Concept
The Defendant's Dilemma
Preemptive introduction and appellate waiver under Ohler
Preemptive Disclosure and Waiver
The Defendant's Dilemma
Suppose Dana is on trial for a federal drug offense and has a prior felony conviction. Before trial, the prosecutor files a motion in limine, asking the judge to rule in advance whether the conviction may be used to impeach Dana if she testifies. Over defense objection, the judge grants the motion under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1). Dana's lawyer now holds an adverse ruling she believes is wrong, and every response to it carries a price.
The price comes from Rule 609(a), which identifies when a witness's prior conviction may be used for impeachment. Since the 1990 amendment, the rule also makes clear that the conviction may be introduced on direct examination.1 The older rule had confined the proof to cross-examination. The circuits, however, had ignored that limit when they needed to let witnesses "remove the sting" of a conviction, and the amendment deleted the limit to match their practice.2 Dana may therefore bring out the conviction herself or leave it for the prosecutor. Her situation is a chain of three decisions, each of which depends on the one before.
The first decision is governed by a rule the Court announced before Ohler: to raise and preserve a claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction, a defendant must testify.4 The rationale is practical. If in limine rulings under Rule 609(a) were reviewable without testimony, almost any error would produce a windfall of automatic reversal, because an appellate court could not call an error harmless when it presumptively kept the defendant from testifying. Requiring the defendant to testify lets the reviewing court measure the effect of any improper impeachment against the whole record. It also discourages motions made solely to "plant" reversible error in case of conviction.5
If Dana does testify, the second decision is a question of timing and presentation. With the ruling in place, the jury is likely to learn of the conviction whichever side raises it. The only choice left is whether Dana says it first, on her own terms, or leaves it to the prosecutor. The first course is the practice the 1990 amendment recognized: a witness who admits the conviction on direct takes the sting out of it.
The third decision is a question of preservation. Appellate courts review; they do not decide cases in the first instance. Absent exceptional circumstances, a party may not raise on appeal an error that it did not first ask the trial court to correct.6 Courts also distinguish waiver from forfeiture. Waiver precludes review. Forfeiture, which occurs by accident, neglect, or inadvertent failure to timely assert a right, still permits correction under the plain-error standard.7 Dana's lawyer neglected nothing, because she objected and lost. The question is whether a deliberate step taken after losing can still cost Dana her appeal.
Ohler answers that question against the defendant who draws the sting. Rule 609(a) itself is silent on whether a party who introduces a conviction on direct examination may later appeal the underlying in limine ruling.8 The Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit conflict on the point. It held that Maria Ohler, against whom the District Court had granted the Government's motion in limine and who then admitted her prior conviction on direct examination, could not challenge that ruling on appeal.9 The reasoning behind that holding, and the arguments the Court rejected, follow in the sections below.