Concept
Unidentified Declarants
Impeachment of hearsay declarants
Unidentified Declarants
Rule 806 lets the opponent attack, and then support, a hearsay declarant's credibility with "any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness."1 Every method of attack in this chapter assumes that someone can say who the declarant is. A conviction cannot be found without a name. Bias cannot be traced without a person whose relationships can be examined. An inconsistent remark cannot be located when no one knows whom the declarant spoke to. Miller v. Keating tests that assumption, because the Third Circuit asked whether the excited utterance exception may ever admit a statement by an anonymous declarant.2
The court began by marking the limits of Rule 806. The rule cannot be read to confer a right to any particular form of attack. Nor does it promise cross-examination, since the Rule 803 exceptions share a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the declarant, whether available or not.3 What the rule does confer is a generalized right to attack credibility. That right is significantly diminished when the declarant is unidentified as well as unavailable, because the opponent loses cross-examination and also any "meaningful prospect of finding evidence of inconsistency or bias."4
The court's response makes sense once the exception and Rule 806 are seen working together. An exception such as the excited utterance rule admits a statement because the circumstances of its making vouch for it, and the opponent gives up the chance to question the speaker. Rule 806 gives the opponent something back: the chance to investigate the speaker and put what turns up before the jury. A declarant who is named but cannot be produced leaves that chance intact, since the opponent can still search for a record, a relationship, or an earlier remark. An anonymous declarant leaves the opponent nothing to search for, and the circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness must then justify the statement alone. So the court asks more of that guarantee.
The court did not hold that statements by unidentified declarants are inadmissible for that reason. Such statements come in if they otherwise meet the criteria of Rule 803(2).5 The court instead distinguished two features of a declarant. Unavailability is immaterial to admission under Rule 803, but unidentifiability is germane to the admissibility determination, and a party who offers the statement of an unidentified declarant carries a burden heavier than where the declarant is identified to demonstrate the statement's circumstantial trustworthiness.6 The burden is a higher hurdle, and a proponent who clears it still gets the statement in.
That heavier burden is easiest to see in the requirement that the declarant of an excited utterance personally observe the startling event. The proponent bears the burden of establishing that perception, and the trial judge resolves any dispute of fact necessary to the question by a preponderance of the evidence. The judge may rely on evidence that is not itself admissible, as Rule 104(a) allows, but must still make the findings that support admissibility.7 A named speaker can be placed at the scene, and a witness can say where the speaker stood. An unknown voice leaves the proponent with little beyond the words themselves and the circumstances around them, and perception becomes harder to prove.
A shout from a crowd shows the difference. Compare an unknown voice with a named bystander who speaks the same words.
The words are the same in both scenes, and what changes is whether the opponent has anything to investigate. For the named bystander, Rule 806 works as the earlier sections described, and the proponent faces the ordinary burden on perception. For the unknown voice, the opponent's chance to investigate is gone, so the proponent must supply what the opponent can no longer test. Two errors follow from missing this. One is to declare the anonymous statement inadmissible per se, which the court rejected. The other is to admit it on the usual showing, as if Rule 806 could still do its work, when the court treated the loss of any meaningful way to find bias or inconsistency as a reason to demand more.