Concept
Who May Contradict
Contradiction
Who May Contradict
Rule 607 answers the question in the broadest terms: any party, including the party that called the witness, may attack the witness's credibility.1 The adversary's freedom to do so surprises no one. The calling party's freedom is the notable part. A lawyer may put a witness on the stand and then offer other evidence that the witness got a fact wrong. The rule asks only who is attacking, and it attaches no condition about surprise or about harm to the lawyer's case. The breadth of that permission is clearest against the doctrine it replaced.
The common law voucher rule forbade a party to impeach its own witness.2 Its origin is obscure; it is probably a late product of the shift from an inquisitorial to an adversary trial. The ban reached every form of attack, including prior inconsistent statements, attacks on character, and showings of bias, interest, or corruption.3 One feature of the old rule bears directly on contradiction. The voucher rule never forbade a party to introduce other evidence specifically contradicting the facts its own witness had testified to.4 A party whose witness had the facts wrong could always prove the facts another way. What the old rule shut off were the other attacks on the witness.
The first justification for the rule was that a party who calls a witness stands behind that witness's credibility. That premise collapses on a practical fact. Except for character witnesses and experts, a party usually has little or no choice of witnesses. It must call the people who happened to see the events, and it takes those percipient witnesses as it finds them.5 A party cannot guarantee the honesty of a person it had no power to select.
The second justification fares no better, for two reasons. It applies only to two kinds of impeachment, the attack on character and the showing of corruption. And a ban on attack by the calling party leaves that party at the mercy of the witness and the adversary.6 Suppose the truth favors the calling party but the witness has a bad character. If the witness tells the truth, the adversary will attack him. If the witness lies, the adversary has no reason to attack, and under the voucher rule the calling party may not do so either.7 The rule thus protects the very witness who does the most damage. The treatise adds that the rule should never be carried to an absurd extreme: if the witness has been bribed to change his story, the calling party ought to be allowed to expose the bribe.8
The Federal Rules abandon the voucher rule as based upon false premises.9 Evidence bearing on a witness's credibility is relevant under Rule 401 because it makes a fact of consequence more or less probable, and Rule 607 lets any party offer it, including the party that called the witness.10
The calling party's freedom still has an edge. Some courts have refused to let a party impeach its own witness when the party used the witness only as part of a plan to impeach him with material that would be inadmissible for other purposes.11 What purports to be defensive impeachment is then really an effort to bring that material into the trial. The fact finder may then use it improperly as a substantive basis for judgment, when it should serve only as information bearing on the witness's truthfulness. This limit turns on the purpose of the call, not on who is attacking. The discussion of abuse of Rule 607, below, develops it with prior inconsistent statements.
Permission to attack does not carry permission to bolster. The credibility of a witness may not be bolstered in the absence of an attack.12 The reason is practical. When direct examination takes place, no one knows whether the opponent will attack credibility at all. Counsel might waive cross-examination, or cross-examine only to elicit facts that support counsel's own theory of the case. Every minute spent on bolstering would then be wasted. The proponent must therefore ordinarily hold information favorable to the witness's credibility in reserve for rehabilitation on redirect or the next stage of the case.13