relevant at all, because only relevant evidence reaches Rule 403. Under Rule 401, evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.11 The Court conceded that the name of the offense was not itself an ultimate fact, as it would have been had the statute required proof of an injurious assault. But the name was a step on one evidentiary route to the ultimate fact, because it placed Old Chief within a particular subclass of offenders for whom firearm possession is outlawed, and a record of the conviction for that named offense made his § 922(g)(1) status more probable than it would have been without the record.12
Relevance follows the logical steps from the proof to the conclusion. It does not ask whether one form of proof is stronger, more direct, or less likely to lead the trier of fact astray; Rule 403 takes up those concerns.13 The government also argued that relevance should be judged for the whole record of conviction and not for its separable parts, such as the name of the offense and the sentence. The Court saw no need to dwell on that argument, though it noted no general obstacle to a district court’s ruling, after objection, that some sections of a document are relevant under Rule 401 and others irrelevant and inadmissible under Rule 402.14
The offer to stipulate raised a second relevance question. The Court held that the availability of alternative proof of the element, such as Old Chief’s own admission that he had a qualifying conviction, did not affect the evidence’s relevance under Rule 401.15 Under the federal rules, the fact to which evidence is directed need not be in dispute.16 The Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 401 adds that a party’s concession is pertinent to the court’s discretion to exclude evidence on the conceded point.17 From those premises the Court drew a consequence for every case of this kind: if relevant evidence is inadmissible in the presence of other evidence related to it, exclusion must rest not on the ground that the other evidence has made it “irrelevant” but on its character as unfairly prejudicial, cumulative, or the like, its relevance notwithstanding.18
That division keeps one question in one place. If a concession made evidence irrelevant, a party could take any fact out of the case by admitting it, and the proponent’s choice of proof would vanish before the judge looked at what the particular item adds and what it risks. Under Rule 403 the judge looks. The judge discounts the item’s value for the concession and compares what remains with the listed dangers, with the margin the rule requires.19 A concession therefore lowers probative value and leaves relevance intact.20 How far the stipulation discounted the record in Old Chief is the work of a later subsection.
A negligence suit shows the same structure. Suppose the defendant admits negligence and contests only damages, and the plaintiff calls an eyewitness to the red-light violation. The testimony remains relevant, because Rule 401 asks for a tendency to prove a fact of consequence and does not require that the fact be in controversy.21 The defendant’s remedy is a Rule 403 objection that the testimony adds little on an undisputed point and that wasted time outweighs that small value.22 Under California’s definition of relevance, by contrast, the same testimony would be irrelevant once negligence was admitted, and the objection would end at the threshold.23 An exam answer on Old Chief’s first holding therefore begins with relevance and moves on to Rule 403, and it should not treat an offer to stipulate as a reason the evidence falls outside Rule 401.
Prejudice From a Prior Conviction
Rule 403 lets the court exclude relevant evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, among other dangers.25 Because the offer to stipulate left the record relevant, the question in Old Chief became what the record cost. The Court answered that “evidence of the name or nature of the prior offense generally carries a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.” That risk “will vary from case to case” but “will be substantial whenever the official record offered by the Government would be arresting enough to lure a juror into a sequence of bad character reasoning.”26 The statement sets a presumption of risk and leaves its size to the facts. This subsection therefore asks what enlarges the risk and what shrinks it, and the next takes up the value side of the scale.
The risk runs along two routes. The first is propensity reasoning. The prior conviction is offered for one legitimate purpose, to show that the defendant belongs to the class barred from possessing a gun, but the record also invites an easier use. The Court described that use as “generalizing a defendant’s earlier bad act into bad character and taking that as raising the odds that he did the later bad act now charged,” or, worse, as calling for “preventive conviction even if he should happen to be innocent momentarily.”27 Each link feels natural to a juror. The middle link, from earlier act to bad character, does the damage, because it turns a fact admitted for status into evidence of what kind of person the defendant is.
The second route lowers the proof jurors demand instead of raising their estimate of guilt. A juror who learns that the defendant already has a criminal record may think that an erroneous conviction would not be quite as serious as it otherwise would be, and so may be satisfied with a less compelling demonstration of guilt than the law requires.28 A defendant can suffer this harm even when no juror thinks he probably committed the charged act, so the danger cannot be reduced to propensity alone.
Both routes grow stronger as the earlier crime comes to resemble the pending charges. The Court said that where a prior conviction was for a gun crime or one similar to other charges in the pending case, the risk would be “especially obvious,” and Old Chief “sensibly worried” that his prior assault conviction, significant enough alongside the gun charges alone, would take on added weight from the related assault charge against him.29 When the earlier act is the kind of act the jury is now deciding about, the step from “he did it before” to “he did it again” needs almost no intermediate reasoning, and the bad-character inference feels like common sense.
The risk has a low end as well. A prior offense far removed in time or nature from the current charges may carry minimal potential for unfair prejudice, and jurors who regard a charge based on an old, minor conviction as overreach may refuse to convict. Because the government cannot compel a defendant to admit his conviction formally, it would bear the risk of jury nullification, a risk the Court said might properly drive the government’s charging decision.30
Resemblance to the charges is therefore one source of risk, and the shock value of the record is another. The Court’s test asks only whether the record is arresting enough to lure a juror into bad-character reasoning, which a vivid record can satisfy without resembling the charge and a resembling record can satisfy without being vivid.
Justice O’Connor’s dissent disputed that this risk is unfair prejudice at all. She allowed that the petitioner’s case may have been damaged when the jury heard the name of his crime, but she could not agree that it was unfairly prejudicial for the government to establish an essential element with direct proof of the prior conviction.31 The majority answered by asking what the record added beyond what the offered admission already supplied: the name of the prior offense “addressed no detail in the definition of the prior-conviction element that would not have been covered by the stipulation or admission.”32 With the stipulation matching the record’s legitimate value, the propensity risk had almost nothing on the other pan of the scale to answer it, which is how the majority could call the prejudice unfair even though the record proved an element.33 That step is the subject of the next subsection, and the dissent returns in full in the last.
Discounting for Alternative Proof
Rule 403 directs the judge to weigh an item’s probative value against the listed dangers and permits exclusion only when those dangers substantially outweigh it.35 The text does not say how to measure the value side, and Old Chief filled the gap: what counts as Rule 403 “probative value,” as distinct from Rule 401 “relevance,” “may be calculated by comparing evidentiary alternatives.”36 The idea extends the familiar point that probative value depends partly on need, since an item is worth less when the record already holds other proof of the same fact. Old Chief applies that point to a specific substitute offered on the very question the item is offered to prove.
The Court considered two understandings of the rule. The first treats each item by itself, setting its own probative value against its own risk. The second compares the item with the alternatives, so that the judge takes account of the full evidentiary context of the case.37 Under the second, the judge first decides on objection whether the item raises a danger of unfair prejudice. If it does, the judge evaluates the degrees of probative value and unfair prejudice for the item and for any actually available substitutes. When a substitute has substantially the same or greater probative value and a lower danger of unfair prejudice, sound judicial discretion discounts the value of the item first offered, and the judge excludes that item if its discounted value is substantially outweighed by the unfairly prejudicial risk.38
The Court chose the second understanding, and its objection to the first concerns incentives. Under the first, a party could structure a trial to produce the maximum unfair prejudice consistent with relevance, choosing the route that carries the greatest threat of improper influence even though a less prejudicial and equally probative route exists. The worst result would be a ruling sustaining the objection, after which the party could fall back on the substitute. The Court called that “a strange rule.”39 Comparison closes the gap, because the cleaner substitute is already before the judge when the ruling is made and lowers the riskier item’s value before the scale is read.40 Leading with the riskier item gains the proponent nothing.
The Court did not rest the comparison on the text of Rule 403 alone. Three Advisory Committee Notes point the same way:
- The Note to Rule 401 says that a party’s concession is pertinent to the court’s discretion to exclude evidence on the conceded point, and that a concession will sometimes “call for the exclusion of evidence offered to prove [the] point conceded by the opponent.”41
- The Note to Rule 403 says that when a court considers whether to exclude for unfair prejudice, the “availability of other means of proof may . . . be an appropriate factor.”42
- The Note to Rule 404(b), which addresses an item that is legitimate evidence of an element and illegitimate evidence of character, directs the court to decide whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs probative value “in view of the availability of other means of proof.”43
Taken together, the Notes show that when Rule 403 makes exclusion discretionary by providing that evidence “may” be excluded, the judge’s discretion may be informed not only by assessing an item’s twin tendencies but by setting the result alongside similar assessments of the alternatives.44
The discount operates on probative value, and the evidence it touches stays relevant. Rule 401 asks only whether an item tends to make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and other proof of the same fact does not remove that tendency. The Court accordingly accepted that the name of Old Chief’s prior offense was technically relevant even though it added nothing to what his offered admission covered.45 A substitute changes how much the item adds, and that increment is what Rule 403 weighs: a concession lowers probative value and leaves relevance intact.46 Two consequences follow for framing an objection. It is a Rule 403 objection, so the objector must still show a danger that substantially outweighs the discounted value, because the discount shrinks one pan of the scale without removing the margin the rule requires. And an argument that the record is irrelevant because of the stipulation misplaces the doctrine, since the judge would answer that relevance was settled under Rule 401 and only the balance remains.
Old Chief shows the comparison at work. The defendant faced assault and firearm counts alongside the felon-in-possession count, his earlier conviction was for assault, and he offered to admit that he had a qualifying felony. The Court began with the danger, which the preceding subsection described. It then asked what the offer was worth. Old Chief’s proffered admission would have been “not merely relevant but seemingly conclusive evidence of the element,” because the statute shows no congressional concern with the name or nature of the prior offense beyond what is needed to place it within the broad category of qualifying felonies, and Old Chief clearly meant to admit that his felony qualified.47
The result followed from that equivalence. The name of the prior offense, though technically relevant, “addressed no detail in the definition of the prior-conviction element that would not have been covered by the stipulation or admission.”48 The Court found no cognizable difference between the evidentiary significance of the admission and the legitimately probative component of the official record; the two kinds of proof were distinguishable only by the risk inherent in the one and wholly absent from the other.49 With the record’s value on status discounted to what the admission already supplied, the probative side of the scale held almost nothing, while the danger of propensity reasoning sat on the other side unchanged. The risk of unfair prejudice therefore substantially outweighed the discounted value, and admitting the record when an admission was available was an abuse of discretion.50 The record stayed relevant under Rule 401 and became excludable only through the Rule 403 comparison.
Old Chief’s own admission is not the only substitute a judge may weigh. The Court observed that other means of proof besides a formal admission may obligate a district court, on proper objection, to exclude the name of the offense, and that a redacted record of conviction is the one most frequently mentioned. Any such alternative requires some jury instruction to explain it. The government may even propose a redacted judgment for the trial court to weigh against a defendant’s offer to admit.51
The discount does not follow automatically from the existence of another item on the same point. The mere fact that two pieces of evidence might go to the same point does not mean that only one of them may come in, and the judge must make the calculation with an appreciation of the offering party’s need for evidentiary richness and narrative integrity.52 Even under the comparison method, a defendant’s offer to concede a point generally cannot prevail over the government’s choice to offer evidence showing guilt and all the circumstances surrounding the offense.53 The discount is thus only as large as the overlap between the item and its substitute, and a substitute that proves less than the item leaves part of the item’s value in place.
Old Chief’s offer reached the element in full, which is why the comparison there came out the other way. The next subsection takes up the general rule that a party may prove its case with evidence of its own choosing, and the Court’s account of why a status element is an unusual place for that rule to give way. The Court itself said that the prosecutor’s choice will generally survive Rule 403 analysis when a defendant seeks to force an admission in place of evidence creating a coherent narrative of the charged conduct.54
The third step decides most cases, because the discount is only as large as the overlap between the item and its substitute. An admission that covers the whole of what a record legitimately proves supports a large discount, as in Old Chief, while a partial concession supports a small one or none.
The Right to Tell a Story
Old Chief’s holding on a stipulated conviction sits beside a general rule that favors the party offering evidence, and the Court stated that rule before explaining why it did not control. The government answered Old Chief’s offer by arguing that a prosecutor may prove a case with evidence of the prosecutor’s own choosing, so that a criminal defendant cannot stipulate or admit his way out of the full force of the case as the government presents it. The government grounded the rule in Parr v. United States, which speaks of the “fair and legitimate weight” that conventional evidence carries and that a bare admission cannot supply. The Court called the rule “unquestionably true as a general matter.”57
The rule works inside the Rule 403 comparison, because it limits how large a discount an offered substitute can earn. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the proponent may present otherwise admissible evidence for the fair and legitimate weight it would have with the trier of fact.58 The rule is needed because the party with the most to fear from vivid proof is the party who would offer to concede it. If a concession could displace the proof, a defendant could drain the force from the prosecution’s strongest item by agreeing in the abstract that its subject is true. The Court gave three grounds of support for the prosecutor’s right of evidentiary choice, and each names something a concession cannot supply.59
The first ground is descriptive richness. Testimony and tangible things do more than satisfy the formal definition of an offense; they tell a story, and a single item may speak to many elements at once. The account of a shooting that establishes capacity and causation may tell just as much about the triggerman’s motive and intent.60 A stipulation answers only the proposition the opponent chose to concede, so it replaces only the slice of the item’s value that lies on that proposition, and the discount for alternative proof shrinks as the overlap shrinks. An offer that does not cover every purpose for which the evidence is relevant does not exclude it at all.61
The second ground concerns what a verdict demands of jurors. Evidence has force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning: as its pieces come together, a narrative gains momentum, with power not only to support conclusions but to sustain the willingness of jurors to draw the inferences, whatever they may be, necessary to reach an honest verdict.62 The prosecution may therefore fairly place its evidence before the jurors as much to tell “a story of guiltiness” as to support an inference of guilt, to convince them that a guilty verdict would be morally reasonable as much as to point to the discrete elements of a defendant’s legal fault.63
The third ground concerns what jurors expect to hear. A syllogism is not a story, and a naked proposition in a courtroom may be no match for the robust evidence that would be used to prove it. Jurors who hear a story interrupted by gaps of abstraction may be puzzled at the missing chapters, and jurors asked to rest a momentous decision on the story’s truth may feel put upon at being asked to take responsibility knowing that more could be said than they have heard. When economy becomes a break in the natural sequence of narrative evidence, an assurance that the missing link is really there is never more than second best.64
The right of choice has a boundary, and Old Chief itself drew it. The need for evidentiary depth to tell a continuous story has virtually no application when the point at issue is a defendant’s legal status, which depends on a judgment rendered wholly independently of the concrete events of the later criminal behavior charged.65 Each of the three grounds fails for its own reason when the element is felon status:
- Descriptive richness has nothing to attach to. The choice of proof for a status element lies between propositions of slightly varying abstraction, either a record saying that a conviction occurred at a certain time or a statement admitting the same thing without naming the offense, and a record admissible only to prove status has no multiple utility to lose.66
- Moral weight is not at stake. The events behind the prior conviction do not feed the jurors’ sense of obligation to vindicate the public interest, and Congress made plain that distinctions among generic felonies do not count: a defendant falls within the category by virtue of a past conviction for any qualifying crime “ranging from possession of short lobsters” upward.67
- Juror expectation is not disappointed. Status lies entirely outside the natural sequence of what the defendant is charged with thinking and doing, so proving it without naming the offense leaves no gap in the story and does not read as an officious substitution.68
With all three grounds out of the picture, the Court found no cognizable difference between the evidentiary significance of an admission and that of the legitimately probative part of the official record, so the two were distinguishable only by the risk that sits in the record and is absent from the admission.69 That equivalence lets the discount reach its full size. The Court then stated both halves as general rules. When proof of convict status is at issue and the prior offense is likely to support conviction on some improper ground, admitting the record when an admission is available will generally be an abuse of discretion, while the prosecutor’s choice will generally survive Rule 403 when a defendant seeks to force the substitution of an admission for evidence creating a coherent narrative of his thoughts and actions in committing the charged offense.70 The same stipulation that cannot displace a robbery victim’s account therefore does displace the name of an earlier conviction, because the victim’s account belongs to the story of the charged conduct and the name of the conviction sits outside it.
The status boundary holds only while the record has no other job. The substitution question normally arises only when the record of conviction would be inadmissible for any purpose beyond proving status, and if the nature of the earlier act were admissible on another issue, such as motive, intent, or identity, Rule 404(b) guarantees the chance to seek its admission.71 Evidence with a second use keeps the multiple utility that a status stipulation does not reach.
The general rule also explains why gruesome photographs usually survive an offer to stipulate. Photographs do not become cumulative and inadmissible merely because oral testimony or a stipulation covers the same general subject, and even where a defendant offers to stipulate to each fact the photograph proves, it may come in on the theory that the prosecution may prove every element or that the photograph carries moral weight.72 In Edwards v. United States, for example, the court admitted photographs of the body over an offer to stipulate to identity and cause of death, and held that Old Chief did not require a different result. The comparison with alternatives still counts, however: the availability of other evidence on the point, such as testimony from the investigating officer and the medical examiner on cause of death, diminishes the need for the photographs and so figures in the Rule 403 decision.73 A later section returns to photographs in practice.
Dissent and Limits of the Holding
Justice O’Connor’s dissent charged that the Court’s rule “misapplies Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and upsets, without explanation, longstanding precedent regarding criminal prosecutions.”75 The majority’s rule is the law, but the dissent repays study, because each of its objections marks a place where the holding is narrower than a first reading suggests. The first half of this subsection follows the dissent, and the second half collects the limits.
The dissent’s first objection goes to the word “unfair.” The Court, she wrote, “never explains precisely why” it is unfair prejudice for the government to prove an essential element directly with evidence revealing the name or basic nature of the defendant’s prior conviction; it notes only that such evidence may lead a jury to infer a propensity to commit crime.76 She illustrated the point with the other element of the offense. The government proved that the defendant possessed a 9-mm. semiautomatic pistol, though possession of any number of weapons would have satisfied § 922(g)(1), and in a murder case the government may prove the victim’s identity although the jury strictly has no “need” to know the name and the victim may be a well loved public figure. “The same logic should govern proof of the prior conviction element of the § 922(g)(1) offense.”77
The dissent also met the propensity concern head on. Rule 404(b) expressly contemplates evidence of prior crimes for other purposes, and where a prior conviction is an element of the charged offense, neither Rule 404(b) nor Rule 403 can bar its admission, because the government tenders the evidence as direct proof of a necessary element and not to prove bad character or action in conformity with it. To say that such proof “unfairly” prejudices the defendant, she wrote, “misreads the Rules of Evidence and defies common sense.”78 The two opinions part on what the evidence’s legitimate function does to the analysis. The dissent treats proof of an element as legitimate and so beyond complaint, while the majority asked what the record added beyond what the admission already supplied.
The second objection rests on the burden of proof. A defendant’s tactical decision not to contest an element does not remove the prosecution’s burden: a defendant may contest the government’s proof on every element, concede some and contest others, or do nothing at all, and the government still carries the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on each element.79 The dissent added that a defendant who “concedes” a prior felony may be trying to take the issue from the jury altogether by effectively entering a partial plea of guilty, something the Court had never endorsed, and it noted that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a) permits a jury waiver only with the government’s consent.80
The third objection answers the majority’s claim that a status stipulation leaves no gap in the story. A jury, the dissent said, is as likely to be puzzled by a “missing chapter” after a stipulation to a prior felony as after a concession on any other element. The jury may wonder why it has not been told the name of the crime, or why the defendant’s possession was illegal given the tradition of lawful gun ownership, and doubt about the criminality of the conduct may influence the jury when it considers the possession element.81
The fourth objection invokes the ordinary remedy. The dissent pointed to the cautionary instruction the jury received, reasoned that jurors are presumed to follow such an instruction, and concluded that the instruction offset whatever prejudice the prior conviction created.82 The majority reached the opposite result. The disagreement connects to the preceding discussion of limiting instructions as an alternative to exclusion: how far the presumption that jurors follow instructions can carry a record that invites propensity reasoning.
The dissent lost, so the practical question is how far the majority’s rule travels, and the majority’s own opinion answers narrowly. The Court said that its discussion was general only because of Rule 403’s general wording and that its holding is limited to cases involving proof of felon status. It added that a defendant on appeal must establish an abuse of discretion, a standard not met by a mere showing of some alternative means of proof that the prosecution, in its broad discretion, chose not to rely upon.83 The limit tracks the reason the discount worked. A status element rests on a prior judgment independent of the charged events, so an admission gives up none of the narrative detail that justifies the government’s ordinary freedom. Evidence that tells the story of the charged conduct has no such feature, and an opponent cannot concede it away.
Outside the status setting, the prosecutor’s ordinary latitude remains in force. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the proponent may present otherwise admissible evidence for the fair and legitimate weight it would carry with the factfinder.84 An offer to concede must also match the evidence, since one that fails to cover every purpose for which the evidence is relevant will not exclude it.85 Even inside the status setting, a formal admission is not the only substitute a court may weigh. The Court named a redacted record of conviction as the alternative most often mentioned, and the government may propose one for the court to weigh against the defendant’s offer.86
Courts have also declined to carry the holding into prior acts offered under Rule 404(b) to show intent and similar points. The Court itself said its holding did not apply to prior crimes offered for such purposes, and federal courts decline to require exclusion in that setting.87 In United States v. Cassell, a felon-in-possession trial, the defense did not contest knowledge or intent, and the government was still allowed to show other instances to prove those points. The reason is that such evidence has a legitimate use beyond status, so a concession cannot supply everything the evidence legitimately proves. A stipulation on mental state still matters, because it sharply reduces the need for proof of other acts and so lowers their probative value, and some federal courts, including the en banc Seventh Circuit in United States v. Gomez, have suggested that such a stipulation may render prior bad acts inadmissible under Rule 404(b).88 The usual result is that the stipulation enters the Rule 403 weighing as one factor and does not displace the evidence as a matter of course.
One last limit comes from what a stipulation would leave out of the trial. Trial judges should be wary of forcing stipulations that drain the moral foundation of a law from the case. If a stipulation were drafted to keep the jury from learning that the defendant is a felon at all, jurors, some of whom might hold strong Second Amendment beliefs, might fear that the law made gun possession itself a crime and acquit out of concern about an overbroad law. That approach would pose a substantial risk of draining the moral underpinnings of the law from the case, something Old Chief cautions against.89 An admission that the felony element is proved differs from an approach that keeps the felony from the jury altogether, and Old Chief’s offer was of the first kind.
The first step does the sorting. A conviction used only as an element belongs in the narrow setting the majority addressed, while evidence offered for a purpose that carries its own story or a mental-state point falls back under the proponent’s ordinary freedom to prove the case as it chooses.