Concept
Reputation and Opinion Testimony
Character for truthfulness
Reputation and Opinion Testimony
Rule 608(a) lets a party attack or support a witness's credibility through another person's testimony about the witness's character for truthfulness, and it names two forms of that proof: reputation and opinion.1 In the first, a character witness tells the jury what the principal witness's community says about the principal witness's honesty. In the second, the character witness gives a personal judgment of that honesty. The rule joins the two with "or," so a party may choose either one, and either one serves for attack and, once an attack has opened the door, for support.2
Both forms are summaries, and the summary is their value. A character witness can state a reputation or an opinion in a sentence, and the opposing party can test its basis on cross-examination without staging a trial over any event in the principal witness's past. Proof built from episodes would work differently, because each episode would need its own evidence and would draw its own dispute about what happened. A reputation or an opinion compresses that history into a short statement and keeps the inquiry within the limits of time and collateral dispute that justify truthfulness evidence in the first place.
This section covers the form and content of the testimony. Whether supporting evidence is admissible at all, the subject of the second sentence of Rule 608(a), belongs to the next section, and specific instances of conduct come after that. Three questions remain here: what a reputation witness must know, what an opinion witness needs and how opinion differs from reputation, and what either form may cover once it is offered.
Reputation Testimony
Reputation testimony works as a relay. The character witness reports what the people around the principal witness say about the principal witness's honesty, and the jury receives that collective judgment from one speaker instead of from everyone who holds it. The character witness need not have seen the principal witness lie or deal honestly with anyone; the witness reports other people's talk. That economy explains why reputation became the traditional vehicle for character proof, and it explains why the rules demand a foundation before the report is heard.
Because the witness repeats what others say, the witness must first show a position to know it. The usual foundation is that the witness has discussed the principal witness's reputation with others, has heard it discussed by others, or has never heard it discussed although the witness would have heard contrary comments had they existed.3 The third route needs care, because silence counts only when the witness stands where talk would have reached the witness. A coworker who sits beside the principal witness every day and has never heard a colleague question that person's honesty can fairly report a good reputation, since doubts about honesty tend to circulate within a group; a stranger's silence proves nothing. The familiarity requirement also keeps reputation from collapsing into private opinion, since a witness with no contact with the community could only voice a personal view under the label of reputation. Requiring a source outside the witness forces the testimony to rest on what others say and gives the opposing party something concrete to test on cross-examination.
The community in which the reputation must exist is defined broadly. The usual question asks about the principal witness's general reputation for truth and veracity in the neighborhood where the principal witness lives, or among those with whom the principal witness works, attends school, or socializes.4 The common law traditionally looked to the community of residence, but in a mobile, largely urban society a person may have no reputation for truthfulness among neighbors at all, so today it suffices that the reputation exists in an associational setting, such as a workplace, in which much the same group of people deal with one another regularly.5 United States v. Mandel illustrates the point, accepting the law office where the principal witness worked as a proper community for proving her reputation for truthfulness.6 A workplace qualifies because daily dealings give coworkers repeated chances to observe honesty and to talk about it, and talk among observers is all that a reputation consists of.
A reputation witness repeats out-of-court talk, which would ordinarily draw a hearsay objection. Rule 803(21) removes that obstacle by admitting reputation among associates or in the community when it is offered to establish character, so the remaining questions concern foundation and form.7 One more requirement completes the foundation: the testimony must relate to the principal witness's reputation at or near the time of trial.8 The jury is deciding whether this person is disposed to tell the truth now. A reputation formed years ago may describe someone who has since changed, or a group the person left long ago, and dated reputation says little about present disposition.
The two witnesses differ in where their knowledge comes from. Ortiz may sincerely believe that Park lies, but a personal belief is opinion, the second form Rule 608(a) allows and the subject of the next subsection; it cannot pass as reputation. Reputation testimony needs a witness like Lindqvist, whose knowledge comes from what a group says.
Once the foundation is in place, the examination is brief and formulaic. The proper procedure is to ask the character witness whether the witness knows the principal witness's general reputation for truth and veracity in the relevant community, and a typical sequence runs as follows:9
Q: Ms. Brandt, do you know Paul Dunn's general reputation for truth and veracity among the people he works with at Halvorsen Supply?
A: I do.
Q: How do you know it?
A: I have worked there six years and have often heard coworkers talk about whether he can be trusted.
Q: What is that reputation?
A: It is bad.
Q: In view of that reputation, would you believe him under oath?
A: No, I would not.
The last question is the standard follow-up. After the witness has stated the reputation, the examiner may ask whether, in view of that reputation, the witness would believe the principal witness under oath.10 The question ties the community's judgment to the issue the jury must decide, which is whether to credit what the principal witness said on the stand. The answers stay short, and the character witness does not recount the episodes behind the reputation, a limit developed below.11 The principal witness also need not be confronted or warned before the character witness testifies, because reputation proof, unlike impeachment by a prior inconsistent statement, requires no such preliminary; only the reputation witness's own familiarity must be shown.12
Opinion Testimony
The second form of proof is testimony in the form of an opinion about the principal witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and here the federal rule departs from the common law.15 Under the traditional practice, an attack on a witness's character for truth had to come as reputation: the character witness could report what the community said but not what the character witness personally thought. The usual defense of that limit was that opinion would breed side disputes about the specific conduct behind it, since the opinion witness could be cross-examined about its basis.16 The danger is real, and trial judges must still hold such disputes within reasonable bounds, but banning opinion to avoid it carried a price.17
Confining the attack to reputation removed much of the objectivity that observation supplies, and it let parties pick character witnesses who, under the guise of reputation, voiced opinions rooted in prejudice and ill will. As Dean McCormick wrote, the hand is that of Esau, but the voice is Jacob's.18 In modern, impersonal urban settings reputation is also often evanescent or nonexistent, so a witness limited to it may have little real community talk to report.19 The Advisory Committee saw the same thing: witnesses who testified to reputation often seemed to be giving their own opinions, disguised somewhat misleadingly as reputation, and courts had already relaxed the old practice by allowing the further question whether the witness would believe the principal witness under oath.20 Rule 608(a) ends the pretense. Witnesses may now be asked directly for their opinion of the principal witness's truthfulness and may answer, for example, that they think the principal witness is a liar, and the opposing party tests that opinion on cross-examination.21
Because an opinion comes from the character witness and not from the community, the foundation shifts from what other people say to what the witness has personally seen. The opinion must be rationally based on the witness's personal knowledge, and that knowledge may come from contact with the principal witness in any part of the principal witness's life, whether at work, in the neighborhood, in a congregation, or in a club.22 No residency requirement applies. The witness must be shown to be familiar with the person about whom the witness is opining, just as a reputation witness must be shown to be familiar with the reputation.23 As with reputation, only the opinion the witness holds at or near the time of trial counts, and an opinion witness may also be asked whether the witness would believe the principal witness under oath.24 Students often import the reputation foundation into opinion testimony. An opinion witness needs no knowledge of community talk, only personal knowledge of the principal witness.
United States v. Lollar shows how readily the rule lets cross-examination, instead of a gatekeeping rule, expose a weak opinion. The defendant had taken the stand, which opens him to attack on his veracity though not on other traits such as violence.25 A former employer, asked whether he would believe the defendant under oath, answered that he would not, and the court held that the trial judge acted within his discretion in admitting the answer over objection.26 The rule, the court observed, imposes no prerequisite of long acquaintance or recent information about the witness; cross-examination can be expected to expose lack of familiarity, reliance on isolated or irrelevant instances of misconduct, and personal hostility toward the principal witness.27 A minimum period of acquaintance would force judges to draw arbitrary lines. Cross-examination instead lets the jury see for itself how thin or how colored the opinion is, and discount it.
That design does not remove the foundation entirely. Length of acquaintance is not the test, but the witness must have enough real contact to have a basis for judging honesty, and a witness with no such basis offers a guess.28
Both witnesses reach the same conclusion, so the difference lies entirely in what each one knows. Once a witness has real contact, the shortness of the acquaintance, the narrowness of the setting, and any grudge go to the weight of the opinion and are tested on cross, as Lollar contemplated. Only a witness with nothing to base an opinion on is shut out.
A decision under Rule 405(a), which governs a criminal defendant's proof of his own character trait and not a witness's truthfulness, shows how courts have lived with the same shift. It is an analogy here, not authority on Rule 608(a). In United States v. Curtis, the majority insisted that reputation and opinion remain analytically distinct. A defendant whose community reputation is bad may still offer opinion, based on personal observation and close association, that his character is good.29 The dissent saw a thinner line. A defendant seeks persons of high standing not because they survey community feeling better than others, but because their appearance on the stand is a personal endorsement of what the accused's reputation is said to be; otherwise the best character witness would be a public opinion pollster.30 Commentary makes the same observation about the persistence of reputation evidence: it persists because it is largely opinion.31 The disagreement concerns how sharply to separate the two forms in cross-examination, and both opinions accept that opinion is now available alongside reputation.
Rule 608(a) refers simply to "opinion" and does not say whether the opinion must be lay or expert.32 That silence supports an argument that a psychiatrist or psychologist could testify to a witness's truthfulness, since other rules distinguish lay from expert opinion when they mean to, but many judges reject the argument.33 Cases permitting expert opinion are rare, and the form the rule contemplates is a lay opinion from a person who knows the principal witness.34 On an exam, treat the character witness as a lay witness with personal knowledge.
Limited to Truthfulness
Rule 608(a) authorizes testimony about a witness's reputation for having a character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and the opinion form attaches to that same character.38 Two limits follow from that wording and from the way courts apply it. The first concerns subject matter: the character witness may address truthfulness and nothing broader. The second concerns detail: on direct examination the character witness states the reputation or the opinion without reciting the specific conduct that produced it. Both limits keep the testimony fastened to the one question the jury must decide, whether the principal witness's account on the stand deserves belief.
Federal practice follows the great majority of courts in confining the inquiry to veracity. Only a few jurisdictions admit reputation for general character or general moral character, and fewer still admit reputation for specific traits other than veracity; Rule 608(a) restricts both opinion and reputation to truthfulness or untruthfulness.39 The Advisory Committee's note says the same thing: the inquiry is strictly limited to character for veracity rather than character generally, which sharpens relevancy, reduces surprise, waste of time, and confusion, and makes the lot of the witness somewhat less unattractive.40
Each of those benefits comes from the same source. The inference behind truthfulness evidence is already thin, because a person's general character trait for truthfulness predicts honesty on a particular occasion poorly.41 A trait that sits further from truthfulness predicts it worse. Dissolute people may be slightly more prone to falsehood than others, but that slight tendency adds little to the jury's judgment of whether this witness is lying today.42 A broad label also carries real costs, because a jury told that a witness is violent or immoral may discount everything the witness says for reasons that have nothing to do with accuracy. The limit therefore works as a relevance filter, admitting the one trait with a plausible connection to lying and excluding the rest. It survives even when the witness is the accused, since a defendant who testifies is open to attack on veracity while evidence that he is violent remains barred by Rule 404.43
The limit applies equally to the supporting side. Once an attack has opened the door, a point the next section develops, a supporting witness may say that Wendy is truthful. Evidence that she is generous or law-abiding does not answer a charge of lying, and the rule speaks only of evidence of truthful character.44
The second limit governs how a character witness backs up the view. The direct examination is ritualistic: counsel lays a foundation showing that a reputation witness is in a position to know the reputation, or that an opinion witness knows the principal witness well enough to hold an informed view, and the character witness then states the reputation or the opinion with little or no elaboration.45 Specific instances of the principal witness's conduct that bear on truthfulness are not admissible on direct examination to support the reputation or opinion witness's testimony.46 A character witness therefore cannot explain that the opinion rests on having been defrauded of a lifetime's savings, and by negative inference cannot testify to having seen the principal witness file a counterfeit form.47
The line shows up clearly on one set of words. A character witness who testifies only that, in his opinion, the principal witness is not a truthful person has given what the rule contemplates. If he adds that he formed the opinion because the principal witness defrauded him of his life savings, he has recited a specific act on direct, and the addition is excluded even though the episode, if true, might say more about honesty than a bare opinion does. A student who treats the foundation as an invitation to narrate episodes has confused two things: the foundation shows how long and in what setting the witness knew the principal witness, and it never requires describing what the principal witness did.
The rule gives up the extra detail on purpose. Observed conduct is arguably the most accurate guide to character, opinion is less accurate, and reputation least accurate.48 Even so, if every character witness could narrate the episodes behind a view, each episode would need its own proof and its own rebuttal, and the principal witness would have to answer a series of mini-trials over events that matter only to credibility. The bare statement costs the jury some detail, but the jury can still weigh the character witness's closeness to the principal witness and the character witness's own credibility, and the opposing party can test the basis on cross-examination. Specific instances are not banned from the trial altogether, since they may be raised in questioning the principal witness, subject to Rule 403, a subject covered in the section on specific instances of conduct.49