Concept
Specific Instances of Conduct
Character for truthfulness
Specific Instances of Conduct
The Rules recognize three ways to show that a witness has a bad character for truthfulness: cross-examination on misconduct that never produced a conviction, cross-examination on convictions, and the use of character witnesses.1 Rule 608(b) governs the first, and it reaches the third when a character witness is cross-examined. Its text states a ban and then a permission. Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness. But the court may, on cross-examination, allow those instances to be inquired into if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of the witness being examined or of another witness whose character that witness has testified about.2 Extrinsic evidence here means proof from any source other than the witness’s own answers on cross-examination, such as another witness or a document offered into evidence.
The two halves answer one problem. Effective cross-examination demands some allowance for going into matters of this kind, but the possibilities of abuse are substantial, so the rule confines what may be asked.3 Proving acts that never produced a conviction through extrinsic evidence would be time-consuming, distracting, prejudicial, and not particularly probative, so the law settles for cross-examination and avoids a trial within a trial on a collateral issue.4 The inference the jury is invited to draw, from an act to a disposition to lie to a lie on the stand, is a propensity inference of the kind the Rules generally prohibit, and they allow it for truthfulness only in the narrow forms this chapter describes.5
The permission comes first because it decides what a cross-examiner may ask, and the ban comes next because it decides what the cross-examiner may do with the answer. The remaining subsections cover the limits of the ban, the rule’s second branch for character witnesses, and the line between this rule and Rule 609.
Misconduct Questions on Cross
Rule 608(b)(1) lets the court allow a cross-examiner to ask a witness about the witness’s own past conduct if the conduct is probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.6 The conduct need not have been a crime, and it need not have led to a conviction. Provided the cross-examiner has a good-faith basis, the court may permit inquiry into offenses that produced no conviction and into acts of misconduct that were never crimes.7 The decision rests in the trial judge’s discretion, and three controls guide it: the cross-examiner’s basis for asking, the kind of act asked about, and the judge’s balance of value against danger.
The danger lies in the question itself. A question that accuses a witness of lying puts the accusation before the jury whatever the witness answers, and the cross-examiner may not prove it afterward. Each control answers a version of that risk.8
The first control answers the groundless question. The text of Rule 608(b) says nothing about good faith, but courts require the cross-examiner to believe in good faith that the event occurred, which means taking reasonable steps to confirm it.9 Michelson v. United States shows the concern: the trial judge there first satisfied himself that the arrest the prosecutor wished to ask about had in fact occurred, so that a groundless question would not “waft an unwarranted innuendo into the jury box.”10 A questioner who cannot show a basis should expect the court to bar the question.11
The second control filters acts by subject matter. The act must be probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness, because Rule 608(b) covers attacks on truthfulness and nothing else.12 Acts that qualify will normally involve a dishonest act or false statement of the kind that makes a conviction admissible under Rule 609(a)(2): deceit, untruthfulness, falsification, some element of active misrepresentation.13 An act that shows a bad temper or a heavy foot on the accelerator says nothing about lying, so asking about it would invite only the inference that the witness is a bad person generally. The usual error is to ask whether the act was wrong, or even criminal. The rule asks whether the act shows a disposition to deceive. Probative value also varies from act to act. Filing false statements on a retail-license application clearly involves deceit and has relatively strong probative force; drunken or disorderly conduct has little bearing on willingness to testify truthfully; and theft, if unaccompanied by falsehood or stealth, falls somewhere between. Given those possibilities, courts have divided over many acts.14
Courts have approved a question about lying on an employment application by answering “no” when asked whether the applicant had ever been convicted (United States v. Howard).15 They have refused questions about conduct that does not involve deceit: State v. Moses held that a witness’s adulterous relationship cannot be asked about because it does not relate directly to truthfulness.16
Bribery shows how fine the line can be. In United States v. Rosa, the trial judge allowed extensive cross-examination about an underlying fraud but limited cross-examination about the witness’s alleged bribery. The court of appeals affirmed. Bribery, it said, “is not the kind of conduct which bears on truthfulness or untruthfulness,” and even if bribery were minimally probative, the extensive examination already permitted on the fraud meant the judge did not abuse his discretion in limiting the rest.17 Other courts have gone the other way: United States v. Irwin appears among the cases approving a question to a government agent about accepting bribes in the performance of official duties.18 A fact pattern involving bribery therefore calls for asking whether the particular conduct involved deception, with Rosa as authority for exclusion where it did not.
A question that clears both controls still faces the judge’s balance. Rule 403 weighs the question’s probative value on credibility against the danger of unfair prejudice, and Rule 611(a)(3) lets the court protect witnesses from harassment and undue embarrassment.19 Courts consider the centrality of the witness’s testimony, whether the witness is a party, whether the act is likely to inflame the jury, and how strongly the act points to untruthfulness.20 Remoteness in time counts too. Congress deleted it as an express requirement, but it remains relevant to probative value under Rule 403, and so does the probable effectiveness of a limiting instruction under Rule 105.21 A question about padded expense reports weighs toward admission when it is put to the only eyewitness about reports he padded last year. It weighs the other way for reports padded thirty years ago, because the old act says little about disposition today. On appeal, the question is only whether the judge abused that discretion, as Rosa illustrates. The inquiry runs on cross-examination, and the witness’s answer ordinarily ends the matter, for reasons the next subsection explains.
Taking the Witness’s Answer
The permission to ask comes with a flat ban on proving the answer. Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness.24 The cross-examiner may ask whether the witness did the act, but the answer is the only evidence of the act the jury will hear. The matter is collateral, and the cross-examiner must take the answer the witness gives.25 The ban runs both ways because the rule speaks of attacking or supporting: a proponent cannot rehabilitate a witness by proving honest deeds through a second witness any more than an opponent can prove dishonest ones. And the ban matters only when the witness denies the act, because an admission is itself testimony and needs no other proof.
The ban rests on a comparison of cost and payoff. Proving an old act through other witnesses would create a trial within the trial: the opponent would answer with witnesses of its own, the parties would dispute what happened and what it meant, and the jury would lose track of the issue actually being tried.26 The payoff is small, because the proof would support only the chain from act to untruthful character to a lie on the stand, an inference the Rules generally disfavor.27 Leaving the question and the denial before the jury keeps most of the value of the impeachment at a fraction of the expense. Courts describe the arrangement as the balance the collateral-evidence doctrine strikes for impeachment by contradiction: a prior lie may be elicited on cross because credibility always matters, but extrinsic proof is barred because a mini-trial would bring confusion, prejudice, and waste of time.28 A conviction is different because proof of it is simple and indisputable, which is why Rule 608(b) opens with an exception for convictions and sends them to Rule 609.29
Return to the collision case. The defense asks Wendy whether she padded an expense report at her last job, and she denies it. Xander, called in the defense’s own case, may give his opinion that Wendy is untruthful, because opinion and reputation are the forms the Rules allow for attacking character for truthfulness.30 Xander may not testify that he watched her pad the report, because that account is extrinsic proof of the specific act she denied, and the defense may not offer the report itself. Opinion and reputation are open routes to Wendy’s character. A recounted episode is not.
None of this leaves the examiner silent after a denial. The witness’s first answer is not necessarily the last, and some badgering seems permitted so long as it stays within the cross-examination.31 A rephrased question to the witness produces only more testimony from the witness. What re-asking cannot produce is a second source of proof, and repeated questions after a clear denial invite a harassment objection, which the court may sustain under Rule 611(a)(3).32 Everything in this subsection assumes the party cares about the act only to show the witness’s character for truthfulness. The next subsection takes up what happens when the act matters for another reason.
Limits of the Extrinsic Bar
The bar on extrinsic proof reaches less far than its flat wording suggests, and the purpose clause explains why. The rule bars extrinsic evidence of specific instances only when it is offered to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness.35 It regulates one use of the evidence, the chain from act to lying disposition to lie on the stand, and it says nothing about the same act offered for another reason. Admissibility of specific acts offered for any other purpose lies outside Rule 608.36
The older wording hid this limit. The rule spoke of attacking or supporting “credibility,” a word broad enough to suggest that any proof aimed at making a witness less believable fell inside the ban.37 The 2003 amendment replaced “credibility” with “character for truthfulness,” which expresses what was always intended: Rule 608(b) covers attacks on truthfulness and nothing else.38
A rule of thumb sorts the cases. The bar applies only when a party offers evidence to contradict a witness’s denial of a bad act that was raised only to challenge the witness’s character for truthfulness. When the party offers the evidence for any other relevant purpose, the bar is inapplicable.39 Rule 608(b) is the only Federal Rule that bans extrinsic evidence to disprove a witness’s denial, which is one reason its reach has caused so much confusion. The working question is what else the evidence proves besides a lying disposition. If the answer is nothing, the cross-examiner is stuck with the denial. If the answer is something, the bar steps aside and ordinary relevance and Rule 403 govern. The test follows from the reason for the bar: extrinsic proof of an act that shows only character is expensive and pays little, while evidence with a second use is evidence the jury needs whatever it thinks of the witness’s character.
Attempts to escape the bar by relabeling propensity proof fail. In United States v. White, the court of appeals held that the proffered evidence about government witness Northcutt “could have served only one function: to demonstrate that Northcutt had a proclivity to lie and therefore was probably lying in this case.” Rule 404(b) prohibits extrinsic act evidence for that purpose, and Rule 608 bars proof of a witness’s specific instances of misconduct by extrinsic evidence when the purpose is to attack credibility, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it.40 United States v. Aponte reached the same result for statements by a witness named Quiles: whatever else might be said of them, the statements “were excludable as extrinsic evidence of the character and conduct of Quiles.”41 Evidence must satisfy every rule that applies to it, and a new label on the offer does not change what the evidence proves.
Contradiction on a point that matters to the case is a second purpose. If a defendant testifies that he first saw the plaintiff’s yellow Ford just before impact, the plaintiff may offer a passenger’s testimony that both occupants saw the car a full block away and talked about it. The testimony contradicts the defendant, and Rule 608(b) does not apply.42
Bias is the most common second purpose. A witness with a reason to favor one side is less reliable for that reason, whatever kind of person the witness is, so proof of bias answers a different question from the one Rule 608(b) regulates. In United States v. Abel, the Supreme Court held that Rule 608(b) does not apply to efforts to prove bias.43 The evidence there concerned a secret prison sect sworn to perjury and self-protection, whose attributes bore directly on the source and strength of the witness’s bias. Shared membership in a loosely knit group with no connection to the litigation, such as a book club, would support little or no inference of bias.44 Evidence of bias may also consist of acts that are not falsehoods at all: proof that a prosecution witness committed another crime for which he is not being prosecuted suggests a motive to please the prosecution.45 Lindemann shows the same distinction from the rebuttal side. The defense suggested that the cooperating witness, Burns, would not have received a plea deal unless he supplied a “big fish” like Lindemann, and the government wanted to answer by showing that the indictment and Burns’s cooperation grew out of a much larger investigation involving the killing of fifteen horses, including Charisma.46 That evidence addressed Burns’s motive for testifying, not his character for truthfulness.
Three other familiar techniques escape the bar for the same reason, because each proves something beyond a lying disposition:
- A conviction admissible under Rule 609 may be proved extrinsically when the witness denies it, because proof of a conviction is simple and indisputable.47
- A prior inconsistent statement the witness denies making may be proved through a person who heard it.48
- A witness who claims to have been sober when the event occurred may be contradicted with evidence that he was intoxicated.49
Rule 608(b) also leaves ordinary background questions alone. A witness’s occupation and related background bear on how much credit the testimony deserves and may be inquired into as a matter of right on both direct and cross-examination, and the witness’s place of residence may likewise be elicited on either.50
Clearing the bar does not guarantee admission. Evidence outside Rule 608(b) must still be relevant and survive Rule 403, and judges use that rule to keep trials moving when the point to be contradicted is of little importance or is highly disputed.51 Abel illustrates the relevance half of that requirement, since the strength of an inference of bias depends on the kind of group or relationship involved.52
Cross-Examining Character Witnesses
Rule 608(b)(2) gives the cross-examiner a second target for questions about specific acts. When a character witness has testified to another witness’s character for truthfulness, the court may allow the cross-examiner to ask that character witness about specific instances of the principal witness’s conduct that are probative of the principal witness’s truthfulness or untruthfulness.55 The earlier questions put a witness’s own conduct to that witness. Here the conduct belongs to the principal witness, and the person who must answer is the one who vouched for, or condemned, the principal witness. Specific instances of the principal witness’s conduct may not be offered on direct examination to support the character witness’s testimony, so they enter, if at all, on cross.56 The ban on extrinsic evidence carries over, so the answers do no more than test the character witness.
The permission rests on what a character witness gives the jury. A reputation or an opinion is only as good as the information behind it, and the cross-examiner tests that information by naming an act a well-informed witness would be expected to know about. If the character witness never heard of the act, the testimony may rest on thin information, and a reputation witness who missed such talk may not be plugged into the community at all.57 If the witness knew of the act and still vouches for the principal witness, the witness is either lying or using a rather strange standard for evaluating good character.58
Suppose Gram testifies that Gardner is honest, and the cross-examiner asks whether Gram knew of specific incidents of dishonesty by Gardner. If Gram did not know of them, he lacked important information about her; if he did know of them, his good opinion of her honesty is hard to understand.59 The questions are damaging whichever way the character witness answers, and the cross-examiner needs no admission from Gardner herself.
At common law the form of the question followed the form of the direct testimony. A reputation witness was asked, “Have you heard that . . . ?” because reputation consists of what people say, and an opinion witness was asked whether the witness knew or was aware, because an opinion rests on the witness’s own information.60 The Federal Rules abandon the distinction. The character witness may be asked directly about the principal witness’s specific acts probative of untruthfulness and also about familiarity with the principal witness’s convictions, arrests, and indictments, since all of these bear naturally on the principal witness’s reputation and on the character witness’s opinion.61
The acts must still fit the trait the character witness addressed. Courts usually deem specific instances involving dishonesty or false statement sufficiently probative of untruthfulness, and such acts are fair game on cross-examination even without a conviction.62 United States v. Curtis states the matching limit on cross-examining character witnesses: an opinion witness may be examined only on matters bearing on his own opinion, a reputation witness only on matters reasonably proximate to the time of the alleged offense and likely known to the relevant community, and the cross must be confined to conduct relevant to the trait the direct testimony addressed.63 Impeaching a witness who vouched for non-violence, for instance, should not open the door to specific instances of lying.64
Whatever the form of the question, the cross-examiner must have a good-faith basis in fact for asking it. If the opponent objects and the cross-examiner cannot demonstrate a basis at sidebar, the judge should bar the inquiry.65 The requirement carries special weight here because the question itself delivers the accusation. A character witness who answers no does not erase the suggestion, and the cross-examiner cannot prove the act. Questions asked without a reasonable basis amount to gross misconduct.66
The second control is the bar on extrinsic proof. The cross-examiner must take the character witness’s answer and may not prove the underlying act through other witnesses.67 The 2003 Advisory Committee Note describes the prohibition as absolute “when the sole reason for proffering that evidence is to attack the witness’ character for truthfulness,” and that condition is met here, since the only legitimate relevance of the answers is to the character witness’s credibility.68
The rule reaches only a principal witness who actually testified. In United States v. Anderson, a witness named Thibodeau gave his view that a man named Besore was trustworthy. Besore never testified: the government tried to subpoena him, and he never appeared at any point in the trial.69 The defense wanted to bring out Besore’s felony conviction through Thibodeau’s cross-examination, and the court rejected the effort on two grounds. Rule 608(b)(2) allows inquiry about the character of another witness, and Besore, who never took the stand, was not a witness. And Thibodeau’s praise neither attacked nor supported the credibility of a witness, because Besore gave no testimony.70 The defense also argued that the real target was Thibodeau’s own credibility, but Rule 608(b) refers to specific instances of the conduct of a witness, so Besore’s conviction could not enter through the back door.71 The threshold follows from what Rule 608 regulates, the credibility of people whose testimony the jury must weigh. An opinion about an absent person neither supports nor attacks anyone’s testimony, and answering it with that person’s record would turn one witness’s cross-examination into a trial of someone the jury never heard.
The rule’s second branch also reaches a party who impeaches through opinion or reputation for untruthfulness. Rule 608(b)(2) is not directly concerned with how to impeach by opinion or reputation for non-veracity. It concerns how to attack, by testing his familiarity with the subject of his testimony, a witness who has made such an attempt. The specific instances are therefore good rather than bad, and they are acts of the person being testified about, not of the witness being cross-examined.72 The provision completes the picture by showing what a party opens the door to by attempting impeachment through opinion or reputation, although just which acts are probative of truthfulness is not self-evident.73
Rule 608(b) Versus Rule 609
Rule 608(b) opens with a carve-out: “Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609.”77 The clause does not fold convictions into Rule 608(b), as if a conviction were one more specific act the cross-examiner may ask about and must then leave at the witness’s answer. It does the opposite. Rule 609 is a separate rule, with its own conditions, for attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness by evidence of a criminal conviction, and Rule 608(b) steps aside when the conduct ended in one.78
The two regimes exist because the proof behind them differs. An act that produced no conviction is uncertain and costly to prove, and its payoff is the disfavored chain from act to untruthful character to a false answer today.79 A conviction rests on the same linked inferences, and the Rules admit it as an exception to the general prohibition on propensity evidence.80 What differs is the ease of proof: proof of a conviction is simple and indisputable.81 A conviction, subject to Rule 609, may therefore be proved extrinsically, while an act offered only for credibility is handled by asking the witness and accepting the reply.
In Childers v. Commonwealth, the court found that a majority of the federal circuits sort specific instances of conduct into two groups: conduct that led to a criminal conviction is governed exclusively by Rule 609, and conduct that did not is governed by Rule 608.82 The court relied on the Advisory Committee’s note, which explains that the phrase “other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609” was not meant to bring convictions within Rule 608 or to open their nature and detail to question. The phrase simply recognizes that impeachment by conviction is an exception to the general rule excluding evidence of specific incidents.83
The exclusivity has practical bite. Rule 609(b) imposes extra conditions on a conviction more than ten years old, measured from the conviction or the release from confinement, whichever is later.84 A cross-examiner who could skip those conditions by asking about the same fraud as a free-standing act under Rule 608(b) would leave Rule 609(b) with nothing to do, so the conduct underlying a conviction is not available as a Rule 608(b) question.
The two rules also differ in what they reach. Rule 609(a)(1) covers any crime punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year, whatever the crime was. The evidence must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a civil case or when the witness is not the criminal defendant, and it is admitted when the witness is the defendant only if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect to that defendant. Rule 609(a)(2) covers any crime at all, however light the punishment, if establishing its elements required proving or admitting a dishonest act or false statement, and it requires admission.85 A felony conviction is therefore eligible for impeachment even when the crime says little about honesty, though the strength of the inference varies with the offense. Perjury, embezzlement, fraud, and tax evasion yield strong inferences about truth-telling, while manslaughter or reckless driving shows chiefly a disrespect for the law.86 Rule 608(b) has no comparable breadth, because it reaches only acts probative of truthfulness. A barroom assault that never produced a conviction cannot be raised under Rule 608(b), yet a felony conviction for that assault falls within Rule 609(a)(1), subject to the balancing that rule requires. Whether a judgment of conviction exists therefore decides more than the method of proof, because it also decides which misconduct the jury may hear about at all.
Where no judgment of conviction exists, the underlying act is tested under Rule 608(b). Impeachment by conviction also leaves a clean appellate record: when the witness testifies and the conviction is used, the ruling is reviewable on appeal along with any other claim of error, on a complete record of the testimony, the cross-examination, and the likely effect on the verdict.87 The details of Rule 609 are taught in their own reading, and they, rather than Rule 608(b), decide the fate of a conviction.88