Concept
Religious Beliefs and Rule 610
Bias and interest
Religious Beliefs and Rule 610
A witness’s religion can reach a jury by two different routes. By the first, a lawyer argues that the witness is honest, or dishonest, because of what the witness believes. By the second, a lawyer shows that the witness belongs to a church that is a party to the case and so has a reason to shade the testimony. Rule 610 closes the first route and leaves the second open.1
Which route a lawyer is on depends on the inference the jury is asked to draw, and that inference decides admissibility. The first part of this unit covers the bar: its text, its history, and the reasons the law refuses to rate honesty by belief. The second part covers the bias exception and gives a way to tell which route a given piece of evidence is on.
The Rule 610 Bar
Rule 610 provides that evidence of a witness’s religious beliefs or opinions is not admissible to attack or support the witness’s credibility.2 The rule runs in both directions. A cross-examiner who asks whether the witness believes in a God who punishes perjury and a proponent who announces that the witness is a devout churchgoer make the same forbidden move: they argue from belief to honesty.
The move was once built into the law of witnesses. Under the early common law competency rules, a prospective witness had to believe in a God who would punish untruth before taking the oath.3 That disqualification has been repudiated everywhere, and affirmations are now allowed as an alternative to the oath.4 The requirement arose in a religious climate that has weakened with time, most common law jurisdictions have abandoned it, and the Federal Rules of Evidence do not require belief in God.5
A second question followed. Evidence law has generally converted old grounds of incompetency, such as interest and infamy, into bases for impeaching credibility.6 Should the same conversion apply to nonbelief, so that a witness now free to testify could be impeached by showing that she is an atheist or agnostic who does not believe in divine punishment for perjury? Most courts that took up the question said no, though a few old cases, reasoning from the conversion principle or following the language of a particular statute, seemingly allowed the attack.7 Rule 610 now bars that evidence in federal trials.8
Two reasons support the bar. Inquiry into religious belief is not sufficiently probative of credibility to justify admitting it, given its potential for unfair prejudice.9 And the prejudice is real: religious belief is intensely personal, religious attitudes may evoke strong feelings in jurors, and society tolerates diversity of religious conviction, so the subject brings great risk of prejudice and little prospect of developing anything that helps.10 A juror might wrongly discount a witness who belongs to an unconventional or unusual religion, and Rule 610 guards against that.11
Two decisions show the bar at work, one against a proponent and one against a cross-examiner. In Government of Virgin Islands v. Petersen, a murder trial, the defense tried to establish that the defendant and an alibi witness were Rastafarians who “reject violence.” The court disallowed the effort, because Rule 610 prohibits such testimony when it is used to enhance the witness’s credibility.12 In the other decision, the court cut off inquiry meant to show that a government witness adhered to a sect whose members consult spirits before acting. The witness had testified on voir dire that he faithfully followed the sect’s teaching and consulted with spirits of his religion before acting, but that his belief would not lead him to violate his oath to testify truthfully.13
Rule 603 requires a witness to declare “by oath or affirmation” that he will speak the truth, and a person who objects to an oath must be allowed to commit to the truth by some other means.14 Rule 610 is also a rule of inadmissibility, not a privilege. It prohibits inquiry into religious beliefs or opinions rather than giving the witness a right to refuse questions about them.15 Many states do recognize a privilege not to be examined about one’s own faith, which yields when the judge finds that the relevance of the inquiry to a fact of consequence outweighs the interest in privacy and the danger of prejudice.16 Because the federal bar targets one use of religion, religious evidence may still be admitted for other purposes, such as to show bias where the witness’s church is a party to the litigation.17
The Bias Exception
The Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 610 marks the edge of the bar. The rule forecloses inquiry into a witness’s religious beliefs or opinions to show that their nature affects the witness’s character for truthfulness, but an inquiry to show interest or bias because of them “is not within the prohibition.” Disclosure of affiliation with a church that is a party to the litigation, the Note says, would be allowable.19 The bar is therefore incomplete: religious evidence is admissible when it is logically relevant on a different theory.20
Both the barred use and the permitted use start with a fact about the witness’s religion, and they part ways at the inference the jury is asked to draw. The barred inference runs from the nature of what the witness believes to how honest the witness is. The permitted inference runs from a tie between the witness and a church or religious organization to a motive to favor or disfavor a party. If religious beliefs or membership in a religious organization could be a basis for bias toward or against a party, proof related to religion is proper, because kinship or antipathy is the basis for the claim of relevance.21 The nature of the witness’s beliefs is not offered as a reason to believe the witness. The evidence is offered to show a motive that could affect the witness’s truthfulness, and Rule 610 does not prohibit that use.22
Bias, in general, is the claim that a witness has some motivation to lie, based on a relationship with a party or a stake in the litigation. The relationship may be personal or professional, and the stake may be emotional, moral, or religious.23 Religion fits inside that definition, and Rule 610 permits evidence of it to show bias.24
The Rastafarian alibi case shows the failing side of the line. The defense there sought to establish the witness’s faith because the faith rejects violence, and the evidence was offered to enhance the witness’s credibility. The court held that Rule 610 barred it.25 The inference ran through the content of the belief, which the rule shuts off in support of a witness as well as in attack. A church that is a party stands differently, because evidence of that tie is offered to prove a motive, and truthfulness is never inferred from what anyone believes.
Had the congregation been a stranger to the suit, the same council seat would show nothing about motive in this trial. A stake can also be emotional, moral, or religious, and a witness whose moral or religious beliefs predispose the witness against a party or another witness has a motive of that kind.26 Even then, the proponent has to show the predisposition against a particular party or witness. A showing that the witness is devout, or follows a strict creed, says nothing about whom the witness favors. It sends the jury back to judging honesty by belief, which the bar forbids.
The prison-gang decision supplies a secular parallel. The prosecutor there planned to discredit Mills’s testimony by eliciting that the defendant, Mills, and another inmate, Ehle, were all members of the “Aryan Brotherhood,” a secret prison gang that required its members always to deny the organization’s existence and to commit perjury, theft, and murder on each member’s behalf.27 Common membership in a group that demands false testimony for fellow members gives a witness a motive to slant an account in a member’s favor. Suppose the gang had been a religious order with identical tenets. Rule 610 would not change the analysis, because the argument never depended on what the members believe about the world or whether the creed is true. It ran from shared membership to loyalty to motive, the kinship theory the Advisory Committee preserved. The answer changes only if the argument changes. A proponent who argues that a witness follows a faith whose teachings make believers liars, or who offers a shared faith to vouch for a witness, draws the inference through the nature of the belief, and the bar applies.
The substitution in step three does the real work, though it is a check and not the rule’s language. An argument that works only if the jury assumes something about what believers of a faith are like fails the swap and falls inside the bar. An argument built on loyalty, kinship, or institutional stake keeps its force when the church is replaced by any other organization.