Concept
Relevance and Admissibility
Relevancy
Relevance and Admissibility
Rule 402 turns the definition of relevance into a rule about what a court will receive. Relevant evidence is admissible unless the United States Constitution, a federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court provide otherwise, and irrelevant evidence is not admissible.1 The two halves of the rule work differently. The second is a flat bar: evidence with no tendency to prove a fact of consequence never comes in, so a failure under Rule 401 ends the analysis. The first is a default that other law can displace: relevance gives evidence a favorable starting position and nothing more. This unit takes up that default, the rules that displace it, the closed list of places those rules may come from, and the consequence for choosing an objection.
The Presumption of Admissibility
Picture the evidence rules as a hurdles race. The item of evidence is the runner, and each rule is a hurdle, a separate basis for objecting. The runner is admitted only by clearing every hurdle, and one sustained objection ends the race even if every other objection fails.2 Rule 402 is logically the first hurdle. Irrelevant evidence trips there and the race is over; relevant evidence earns only the right to face the hurdles that remain.3 Relevance is therefore necessary for admission and never sufficient, and an answer that calls evidence admissible simply because it is relevant skips every hurdle after the first.
The default favors admission because a trial aims at judgments based on an accurate understanding of the facts. The system of proof therefore presupposes that the parties may present to the court or jury all the evidence that bears on the issues.4 Many rules, such as those on privilege, hearsay, and judicial economy, limit that free proof and keep probative evidence from the factfinder, but each needs its own distinct ground, and absent such a ground the evidence should be received. The converse also holds: evidence without probative value should be excluded.5 Rule 403 confirms the default from the opposite direction. It codifies the judge's power to exclude relevant evidence, but only when unfair prejudice or a similar factor substantially outweighs probative value.6
Irrelevant evidence is barred for two practical reasons. Courts should not waste time receiving worthless information: lawyers free to offer anything that might conceivably help would swell court workloads, and attorneys in seemingly hopeless suits could drag proceedings out for weeks or years in the hope that something would turn up.7 Jurors, too, probably assume that everything they hear bears on the disputed facts, so an item that does not will likely confuse them and may lead them to shoehorn it into the case in some misguided way.8
Rules That Still Exclude
The low threshold of Rule 401 sends a great deal of relevant evidence on to the later hurdles, where rules built for other purposes wait. This subsection offers examples only; other readings teach each rule in full. What the examples share is a trade: each rule gives up some probative evidence to protect a competing interest.
Privilege shows the trade most plainly. The privilege rules reject highly relevant evidence because they protect relationships regarded as important enough to society to justify sacrificing some sources of facts that would aid in bringing out the truth.10 Hearsay and judicial economy likewise cost the factfinder some probative evidence.11 The Constitution and federal statutes appear on Rule 402's own list of sources, so each can displace the default as well.12
Rule 403 is the general counterweight inside the Rules. Unlike the privilege rules, which protect a defined set of relationships, it operates in a generalized way.13 The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.14 The word substantially tips the balance toward admission, so a relevant item of modest value still comes in unless a specific danger weighs heavily against it.
The Closed List of Sources
Rule 402 names four sources, and only those four can supply a rule that excludes relevant evidence: the Constitution, a federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.17 A court therefore cannot keep out relevant evidence by invoking a doctrine that none of the four contains.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. shows the closed list at work. Before the Rules, courts tested scientific evidence under the Frye general-acceptance standard. In 1993 the Court discarded Frye for federal courts in favor of a more flexible approach that was still designed to ensure the reliability of scientific evidence, and in 1999 Kumho Tire extended the Daubert standard to all expert testimony presenting technical or specialized material.18 A general-acceptance requirement appears in none of the four listed sources, so it could not survive as a freestanding ground of exclusion.
The list is closed for a structural reason. If unwritten doctrines could still exclude relevant evidence, the list in Rule 402 would mean little, because any court could rebuild a narrower test of admissibility from the older common law and quietly raise the bar that Rule 401 sets low. Tying every exclusion to a text lets a party find the ground, read it, and argue about its scope.
The common law does not vanish entirely, and two decisions mark where it stops. In United States v. Abel the Court found a common-law precept entirely consistent with Rule 402's general requirement of admissibility and treated the common law as guidance in applying the Rules. In Bourjaily v. United States the Court could not find a particular common-law doctrine in the Rules and held it superseded. The difference is whether the old doctrine fits within what the Rules provide: it may inform how a listed rule is applied, but it cannot supply an exclusion of its own.
An exam stem can test this by describing expert testimony that satisfies the Rules but would have failed under Frye because the technique was not generally accepted. An objection resting only on lack of general acceptance fails, since that requirement comes from none of the four sources. The reliability concern survives, but it runs through the Daubert and Kumho Tire standard rather than through Frye.
Choosing the Objection
Because Rule 401 is so broad, it is not very useful as a basis for excluding evidence in close cases, and the other exclusionary rules exist to limit what relevance unchecked would let in.21 An objection should therefore name the specific rule that fits the problem. The confidential statement to a lawyer in the last hypothetical is relevant, so calling it irrelevant misdescribes it, while naming the privilege identifies the true ground of exclusion.
Irrelevance wins only when the evidence fails one of Rule 401's two conditions: it has no tendency to make a fact more or less probable, as with the plaintiff's favorite food in the force suit, or the fact it addresses is not of consequence to the claim or defense. Either failure puts the item out at the first hurdle, and no further rule needs to be found.
An offer to concede a point is not an objection at all. A party normally has the right to choose the evidence with which she wishes to prove her case, and an opponent ordinarily cannot block that evidence by offering admissions or stipulations.22 One ground for that right is practical: an item of evidence very often proves more than one point, so conceding one point does not justify excluding the item.23