Concept
Why Prior Statements Impeach
Inconsistent statements and conduct
Impeachment by Prior Inconsistency
Why Prior Statements Impeach
A witness who testifies one way at trial after speaking differently before trial is blowing hot and cold, and that vacillation raises doubt about the truthfulness of both statements.1 Proof of a prior inconsistent statement, imprecisely called “self-contradiction” in some accounts, is probably the most frequently employed mode of impeachment, the attack on a witness's credibility.2
Almost always a witness has made earlier statements on the subject of her testimony. When those statements differ from what she says at trial, the attacking party may cross-examine on them and, subject to some conditions, prove them by extrinsic evidence, meaning testimony by other witnesses.3 A skilled cross-examiner can argue that the earlier statement refutes the testimony on the very point in question. The bare inconsistency does not explain why the witness changed her story, so the cross-examiner may also offer theories drawn from the larger setting: bias toward the calling party, a witness who has been bought or frightened off, or a poor memory.4
The intersection case shows the technique at work. Abby sues Burton for property damage and personal injuries after a collision between her maroon station wagon and his blue sedan. To show that Burton ran the light, her lawyer calls Bystander, who saw the accident, and Bystander testifies that the light was green for the station wagon and that the blue car ran a red light.5 On cross-examination, Burton asks about a conversation Bystander had with an insurance adjuster, Charles, three days after the accident: did Bystander say that the blue car had the green light in its favor? Abby objects on hearsay grounds, and Burton answers that he seeks only to impeach the witness, not to offer the statement for its truth.6
Burton is right, and his answer shows what makes the technique work. The statement is useful not because it is true but because it shows that one or both of the statements is false. The light cannot have been both red and green for the blue car when it entered the intersection, so Bystander is uncertain or mistaken about what he perceived.7 The jury need not decide which version is correct. It needs only to see that a witness who has given incompatible accounts of one event is blowing hot and cold.8 The same logic works when both versions are wrong. Suppose a witness testifies that a car was going 70 miles an hour and earlier told police it was going 50, and the car was in fact going 60. The earlier statement still bears on credibility because it conflicts with the testimony. It need not flatly contradict the testimony; being inconsistent with it is enough.9
That feature also answers the hearsay objection. Prior statements of a witness, whether consistent or inconsistent with her present testimony, are not considered offered for their truth, and so are not hearsay, when they are offered only on the issue of credibility.10 Burton's question asks the jury to notice that Bystander changed position, not to accept what he told Charles. The distinction takes care, because every statement of fact also says the speaker thinks the fact is so, and that is why listeners ordinarily take such a statement as proof of the fact.11 The impeachment use depends only on the conflict between the two accounts, not on the earlier statement being believed.
The nonhearsay treatment lasts only as long as the statement is used for impeachment. Unless an earlier statement qualifies for an exemption or exception to the hearsay rule, it cannot be used to prove the truth of what it asserts, and that holds in bench trials as well as jury trials.12 Had Burton offered Bystander's remark to Charles to prove that the light really was green for the blue car, that use would have been hearsay, and absent an exemption or exception the remark could serve only to impeach. The next sections draw that line between impeachment use and substantive use.
That two witnesses differ does not, by itself, mean that either has been impeached.13 Impeachment by specific contradiction is a different technique. It demonstrates that some particular part of a witness's testimony is false and suggests that the jury therefore has reason to disregard the remainder.14 Some writers call it simply impeachment by contradiction, a label best avoided because it is easily confused with impeachment by self-contradiction.15 The reliable way to keep the two apart is to ask what the testimony is being compared with: the witness's own earlier words, which is the subject of Rule 613, or other evidence of what happened.
Rule 613 then supplies the mechanics. Under Rule 613(a), a party examining a witness about the witness's own earlier statement need not show it or disclose its contents to the witness, but must on request show it or disclose its contents to the adverse party's attorney.16 Under Rule 613(b), unless the court orders otherwise, extrinsic evidence of the statement waits until the witness has had an opportunity to explain or deny it and the adverse party has had an opportunity to examine the witness about it.17 Later sections take these requirements up in turn.