Concept
The Rule 806 Principle
Impeachment of hearsay declarants
Impeaching Hearsay Declarants
The Rule 806 Principle
An out-of-court statement can reach the jury while the person who made it stays home. When that statement is admitted as hearsay, the jury is asked to believe a speaker it never sees, and the opposing party needs some way to test whether that speaker deserves belief. Federal Rule of Evidence 806 supplies it. Once a hearsay statement has been admitted, the declarant's credibility "may be attacked, and then supported, by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness."1 The same command applies to a statement described in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E), a group a later section takes up.
The reason for the rule lies in what hearsay asks of the jury. The hearsay rule governs statements offered to prove the truth of what they assert, so the jury must believe the declarant for the statement to do its work, and the declarant's credibility therefore matters.2 Admitting the statement puts the declarant's account before the jury as if the declarant were testifying, and a declarant treated that way should face the same impeachment as a witness who does testify.3 The rule therefore treats the hearsay declarant as a witness for purposes of impeachment and rehabilitation.4 The "as if" is only a yardstick. The declarant is never sworn, and the court asks a single question: which evidence of attack or support would have been admissible had this person taken the stand?
The rule's wording sets two conditions on how it operates. The first is a trigger. Rule 806 speaks of a statement that "has been admitted in evidence," so the right to attack the declarant arises only once the statement is in the record.5 The second is sequence. Credibility is attacked and then supported, so the proponent's chance to bolster the declarant follows the opponent's attack, and neither side is left with a one-sided picture of the speaker.
Character-type evidence has two distinct uses, and the rule speaks to only one of them. Offered substantively, to show that a person acted in conformity with a trait at a particular time, such evidence meets the bar of Rule 404(a)(1). Offered to impeach, to show that someone may have lied, it addresses credibility and does not depend on a propensity inference.6 Rule 806 opens the declarant's credibility to attack. It does not make the declarant's character a substitute for proof of what happened on the occasion in question.
The rule covers statements admitted under hearsay exceptions and admissions. It does not apply to statements that are nonhearsay and not admitted for their truth.7 That boundary follows from the reason for the rule, because the right to attack a declarant exists only where the jury is asked to rely on the declarant.
Three consequences of this parity organize the rest of the chapter. First, the methods of attack track those available against a live witness, so convictions, bias, defects in capacity, and character for untruthfulness all become tools against an absent speaker. Second, procedural requirements that an absent declarant cannot satisfy are relaxed. The clearest example is the live-witness expectation that a prior inconsistent statement be put to the witness for explanation or denial, which gives way here.8 Third, if the party against whom the statement was admitted calls the declarant to the stand, that party may examine the declarant on the statement as if on cross-examination, which permits leading questions.9 None of this requires the declarant to appear in court, because the protection extends to every out-of-court declarant whose statement has been admitted.