Concept
Persons Who Cannot Be Excluded
Exclusion of witnesses
Persons Who Cannot Be Excluded
Rule 615 requires the court to exclude witnesses when a party asks, and the same sentence names the people the rule does not authorize excluding.1 A court that grants the request must first identify who falls outside it.
The text names four exemptions: a party who is a natural person, one officer or employee of a party that is not a natural person, any person whose presence a party shows to be essential to presenting its claim or defense, and a person authorized by statute to be present.2 They rest on different footings, and the footing decides how each is applied. The first two depend on the person's relationship to the lawsuit. The third depends on a showing by the party, so the court does not presume that anyone is essential. The fourth depends on a statute outside the rules of evidence, which supplies the authority to be present.
Each exemption therefore asks the person who wants to stay a different question. Are you a party? Has the party's attorney designated you as its one representative, and are you an officer or employee? Has the party shown that you are essential? Does a statute authorize you to be here? The subsections below take the questions in that order.
Natural-Person Parties
The first exemption is the simplest. The rule does not authorize excluding a party who is a natural person, meaning a human being as opposed to a corporation or a government.3 Party status is the whole test. The exemption for essential persons requires a showing of need,4 but an individual party makes no showing at all, because being a party is enough. When the court grants a request, it sends the other witnesses out and leaves the individual litigants where they sit.
The reason is plainest for the accused in a criminal case, who obviously cannot be excluded from his own trial.5 The Senate Judiciary Committee made a related point when it compared an investigative agent at counsel table to the client beside defense counsel, who always has the client present to consult during trial.6 The rule's text reaches every natural-person party, civil or criminal, and it carves out no exception for a party who will also testify.7
An interest in the outcome does not make a person a party. A crime victim shows the point. The prosecuting authority acts for the public, so the victim is a witness and not a party, and this exemption does not cover the victim.8 Whether such a victim may stay depends on the statutory exemption, taken up below.
The Constitution adds a limit of its own. In Geders v. United States, the trial court barred the defendant from consulting his lawyer during a 17-hour overnight recess between his direct and cross-examinations, and the Supreme Court held that the order violated his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.9 Geders is a constitutional holding and not a reading of Rule 615, but it explains why the exemption has force. A defendant allowed to stay in the courtroom would gain little if the court could then cut him off from counsel to prevent coaching. Judges routinely instruct excluded witnesses not to confer with others about the testimony,10 but that instruction cannot be turned against a defendant's access to his own lawyer.11
The exemption does not remove the worry about tailored testimony, because a party who has heard every other witness can shape his account to fit. The exemption addresses presence in the courtroom, and the order of witnesses stays within the court's control. Rule 611(a) lets the judge control the mode and order of examining witnesses,12 and the commentary raises the possibility of requiring a party to testify early, ahead of the others.13 A judge who fears tailoring can therefore address it through the sequence of proof without excluding anyone.
Entity Representatives
The second exemption covers a party that is not a natural person. The rule does not authorize excluding one officer or employee of such a party if the party's attorney has designated that person as its representative.15 An entity can sit at counsel table only through a person, and the people who know its side of the case are often the people who will testify. Witnesses also do not sort neatly by side, since a direct examiner may need to call a hostile witness,16 so an entity's own employees may be called by its opponent. The exemption gives the entity one seat in the courtroom, which puts it on roughly the footing of an individual party. The Senate Judiciary Committee drew the same comparison when it likened an investigative agent at counsel table to the client beside defense counsel.17 Because the representative stands in for the party, the representative stays even when called as a witness, and the concern about tailored testimony is left to the court's control over the order of witnesses.18
The text sets three limits, and each keeps the exemption from swallowing the rule. The first is numerical: the rule speaks of one officer or employee. Every additional employee who stays hears the testimony and may conform to it, which is the risk exclusion exists to remove. An entity that wants a second person in the courtroom cannot get there through designation; it must qualify that person under another exemption, such as a showing that the person is essential.19 In United States v. Farnham, the Fourth Circuit relied on the “singular phrasing” of the exemption in allowing only one of two FBI agents to remain in the courtroom.20
The second limit is that the representative must be an officer or employee of the party. The designee stands in for the entity, so the person must hold a position within it, and an outsider does not qualify however useful the party finds that person.
The third limit is that the party's attorney must make the designation. Counsel's designation is a deliberate act that tells the court and the opposing side who the representative is. An employee who simply takes a seat in the gallery has not become the party's representative by sitting there. Together the limits give the entity parity with an individual party and nothing more, so it cannot keep every important employee in the room.
The sharpest disagreement arises in criminal cases, where the government is a party that is not a natural person and prosecutors commonly want the investigating agent as its representative. The exemption extends to a government's investigative agent.21 The Senate Judiciary Committee reported that many district courts let government counsel keep such an agent at counsel table although the agent is or may be a witness, because an agent who has lived with a complex case can help counsel meet trial surprises.22 The difficulty is that the case agent is usually a central witness, so the person who hears every other witness is also the person best placed to align an account with what has already been said. The exemption protects presence and does not govern when the agent testifies, so the court keeps its Rule 611(a) power to control the order of witnesses.23
Courts grow wary when the label is loose. In Gustafson v. State, a state court confronted a prosecutor's “investigator,” himself a material witness, who stayed in the courtroom while the other witnesses were excluded. The court saw no way the investigator could qualify under the representative exemption, and it quoted the Senate committee's observation that the government could not often meet the burden of showing that an agent's presence is essential.24 It still suggested that the error might have been harmless, because the investigator testified after only the first State witness and his testimony did not appear to relate to that witness's account.25
The two lines of authority fit together once the text is read closely. The representative exemption protects one person whom counsel designates, and any other claim to presence has to be shown. A prosecutor who wants the case agent in the courtroom stands on firmer ground by designating the agent as the government's representative than by arguing that the agent is essential.
Essential Persons
The third exemption protects “any person whose presence a party shows to be essential to presenting the party's claim or defense.”27 The first two exemptions turn on identity, so a party or its designated representative qualifies without any showing. This one turns on what the party can demonstrate, and the verb shows places the work on the party that wants the person to stay. The court does not presume essentiality, and counsel's assertion that a witness is valuable does not establish it.
Two features of the exemption, the burden on the party and the breadth of the judge's discretion, follow from the rule's structure. A party that asks for exclusion is entitled to it, and an exception that any party could claim for its preferred witnesses would consume that entitlement, since nearly every party regards its own witnesses as helpful. A showing forces the party to name a need, and the party knows best what the person contributes. The judge, who watches the issues, the evidence, and the timing unfold, is best placed to evaluate that need, and courts accordingly give the trial judge wide discretion.28
Experts supply the standard illustration. A person who will testify as an expert may be essential as an aide to counsel, who must understand and answer what the other side's experts say.29 The reason is timing. When counsel lacks familiarity with the field, she may need an expert “at her elbow” during the opposing expert's testimony, because without that help she is handicapped in preparing on the spot for an immediate cross-examination.30 A strong argument can also be made for an expert whose own opinion will rest in part on evidence presented at trial,31 since the conclusion will depend on what the trial evidence turns out to be.
In United States v. Burgess, the Fourth Circuit upheld a ruling that let the psychiatrists for both the prosecution and the defense remain in court despite the exclusion rule.32 Where a party seeks to except an expert from exclusion on the basis that he needs to hear the witnesses' testimony firsthand, the court explained, the choice is within the trial judge's discretion and should not normally be disturbed on appeal.33 The even-handed result, in which both sides' experts stayed, left neither party with an advantage.
Expertise helps a party's showing but does not make it. In Miller v. Universal City Studios, the Fifth Circuit doubted that expertise provides an “automatic basis” for the exemption and suggested that a literary expert in a copyright suit might not qualify.34 The doubt makes sense because the exemption asks what the case requires, and a credential describes the witness and not the need.
Tasty Baking Co. v. NLRB shows the standard working against a party that treated an important witness as an essential one. An employer faced charges before an administrative law judge that two of its managers, Kenney and Britsch, had threatened employees. Its attorney designated the vice president for human resources as its representative, and the judge excluded four other managers, Kenney and Britsch among them. The employer argued that the two accused managers were “essential,” but the D.C. Circuit held that the judge retains considerable discretion in deciding which witnesses are essential under the rule and found no abuse of it.35 The court added that prejudice seemed highly unlikely, because company counsel had been able to prepare both managers and both testified in rebuttal of the General Counsel's witnesses, and the burden of showing prejudice lies on the party claiming injury.36 Designation had secured the company one seat. Any claim to another seat required a showing of essentiality, and the managers' importance lay in what they could say as witnesses, which exclusion left intact, since an excluded witness still testifies when called.
The Senate committee view quoted in Gustafson applies the same burden to the government. An investigative agent's presence may be extremely important to government counsel in a complex or specialized case, yet the committee doubted that the government could often show the presence essential.37 The contrast with the second exemption is instructive. Designation secures a representative's seat without more, while any further case-familiar official must be justified by facts about the trial, and the commentary recognizes that law enforcement officials fully familiar with the case and exhibits may qualify in a suitable case.38
Persons Authorized by Statute
The fourth exemption is the briefest: the rule does not authorize excluding “a person authorized by statute to be present.”40 The first three exemptions turn on who a person is or what the person does for the case, as a party, a designated representative, or someone shown to be essential. This one turns on a law outside the rules of evidence. If a statute authorizes a person's presence, the sequestration order cannot reach that person.
The exemption was added to Rule 615 in 1997 to accommodate federal victims' rights statutes.41 The need for it becomes clear when a victim is tested against the exemptions that precede it. A victim is not a party, because the prosecuting authority, state or federal, acts on behalf of the public and the victim does not appear as a litigant.42 A victim is also not ordinarily an essential person, since that category usually applies to agents and experts.43 Under the first three exemptions, a victim who will testify looks like any other witness and waits in the hallway when the rule is invoked.
The setting the 1997 addition addresses is the victim of the offense charged, whom the prosecution contemplates calling as a witness at a later sentencing hearing.44 Without the exemption, that prospective witness would fall under the exclusion command.
The rule points to statutes and does not spell out when victims may attend, so the exemption has no content of its own. It protects a person whom a statute authorizes to be present, and its reach depends on what that statute authorizes. It gives no one a right to attend by itself.
A common error is to look for a victim's seat in one of the other exemptions, calling the victim a party because the case concerns the victim's injury, or an essential person because the victim is the central figure. Neither label fits, for the reasons above. The correct analysis asks a single question, whether a statute authorizes this person to be present, and treats an emotional stake in the outcome as irrelevant. A witness with no statutory right, like the neighbor in the example, is excluded when a party asks, unless another exemption applies.