Concept
Inconsistent Statements and Conduct
Impeachment of hearsay declarants
Inconsistent Statements and Conduct
Rule 806 treats a hearsay declarant as a witness who never took the stand, and its second sentence makes an adjustment for that absence: “The court may admit evidence of the declarant's inconsistent statement or conduct, regardless of when it occurred or whether the declarant had an opportunity to explain or deny it.”1 The use of inconsistent statements to impeach a hearsay declaration is a subject Rule 806 itself treats.2
Inconsistency is one method of attack among several. The methods run along a continuum, from those aimed at character for truthfulness, like a criminal conviction, through bias, to those aimed at perception, like poor eyesight; inconsistency joins them as another way of giving the jury reason to doubt the speaker.3
The sentence has three working parts. Its last clause lifts a condition that governs live witnesses, and the first subsection takes that up. The words “regardless of when it occurred” and “statement or conduct” control timing and the kind of evidence that counts, and the second subsection covers them.
No Explain-or-Deny Requirement
The clause “whether the declarant had an opportunity to explain or deny it” removes a condition that governs how a live witness is impeached by inconsistency.4 To see what has gone, start with the baseline in Rule 613, which has two parts with different jobs.
Subdivision (a) governs how counsel asks the question. A lawyer who examines a witness about a prior statement need not show it or disclose its contents to the witness, but must, on request, show or disclose it to the adverse party's attorney.5 As the Advisory Committee explained, the disclosure to counsel is designed to protect against unwarranted insinuations that a statement has been made when the fact is to the contrary.6
Subdivision (b) carries the condition that matters here. When the impeaching proof is extrinsic evidence, meaning proof from a source other than the witness's own answers, such as another witness or a document, the witness must be given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement and an adverse party an opportunity to examine the witness about it.7 In United States v. Dennis, the court treated the foundation for a witness's grand jury testimony as laid because the witness had been given the opportunity to explain the apparent contradictions.8 A December 2024 amendment made the sequence explicit: unless the court orders otherwise, the extrinsic evidence may not be admitted until after the witness has had that opportunity.9
The condition is not absolute even for live witnesses. The opportunity may be refused where the interests of justice require, as when counsel learns of the statement only after the witness has left the court's reach.10 Subdivision (b) also does not apply to an opposing party's statement under Rule 801(d)(2),11 and one source adds that statements admitted under a hearsay exception are likewise outside it.12
Everything in subdivision (b) assumes a speaker who is in the courtroom, or can be recalled, to answer. A hearsay declarant is not that speaker. The declarant's words reached the jury through another witness, a document, or a recording, and the declarant is generally not at trial. If the opportunity had to be afforded, few inconsistent statements would ever be admitted to impeach a hearsay declarant, a result contrary to the basic policy of Rule 806 that hearsay declarants can be impeached to the same extent as trial witnesses.13 Rule 806 therefore drops the requirement: the provisions allowing a declarant to deny or explain do not apply, since the declarant may not be available at trial.14
Bar questions on this point turn on one variable: whether the person whose earlier statement is offered testified at this trial or is a declarant whose words came in by hearsay. The instinct that loses points is to carry the live-witness condition over to the declarant.
The two scenes differ only in the status of the speaker. Walt was a witness at this trial, so Rule 613(b) applied and its condition went unmet. Fred never took part in the trial, so the condition has no one to attach to, and Rule 806 sets it aside. Fred's retraction also postdated his remark, which the next subsection explains is no obstacle.
Two cautions keep the relaxation in its place. First, it removes only the opportunity condition. The procedure for impeaching an absent declarant is relaxed, but separate restrictions in other rules are not eliminated.15 Extrinsic evidence of an inconsistency on an incidental matter, for example, can still be barred under Rule 403, because it does not advance the credibility inquiry enough to justify the risk of confusion and delay.16 Second, the Rule 613(b) exemption for an opposing party's statement under Rule 801(d)(2) is a separate provision for a separate category of statement. A prior inconsistent statement should not be confused with an opposing party's statement, and neither exemption should be mistaken for the Rule 806 relaxation.17
Timing and Conduct
Rule 806 admits the declarant's inconsistent statement or conduct “regardless of when it occurred,” and the phrase does real work.19 Live-witness doctrine goes by the label “prior inconsistent statement,” and students who learned it that way often treat the calendar as a threshold and reject a contradiction that postdates the admitted statement. For a hearsay declarant, evidence of the inconsistent statement comes in without regard to the usual rule requiring an opportunity to explain, and by the literal words of the rule nothing requires that the additional statement have been made earlier than the hearsay statement already admitted.20
The result fits what an inconsistency shows. Two accounts from one speaker that cannot both be right give the jury a reason to doubt the speaker whichever account came first. A rule that counted only earlier contradictions would let a declarant escape impeachment on a later retraction, contrary to the policy that hearsay declarants can be impeached to the same extent as trial witnesses.21
The same sentence reaches inconsistent conduct as well as inconsistent words.22 A person who says one thing and then acts as though the opposite were true gives the jury the same reason to doubt the account that a contradiction in words would, and the freedom about timing applies here too, so the conduct may precede or follow the admitted statement. Conduct receives no special route past the other rules of evidence, because Rule 806 relaxes the procedure for impeaching a declarant and leaves separate restrictions, such as Rule 403, in force.23
Timing and conduct widen the field without waiving the requirement that the evidence actually be inconsistent. Rule 806 is where inconsistent-statement impeachment of a hearsay declaration is treated,24 and it supplies the same techniques that discredit a testifying witness, including the need for a genuine conflict.25 The standard is generous, though. A flat contradiction is unnecessary, and it suffices that the other statement varies enough from the account being tested to weaken it, as when a statement placing a defendant in the front seat of a car during a drug transaction conflicts with a later account placing him in the back seat, even though both put him at the transaction.26 A significant omission can also qualify, so an account that leaves out an important point included in the other account gives the jury a reason to doubt the speaker. The weight of the impeachment follows the degree of conflict: inconsistency on important points counts for more than inconsistency on lesser ones, and large discrepancies count for more than small ones.27